Enhancing the implementation of safety engineering systems in oil and gas construction projects in the UAE by Kashwani, Ghanim Abdalla
  
 
 
Enhancing the Implementation of Safety Engineering Systems in Oil and Gas 
Construction Projects in the UAE     
 
Ghanim Abdalla Kashwani, M.Sc. 
Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Heriot-Watt University 
School of Energy, Geoscience, Infrastructure and Society 
 
August 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The copyright of this thesis is owned by the author. Any quotation from the thesis 
or use of any of the information contained in it must acknowledge this thesis as the 
source of the quotation or information. 
 
2 
  
Abstract 
 
Risk assessment is one of the most critical methodologies used in the safety engineering 
system in oil and gas construction projects that require high levels of precaution in construction 
activities such as pilling, materials fabrication, and structure installation. The main purpose of 
risk assessment is to provide full protection to the four main elements that are crucial to the oil 
industry: People, Environment, Assets and Reputation (PEAR). Any failure or defect in the risk 
assessment implementation can potentially lead to catastrophes not only during the construction 
stage but also in the advanced stages such as operation and productions. Historically, in oil and 
gas construction projects many oil spills and blow outs occurred due to lack of efficient risk 
assessment in the construction phase, resulting in financial loss and human capitals. The aim of 
this research is to enhance the implementation of safety engineering systems in the oil and gas 
industry construction projects through risk assessment application in the UAE. Firstly, the aim is 
achieved via conducting a questionnaire to determine the current defects in the risk assessment 
applied methodology in the safety engineering system. Secondly, interviews are conducted with 
safety construction professionals to examine top risk factors in UAE oil and gas construction 
projects. After that, a framework to enhance the application of risk assessment and optimize 
safety engineering system is proposed based on the results found during the questionnaire and 
interviews phases. Finally, qualitative and quantitative validation of the proposed framework is 
applied to strengthen its feasibility and mechanism. This research study contributes to 
construction safety knowledge by studying behavioral safety performance and its critical role in 
risk assessment implementation. The main outcomes of this research study expose a gap in the 
understanding and the practices of risk assessment methods between management and workers, 
especially with regard to human factors effects on safety performance. In addition, this study 
recommends using proactive KPIs to measure the safety culture in the construction site in which 
it gives the chance to conduct early correction actions before the occurrence of the incidents.     
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Chapter 1: Background 
 
 
1.1. Introduction  
 
Construction is a very dynamic and complex industry, facing numerous challenges. 
According to Reyes et al. (2014), Health and Safety (HS) concept can play a vital role in 
preventing and mitigating all critical risk factors and this only can be achieved by ensuring the 
implementation of HS matters in the whole construction project life cycle. Reyes et al., believe 
that construction industry has a high accident rate compared to other industries due to the 
complexity of construction factors, possessing a social, human and economic dimension. Haslam 
et al. (2005) provide examples of these dimensions, listing inadequate training, large number of 
subcontractors, lack of proactive culture, and an inadequate risk assessment. Haslam claims that 
these negative factors can be prevented and controlled in the design phase before they escalate 
and affect the whole project. This can be achieved through accurate hazards identification 
techniques such as Task Risk assessment (TRA), Hazard Identification (HAZID), and Hazard 
and Operability Study (HAZOP). Cheng et al., (2012), however, suggests that all HS matters in 
the organization can be addressed and implemented effectively if there is a specific system such 
as Health, Safety and Environmental Management System (HSE-MS). Cheng et al., explain that 
in any construction project, safety engineering system has become critical to construction due to 
the legislative and regulatory requirements in the country along with the company‘s reputation 
and social responsibility. 
Usually in construction and operations sites, a multitude of safety problems occur 
frequently each year, leading to personal injury and may permanently affect employee‘s long-
term health (Young & Yonghua, 2004). In order to improve safety engineering system and 
reduce accidents as well as personnel injuries, HSE-MS must be constantly improved at 
construction sites. HSE-MS in construction sites ideally should contain the concepts and 
principles that are used in the development and management of an effective HSE program. The 
HSE-MS plan should be continuously improved with particular emphasis on organizational 
accident prevention in construction sites (Mikkelsen et al. 2004). For example, special attention 
15 
  
should be given to elements such as morale influence, education and training, the role of the 
supervisor, inspections, auditing, policies and risk assessment. 
Coble et al., (2000) mention that risk assessment is one of the most vital elements in 
addressing all the HS engineering matters of the construction building project life cycle where 
internal factors can have direct influence on the risk assessment implementations. Internal factors 
that may affect the risk assessment implementation in the construction company are insufficient 
communication, perceived budge viability and production/time pressure. Coble et al., propose 
best management practices that are mostly related to management leadership which can increase 
the awareness level internally at construction organization. In the end of their research, the 
authors encourage researchers to study the effects of external factors such as new technologies 
and their effect on the risk assessment implementation in the construction building projects.  
 
1.2. The history of safety engineering system in oil and gas construction 
projects 
 
The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) recognizes the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) as one of the leading countries in the oil and gas industry in the Middle East and 
the world where it owns around 10% of the world‘s total crude oil reserves (OPEC, 2016). 
According to OPEC‘s annual statistical report in 2016, the crude oil export rate for UAE is 2.9 
million barrels per day (b/d) where the production rate of the onshore oil and gas construction 
rigs is around 1.8 million (b/d). UAE is ranked as the fourth largest gas reserves country in the 
world for the gas production after Russia, Iran, and Qatar (Salama et al., 2008). The oil and gas 
industry in UAE witnesses a continuous improvement and development in the production rate as 
shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Crude Oil production for UAE (OPEC, 2016). 
Year Production rate Million (b/d) 
1984 1.0 
1986 1.1 
1989 1.6 
1990 1.8 
1991 2.0 
1998 2.2 
2016 2.9 
 
According to Salama et al., (2008), the efficiency of the oil and gas construction projects 
from 1980 until the present time plays a vital role in enhancing the production rate. The oil and 
gas construction projects in UAE are divided into three main categories; onshore, offshore and 
pipelines where around 90% of these construction projects are located in onshore fields. There 
are several activities that can take place at the constructions sites including but not limited to 
materials fabrication, structure installation, etc., which are performed at the required phases (e.g. 
exploration or production). All these construction activities are associated with serious hazards 
such as working at height and dropping objects due to the hydrocarbon materials existence. For 
instance, fire, explosion, and blow out can be critical hazards that can lead to fatalities.  
Oil and gas construction projects have witnessed many historical catastrophes that 
eventually laid the groundwork for professional practices to the industry (Davies, 2010). These 
serious safety failures increased the oil and gas construction world awareness towards safety 
implementation in the construction activities such as structure installation, foundation pilling, 
and materials fabrication. This is due to the different economic and environment loss that oil and 
gas construction industry suffered due to these accidents. According to Cohen, (1995) financial 
damages in oil and gas construction can have a major impact on the company's profit profile 
since these damages link directly with decrease in production and downtime losses. For the 
environment damages, Ronza et al., (2009) believe that oil and chemical spills are the main 
environmental threats in the oil and gas construction projects damaging vital ecological elements 
such as soil, natural habitat, and marine life. Surprisingly, Ronza et al., mention that the oil and 
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gas construction companies often fail to comply with environmental performance until the 
regulatory authorities like Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) start imposing penalties and 
fines. These legal penalties presented the wake- up call to the whole oil and gas industry to adopt 
proper methods to control hazards at construction sites. As a result, the oil and gas construction 
industry adopted risk assessment methods from other industries so as to ensure efficient control 
and mitigation process (Aven, 2009). 
 
1.3. The history of risk assessment in oil and gas construction projects 
 
The oil and gas construction projects pose high risks to both staff and workers if 
appropriate controls are not in place. Hence it is important to use risk assessment in the safety 
system to mitigate the possible hazards that exist in the work environment. UAE is one of the 
leading countries in the oil and gas construction projects in the Middle East and the world. UAE 
companies in oil and gas construction projects use very advanced risk assessment applications in 
their safety engineering systems as shown in Table 2: 
 
Table 2: Risk assessments that are used in oil and gas construction rigs in UAE. 
Risk Assessment and Management Procedures 
 
Health, Safety and Environment Impact Assessment (HSEIA) 
 
Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Assessment (EERA) 
 
Hazard Identification (HAZID) 
 
Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Study 
 
Qualitative Risk Assessment (QLRA) 
 
Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH) 
 
Major Accident  Hazard Analysis (Bowtie Analysis) 
 
Manual  of Permitted Operations (MOPO) 
 
Occupational Health Risk Assessment (OHRA) 
 
Task Risk Assessment (TRA) 
 
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) 
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Unfortunately, risk assessment applications in safety engineering systems have been 
developed after numerous serious incidents where inadequate poor communication in the 
construction phase was the root cause for these incidents. According to Davies (2010), many of 
these serious incidents occurred in the operation phase that could have been controlled had the 
risk assessment been effectively implemented in the construction stage. 
 Alexander L. Kielland capsize (North Sea, 1980) 
Due to fatigue cracks that caused major collapses in the bracing members of the rig 
structure, 123 workers were killed in this fatal accident. According to Moan, (2007), the 
main technical failure that lead to this huge accident occurred in the design phase where 
load distributing was not measured correctly thereby it affecting the welding mechanism. 
In addition, the author believes that escape and evacuation process were not carried out 
efffectively due to the poor emergency preparedness and limited access. For example, 
there was only one life boat that was launched to safe more than 80 workers.  
 Ixtoc I. Blowout (Gulf of Mexico, 1979) 
Boehm and Fiest, (1982) consider Ixtoc I. Blowout disaster to be one of the historical 
spills in the oil and gas construction industry. It caused a massive contamination area 
(180 km x 80 km) due to a well control issue during the operation. It is clear that there 
was no equivalent point between hydrostatic and formation pressures where the increase 
in the formation pressure generated a fluid kick that later developed into a blowout. 
According to the authors, technical failures in the well head design affected Blow Out 
Preventer (BOP) function and led to loss control of the well. As result, around 3.5 million 
barrels of oil spilled into the Gulf of Mexico. 
 Piper Alpha Explosion (North Sea, 1988) 
Davies (2010) mentions that Piper Alpha accident is considered one of the most famous 
fatal accidents in the oil and gas business industry. 167 workers lost their lives in this 
tragedy due to the removal of a safety valve from a compressor, resulting in a gas leak 
which caused a major fire. However, Davies believes that apart from this active failure 
(direct cause), other technical, procedural and behavioral causes played a critical role in 
escalating this catastrophe. The following point represents the latent failures as 
mentioned in American Petroleum Institute (The Lessons of Piper Alpha, 2009): 
1. Lack of effective communication between crew member (behavioral)  
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2. Not applying Permit to Work system (PTW) adequately (procedural) 
3. Continued pumping of gas and oil by the Tartan and Claymore platforms (Technical) 
4. Poor emergency plan  
 
 Deepwater Horizon Blow Out (Gulf of Mexico, 2010) 
11 workers were killed and more than 4 million barrels of crude oil was spilled in Gulf of 
Mexico due this huge blowout. According to Rathnayaka et al. (2013), the main technical 
failure that led to this catastrophe was inadequate cementing in the completion phase that 
marred the well control process. It is clear that, due to the poor quality of cementing in 
the down hole during construction and high formation pressure, hydrocarbons were 
released and reached all the way to the drilling column causing an explosion where it was 
hard to control the kick by BOP because of the its high volume. In addition, the authors 
state that other invitation reports indicated safety management failures such as leadership, 
communication and managing resources were classified as root causes for this fatal 
accident.  
In oil and gas construction projects, any failure in the risk assessment could lead to major 
catastrophes (Hauge et al. 2014, Elshorbagy et al. 2008, Shahriiar et al. 2012). Risk assessment 
examines closely all the activities that may take place in the oil and gas construction projects. 
The main purpose of risk assessment is to provide full protection to the four main elements that 
are of utmost importance to the company i.e. People, Environment, Assets and Reputation 
(PEAR) from any harm in the work place (Aven & Vinnem, 2007) as shown in Fig. 1. 
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Figure 1: Risk Assessment seeks to improve the four (PEAR) elements. 
 
The history of risk assessment started with the insurance companies that are associated 
with The Industrial Revolution, which took place from the 18
th 
to 19
th
 centuries, in different 
businesses (American Bureau of Shipping, 2000). When large capital investments were made in 
the industrial business, it was necessary to understand, manage, control and calculate the risk. In 
the beginning of 1980, EPA required a worst environmental scenario description in the 
application for the entities who are applying for the environmental permit. After that, other 
agencies started to implement the concept of risk assessment. For example, the Minerals 
Management Service (MMS) in United States 1982 had developed the environmental and safety 
regulations for offshore oil and gas industry (Scarlett et al. 2011). Soon after, the awareness of 
the importance of risk assessment increased in the industrial businesses, especially in the oil and 
gas industry due to its association with multiples hazards. 
In the beginning, the concept of risk assessment pertained to be more perspective based 
regulation and then developed to performance based regulation. It is clear that, in perspective 
regulation, the assessment of risk will be more in terms of equipment and the technologies used 
in the event without defining and analyzing the risk itself, which is the case of risk based on 
performance regulation. The risk based on performance regulation has evident role in 
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controlling, analyzing and mitigating the risks. For instance, when the risk assessment is 
developed, most of the risk assessment techniques classify the risk based on its severity and 
frequency and then they propose mitigation plans to control the hazards.  
Unfortunately, usually the development of risk assessment in oil and gas field comes after 
the occurrence of serious incidents. For example, following the Alexander Kielland accident in 
the Norwegian offshore rig in 1980, the petroleum authorities in Norway required that risk 
assessment had to have risks with a probability higher than once every 10,000 years (Norwegian 
Petroleum Directorate,1989). This is very similar to other real incidents in which the main lesson 
learned was to strengthen risk assessment, thus enabling risk assessment to take a major role in 
every oil and gas construction company regulations. This demonstrates the growth of risk 
assessment from usage as method to a mandatory regulation to any hydrocarbon operating 
facility. 
This development leads to have an advanced risk assessment in the oil and gas 
construction companies whether they are contractor or construction companies. It is clear that 
risk assessment and management formed the most important element in the HSE management 
system where all other HSE elements should work in favor of risk assessment and management 
element (Aven & Vineem, 2007). As such, risk assessment is involved in almost every activity in 
oil and gas construction projects. For example, risk assessment should be used in planning, 
designing, piling, structure installation, and waste management. This variety of risk assessment 
usage provides engineers and planners the chance to use risk assessment in different techniques 
and methods. For instance, a number of technical methods (qualitative and quantitative) have 
been used for risk assessment  in oil and gas construction rigs such as Failure Mode and Effect 
Analysis (FMEA), Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and 
Event Tree Analysis (ETA) (Khan & Abasi, 2001). All these methods cover the basic concept of 
risk assessment which is to have a systematic way to predict and prevent unwanted events during 
oil and gas construction projects. 
1.4. Rationale 
 
According to experts in oil and gas construction projects and in reference to previous 
accidents in other hydrocarbon fields, the possible causes of accidents are analyzed by first 
identifying the root causes of the accidents through risk assessment. Root cause analysis through 
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risk assessment provides a great learning opportunity so as to continuously improve the HSE 
management by examining what went wrong (ISO, 2008). The development of risk assessment  
helps reduce the serious incidents that occurred in the oil and gas industry such as blow outs, 
pipe leaks, and toxic gases release in which most of risk assessment that are currently in the oil 
and gas industry cover the following aspects (Vinnem, 1998): 
 Estimation of risk acceptance criteria 
 Determining design loads and conditions 
 Understanding of hazards causation and potential escalation pathways 
 Ranking of hazards according to risk potential 
 Providing emergency plans and responses 
This positive impact of the risk assessment has a global effect in the international oil and 
gas construction rigs whether onshore or offshore as shown in Fig. 2 which is taken from The 
International Association of Oil & Gas Producers report, (OGP, 2011). 
 
 
Figure 2: (TRIR) – Companies (owners) and contractors (service providers) 2001-2010 (OGP, 2011). 
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Fig. 2 shows all Total Recordable Injury Rate (TRIR) for all international oil and gas 
construction companies (owners or contractors) between 2001 and 2010, clearly emphasizing the 
huge improvement in safety performance. It is clear that, the overall TRIR was 1.75 in 2009. 
This is a 64% improvement compared with 2001, where the TRIR was 4.90. Also, Fig. 2 
displays how oil contractor companies have a higher number of accidents than owner or 
construction companies. 
As explained earlier, the risk assessment has strengthened gradually over time; 
concurrently the HSE performance for the oil and gas construction companies also has 
undergone gradual enhancement globally. Table 3 shows the Lost Time Injury Frequency (LTIF) 
record for the oil and gas construction companies in each region from 2006 to 2010. As shown in 
the table, the Middle East has the best LTIF record compared to other regional areas. 
 
Table 3: LTI records from 2006-2010 (OGP, 2011). 
 
 
The numbers shown in Table 3 indicate that safety performance has improved between 
2006 and 2010 in the entire world and that risk assessment is functioning in an effective manner. 
Other statistics, however, show risk assessment implementation issues at which problem still 
exists in the safety engineering system. For example, in 2010, OGP, (2011) report mentions that 
the top 10 casual factors that assigned to fatal incident were related to risk assessment and its 
implementation such as inadequate, communication, training, competence, hazard identification 
and supervision. 
Risk assessment implementation is not a new challenge for the safety engineering system 
in the oil and gas industry, where many famous cases studies of failed risk assessment  result 
from a lack of risk assessment  implementation. For example, the Control of Major Accident 
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Hazards (COMAH) report by HSE 2011 mentions that the root cause of the 2005 Buncfiled 
explosion (Oil storage) in Hertfordshire Oil Storage Terminal was the lack of the safety 
implementation in the construction design stage. The report mentions that the safety 
implementation measures that should be taken were fuel escaping safety measures. This would 
have helped prevent escape of flammable vapour and stop pollutants from poisoning the 
environment. Moreover, the report mentions the following points to cover the gap in safety/risk 
assessment implementation:  
 Safety management was not conducted for critical equipment 
 Working hours load on the staff was high and employee welfare should be considered 
 Poor communication between designers and suppliers in the usage of the critical 
equipment 
 Environmental response plan was not in place as it is recorded in the emergency plan 
 Visibility and leadership were not presented and implemented in an effective way in the 
safety management  
When one examines the investigation report, it appears that the risk assessment 
implementation issues impact not only the construction stage but also primary stages like policy 
setting, planning, committed leadership development, and visibility of the company. It is clear 
that, risk assessment implementation may not be so visible in these stages but it poses a direct 
connection with operational implementation. For example, high profile management 
involvement in the safety activities should appear in the following safety events; meetings, 
awareness campaigns, audits, and inspections. This will set a good example for the operation 
employees (end-users) to place safety on the top of their priorities when performing their jobs. 
There are statistics showing that the UAE oil and gas construction rigs face the same 
challenges towards risk assessment implementation. Al Kurdi (2008) believes that the first 
reason behind incidents in oil and gas construction in UAE is due to the lack of safety 
engineering implementation. Al Kurdi believes that there is a necessity to provide an integrated 
framework that can enhance the implementation mechanism. Fig. 3 presents numbers supporting 
Al Kurdi assumption that the poor implementation of risk assessment and its elements are the 
main reason for incidents in all oil and gas construction projects in the UAE (ADCO, 2012). 
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Figure 3: Incident Root Cause Types (ADCO, 2012). 
The conclusions made above regarding poor implementation of risk assessment as the 
main reason for many incidents indicates that the UAE oil and gas construction are facing 
difficulties in risk assessment implementation in the same way as many other oil and gas 
industry countries suffer. This leads to many questions that require answers on how the current 
risk assessment is used in the oil and gas construction rigs. For instance: why do other 
international oil countries have good safety performance but UAE‘s oil and gas construction 
have issues in safety performance even though they share the same risk assessment? Are there 
defects in the current process that need to be solved in the risk assessment? What are the 
challenges that risk assessment face in UAE oil and gas construction projects? 
1.5. Significance of the study  
 
Risk assessment implementation poses a multi-pronged issue, such as technical, 
procedural and behavioral. In the studies that have been conducted on the risk assessment for oil 
and gas construction rigs, it can be inferred that these studies aim to enhance the effectiveness 
risk assessment by creating numerical or algorithm models using the quantitative or qualitative 
risk assessment. Upon review of the literature on risk assessment, it can be concluded that 
previous studies focused on the mechanism of the risk assessment and hazard identification that 
are used in the oil and gas industry such as FTA, HAZOP, and EIA. The implementation 
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problem contains different aspects and in the literature reviews there is no specific study that 
focuses on the risk assessment implementation problem directly. Thus, to answer the question 
why people do not implement the safety rules that come from risk assessment, different factors 
should be analyzed in the risk assessment structures and how the system is very closely linked. 
In addition, during this study the relationship between human factors and safety 
engineering system will be highlighted. For example, human factors have a major effect on the 
risk assessment implementation because it is linked to the individual behavioral safety that 
interacts with work environment, technical and procedural processes in the construction stage. 
According to Gordon et al. (2005) there are possible threats to human factor that need to be 
covered during the evaluating the performance of human factors towards safety. Gordon et al., 
explains that the threats are related to factors that affect the individual behavioral safety such as 
organizational safety culture, safety leadership, competence and training where these factors can 
show the reliability of human factors on risk assessment methods. 
 
1.6. Aim and objectives  
 
The aim of this research is to enhance the implementation of safety engineering systems 
in the oil and gas industry construction projects through risk assessment application in the UAE. 
This aim will be achieved through evaluating the following three objectives:  
Objective 1: Evaluating the current defects in the risk assessment as a method used in the 
safety engineering system.  
Objective 2: Examining top risk factors in UAE oil and gas construction projects.  
Objective 3: Developing a framework to enhance the application of risk assessment for 
optimizing safety-engineering system.  
Objective 4: Validating the developed framework through industry professionals 
feedback. 
The goal of the first object is to expose the current issues that face the risk assessment in 
the oil and gas construction. This objective will help identify the different types of general 
concerns that may affect the performance and mechanism of the risk assessment implementation. 
This evaluation will cover all the possible affecting factors that come from different areas such 
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as technical, procedural, and behavioral. For example, the technical side will be evaluated 
through assessing the below elements of risk evaluation process and approaches with respect to 
risk assessment implementation; risk identification, risk analysis, and risk control. In this part of 
evaluation, it is vital to evaluate the integrity of the risk assessment process where this evaluation 
would help determine and understand the efficiency level of the methods, either quantitative or 
qualitative, that are employed in each process in risk assessment and how control measures are 
applied. Additionally, the relationship between risk assessment elements will be examined to aid 
in forming a generic idea about the key mechanism of how hazards and risks are assessed and 
managed from the identification stage to the treatment stage. Furthermore, risk controls 
techniques such as engineering controls and administration controls will be examined. This will 
help identify the factors (whether technical or procedural) that are taken into account when 
selecting risks controls and how they affect the safe systems of work elements; materials, people 
equipment, and environment. This objective will help answer the following questions: what risk 
identification and analysis stages methods are used? What are the gaps in the risk assessment for 
oil construction? Moreover this objective will be evaluated through examining the five human 
factors listed below that affect the risk assessment implementation: 
 Behavioral safety 
 Educational and social barriers 
 Organizational safety culture 
 Employee welfare 
 Leadership culture. 
For the second objective, evaluating risk factors such as safety legislation, level of 
compliance, improper design, communication, budget, lack of resources, etc., can provide an 
integrated understanding and of risk assessment framework usage in UAE oil and gas 
construction. However, in this research work only the top risk factors will be examined to gain a 
specific scope of the major risk factors in oil and gas construction projects.  
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Figure 4: Top Risk Factors in UAE oil and gas construction projects. 
According to El Sayegh, (2008), the significant risk factors in construction projects in 
UAE can be divided into two areas: safety legislations and human factors where both the owners 
and contractors have common risk factors during the construction activities. This research aims 
to cover these three areas from two perspectives: safety legislations and human factors as shown 
in Fig. 4. 
Studying safety regulations and legislations result in a better understanding of risk 
assessment policy, features, and guidelines and that help identify any defects affecting the 
implementation mechanism from the legal aspect. Moreover, this research focuses more on risk 
assessment planning and monitoring. In this stage, it is important to see how risk assessment is 
involved in the business plan of the oil and gas construction companies. Equally important is to 
examine how these companies use their recourses towards risk assessment and what methods are 
used to monitor the safety performance, whether in the proactive or reactive stage. In addition 
this research strives to explore the mechanism of risk communication, and its accessibility, 
delivery methods and how this affects the implementation of risk assessment. This would help 
evaluate the importance of risk communication role in enforcing risk regulations in UAE oil and 
gas construction. 
The last part in this objective is to examine risk acceptance criteria used in UAE oil and 
gas construction. Risk acceptance criteria strive to answer the question of how safe is safe 
enough, where as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) principle is extensively used to decide 
whether to accept the risk or mitigate it. This usually occurs in the risk analysis step, aiding the 
understanding of how oil and gas construction companies are using acceptability and tolerability 
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risk concepts in their acceptance criteria regulations and how financial factors (e.g. cost benefits 
analysis) can affect this process. Moreover in this objective, the research strives to identify and 
analyze the external and internal factors that affect the level of compliance towards regulations in 
the organization such as inadequate auditing and inspection, weak enforcement of local 
authorities and poor safety performance contractors. 
1.7. Contribution to knowledge  
 
The weakness in the implementation of safety system can be related to the inadequate 
risk assessment. The scenario of faulty implementation of risk assessment might be due to the 
organizational culture that affects the safety behavior of the employee. There are various 
scenarios and assumptions in theory but which ultimately fail in deciphering the real cause and 
effect of the implementation problem for oil and gas construction projects. Risk assessment 
implementation problem in the oil and gas industry can cause a lot of financial and human 
capitals loss internationally. Although the UAE oil and gas construction rigs have an improved 
safety performance system, UAE oil and gas construction rigs are facing risk assessment 
implementation problem like other oil countries in the world. To solve this issue, a specific and 
focused study should be carried out to identify the root causes. Many scholars try to analyze the 
implementation problem in the oil and gas industry and other heavy industries through different 
aspects, such as risk assessment, risk regulations, risk planning, and human error analysis. 
However, there is lack of integrated studies that evaluate the relationship between these elements 
and their effects on the risk assessment implementation in the Gulf area. Enhancing the risk 
assessment implementation will allow a better safety performance and culture in the UAE oil and 
gas construction rigs where human lives will be saved in addition to saving costs and adding 
monetary value to the oil and gas industry. 
Studying behavioral safety and its role in risk assessment implementation is critical for 
the organizational safety performance as people are considered the most important resource for 
any organization. Most of the study that was conducted to determine the efficiency of the risk 
assessments focus only in the technical and procedural aspects without considering                       
the behavioral feature. This research study will try to fill this gap by studying and analyzing the 
effects of technical, procedural and behavioral impact on the risk assessment method for all the 
employees in the organization. For instance, safety is not only meant for the end-user safety 
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behavior at the operation stage, usually the scope is broader when senior management is 
involved. This will help determine the personal factors and the behavioral safety for all 
employees from management to end-user level. However, individual behavioral safety is directly 
affected by the cultural and educational factors. As such, this research aims to evaluate the 
educational level for the end-users and this will provide a general understanding an idea about 
the labourers awareness and knowledge towards safety. Nevertheless, determining the 
educational level is not enough for a full understanding of the individual behavior safety as the 
individual cultural safety should be examined alongside the educational level. Moreover, this 
research aims to evaluate organizational safety culture of oil and gas construction companies in 
the oil and gas construction rigs. Additionally, it strives to assess how organizational culture 
affects the safety behavior of the labourers in the construction stage. Moreover, employee 
welfare will be examined to observe how employees deal with mental and physical stress faced 
in their work place and how the management can demonstrate their leadership, commitment and 
visibility towards safety culture. 
1.8. Summary of the chapter  
 
One of the objectives of this study is to develop a framework for implementing risk 
assessment in UAE oil and gas construction rigs. The framework will cover three aspects: 
technical, procedural and behavioral. This framework will highlight the defects that influence the 
implementation of risk assessment in the oil and gas industry. The concept of this framework 
will rely on the results of the pervious objectives where it will consider the employees from the 
management to the operation level.  
The framework will propose solutions and recommendations to fill the current gaps that 
affect the implementation of risk assessment in the safety management. This will also support 
King‘s (1990) opinion that developing an updated safety framework from time to time in any 
critical industries would help learn from the previous mistakes, prepare for the current challenges 
and enhance the safety management performance for the future. The goal of this framework is to 
provide an integrated examination and suitable decision-making mechanism that leads to 
effective preparations and control methods for all the potential risks in different activities at the 
oil and gas construction industry in UAE. 
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Accidents and incidents can happen anytime during the construction process. Proper and 
adequate risk assessment can contain the number of accidents and may even remedy major HSE 
related problems. Without adequate risk assessment implementation, reactive accident response 
may be used rather than preventive planning. This may usually increase the cost related to 
response measures, delay the optimum response implementation and may even lead to expansion 
of the accident or the problem in hand. It is clear that, even if there is a good risk assessment and 
HSE performance in theory, there are some difficulties in the implementation which may cause 
unexpected accidents that affect all the safety business plans and the recovery process and may 
cost a lot of time and money for the company. Therefore, there is no guarantee for the 
improvement that is caused by risk assessment if there is no implementation. 
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Chapter 2: The current defects in the oil and gas construction projects 
risk assessment 
 
2.1. Introduction  
 
Safety engineering system is an integrated system in which all its processes are connected 
together in some way. According to Kaplan (1991), it can be agreed that risk assessment is the 
most vital in the safety engineering system process where the decision-making step is usually 
related with the findings of the risk assessment. To clarify, the process sequence of risk 
assessment is to identify, assess the potential hazard, implement the controls, whether 
engineering controls or administration controls, and then apply the recovery plan. Therefore, risk 
assessment process can be divided into four main actions: identify, assess, control and recover 
where these actions are directly related and can be highly affected by external and internal 
factors (ISO, 2008). For example, in risk identification stage, if the collected information about 
the hazard is not accurate and enough, a faulty analysis may be conducted in the risk analysis 
stage resulting in a lack of implementation towards risk assessment (HSE, 2001). According to 
Aven & Vineem (2007), even with risk assessment development there are many potential 
accidents in the oil and gas industry due to the implementation problem that leads to an 
inadequate risk assessment. In order to reduce and control these likelihoods, risk assessment 
should be implemented in a professional manner. Many scholars believe that the inadequacy of 
risk assessment could be due to the deficiency in risk assessment process elements. 
Risk and hazard identification is the first step in the risk assessment process that is used 
in the oil and gas industry to identify the possible hazards that may be associated with a certain 
job. Schroeder and Kaclson (2007) mention that risk identification is the most important step in 
the risk assessment process in the oil and gas sector, because adequate risk identification 
generally includes; lesson learned, current status of risk assessment methods and HSE plan. The 
main goal of risk and hazard identification is to expose all the hidden hazards and provide a first 
response or mitigation plan to control the potential risks. The importance of risk identification 
lies within the way of its implementation that affects the next process in risk assessment. This is 
due to the fact that risk identification findings represent the first inputs for the whole risk 
assessment process. 
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2.2. Evaluation of technical challenges and defects in the risk assessment  
 
Reviews and analyses of the lesson learned, current status of risk assessment and HSE 
plan in the risk identification stage would help in obtaining a better risk breakdown structure and 
that will strengthen risk identification implementation. Risk categories that are used in the oil 
and gas industry are; technical support, procurement and materials, startup & operations, field 
execution & logistics and organization and communications (Kerzner, 2003). 
Kerzner explains that the inadequate risk identification in these categories will lead to 
weakness in applying risk assessment in the construction stage. As such, many oil and gas 
construction companies make sure to conduct Task Risk assessment (TRA) for any coming 
project. In (TRA) mechanism, the hazards are identified for different phases of the project and 
preliminary prevention plans or control measures are provided accordingly which lead to more 
accurate implementation (Yong & Mannan, 2010). There are number of methods and approaches 
that used for risk identification other than the TRA such as HAZID, HAZOP, and etc, but 
according to Chapman (2001), any method is used for risk identification purposes should include 
5 important steps to be effective and implementable. Chapman suggests that the effective risk 
and hazard identification process should include the following steps: 
 Knowledge-acquisition 
In this step, the overall objectives for the project should be reviewed with respect to the 
project parameters such as cost, timeline and planning. Moreover, an integrated 
assessment and examination for the general hazards that threat the project should be 
identified and discussed. 
 Selection of the representatives team 
Hidden hazard is one of the main threats that affect risk identification mechanism in 
implementing risk assessment goals. To avoid that, Chapman (2001) believes that the 
team who participate in the identification and assessment of the risks facing the project 
should have people from the core business such as construction people where this will 
help expose hazards that are hidden to the senior management and engineers working in 
the offices.  
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 Presentation of the project process 
Chapman says that it is necessary for risk identification members to go over the project 
process to increase their awareness about the project which will develop their ability to 
identify the hazards for each phase of the project. 
 Identification 
According to Wideman (1986), the identification step is more like breakdown process 
where each has its own way and system for utilizing the identification concept. However, 
the author says that for each method there are limitations that may determine how 
suitable the method is in regard to a certain activity in the project. Therefore, it is 
important from the representative team to have full knowledge about the capabilities of 
the used risk identification.  
 Encoding 
The aim of this step is to register the potential risks and classify them in a qualitative 
manner.  
 Verification 
Verification is used to obtain the assessment acceptance from the representative team 
towards risks and their sources, and the likelihood of occurrence and impact.  
Risk identification is not only about answering the questions of when, where, why, and 
how, the risk may be identified, one needs to determine risk factors, risk probabilities, 
and providing preliminary risk response plan which would result in having a better 
implementation of risk identification in the field (Eskesen & Tengborg, 2004). 
Moreover, ISO 17776, (2000), that is tailored for the Petroleum and natural gas 
industries, includes guidelines on tools and techniques for hazard identification and risk 
assessment, as well as the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS, 1992), both recommend 
the following risk identification methodologies: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA), Hazard and 
Operability Study (HAZOP), Hazard Identification check list (HAZID), Environmental Issues 
Identification (ENVID) and ―what if‖ analysis. 
According to Hubbard (2009), risk matrix is usually used in the risk identification stage 
in the oil and gas industry where it could take different input shape such as 3x3 table, 5x5 table, 
or even more where severity (consequence) and frequency (likelihood) are used as parameters to 
determine the level and intensity of the risk as shown in Fig. 5. According to the author that the 
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implementation problem in risk identification occurs when the wrong estimation in the 
consequence or likelihood is made. However, Sharhriar et al., (2011) believes that the real risk 
assessment implementation problem starts in the risk analysis step due to the wrong application 
of the analysis process. He says that risk analysis is used in different methods and techniques; 
Frequency approach or Bayesian approach, but to ensure the implementation is taken place, two 
factors should be applied in an effective way; determine the current control plans and 
consequences of potential risks. 
 
 
Figure 5: A 5x5 Risk Matrix Table (What is Risk Matrix, n.d.). 
 
Aven (2009) states that risk analysis is so critical towards implementation because it is 
usually associated with decision-making. It is clear that, risk analysis deals with the 
uncertainties, causes, and consequence of risk. The result of risk analysis is usually followed by 
decision-making action in stages of risk evaluation and risk treatment. The decision made can 
directly affect the whole process of Risk assessment including proper risk assessment 
implementation. For instance, after analyzing the risk, the following actions may be applied 
depending on the decision-making criteria in the risk treatment stage; accept, reduce, avoid, 
transfer. 
As Sharhriar et al, (2011), say that the methodology of risk analysis can affect 
implementation process. For instance, risk is usually defined as expected value of probability and 
consequences where probability parameter can be defined in quantitative manners such as 
empirical or numerical equations, or it can be defined in qualitative manner depending on other 
data such as historical data or background information. However, this classical definition of risk 
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analysis function cannot be that accurate due to uncertainties that are usually associated with 
occurrences of the risk and this may affect the implementation process of risk assessment. To 
avoid and reduce this negative impact in risk analysis, Ersdal and Aven, (2008) say in their 
research that, improvement of safety barriers and good quality controls lead directly to better 
communication and enhance the decision-making towards the implementation. Moreover, it is 
suggested to use (ALARP) principle to have better risk analysis decision with respect to safety 
and cost to have a logical implementation. 
 
2.3. Evaluation of organizational defects in the risk assessment  
 
However, many scholars believe that the main reason for risk assessment implementation 
issue is due to the weakness and gaps in risk legislation, in which risk assessment process needs 
to be controlled in a systematic way with respect to the roles and responsibilities of each 
involved party. For example, Johnson (2014) states that risk assessment is a process and 
performance based approach and it is highly attached to the safety regulation in the heavy 
industries. The author says that, by having an effective limitations and requirements in the risk 
regulation, enhanced standards would be legislated that leads to better safety practices in the 
industries. Moreover, Hale (2015) supports this idea, stating that safety regulation is a dynamic 
process that consists of the following steps: Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) cycle and to have high 
quality of implementation towards risk assessment, two things should exist in the regulation; 
monitoring and management of change (flexibility). 
Hale defines monitoring as a rule follower where it is more like an active procedure for 
the whole risk assessment process. In the risk assessment monitoring, the purpose of this stage is 
to know the status of the project of concern in terms of the safety performance. This can be 
measured through daily, weekly, monthly and annual risk reports, where all working capitals, 
availability of the resource, and financial projections should be mentioned alongside with 
compliance, violation and deviation of the current project. Burke et al., (2012) mention that the 
existing monitoring system in the oil and gas industry needs to be restructured due to the 
inadequacy level. The authors say that the self-reporting system has a lack of transparency which 
cause lack in implementation for the whole risk assessment. The author uses as example the oil 
spill accidents that frequently happen in Grand Bank Eastern Canada which affect the 
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biodiversity life in there. This support the idea of Hale that weak monitoring can indicate 
existence of different issues such as inadequate behavioral safety, but the effective monitoring 
can point out the challenges that risk regulation is facing especially in the planning phase in the 
oil and gas industry. In addition, many scholars believe that auditing can be a good method for 
monitoring in oil construction. It is clear that the purpose of reviewing the audit system is to 
determine the level of compliance towards risk assessment regulations. According to Wang & Li 
(2011), audit is a very effective indicator for determining external and internal factors that affect 
risk regulation system. The author explains that audit is usually conducted against the whole 
system of the organization. It requires reviewing a lot of documents that contains different risk 
regulations. The authors add that audit findings can develop and improve regulations for risk 
assessment which will result in better implementation of safety performance in the organization. 
Moreover, according to Wu & Li (2006), auditing can be a very good monitoring for ensuring 
regulation compliance. For example, many contractors show full compliance for regulation prior 
awarding their contracts and during the early stage of construction, but after proceeding for a 
while with construction activities, the compliance towards the regulation decreases because of 
insufficient audit frequency and follow up.  
However, other researchers believe that reporting is the key to overcome all the 
organizational deficiencies that may affect the risk assessment implementation. According to 
Bridges, (2012) Near Misses are the best indictors to evaluate the risk assessment 
implementation. Near Miss can be defined as an unplanned sequence of events that could have 
caused harm if conditions were different or is allowed to progress, but did not in this instance 
(Bridges, 2012). In the oil and gas industry, Near Misses should be investigated to help identify 
the root causes. This would assist the company in understanding the defects in their HSE system. 
Since Near Miss Incidents have common causes to affect work procedures, response to the root 
causes of the Near Miss will eliminate the root causes of the accident. This highlights the 
importance of the Near Miss investigation as it is vital in preventing accidents due to the fact that 
generally Near Misses share root causes with accidents. 
Reporting Near Misses has a big role in reducing accidents and injuries in the petroleum 
sector. For example, in Canada during the 1980s, when Near Misses began to be reported in the 
petroleum sector, injures record plummeted by 80% in 1986, thereby reducing direct cost by 
three million US dollars (Borg, 2002). Risk assessment implementation can be examined by the 
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Near Misses. Borg (2002) mentions in his technical report that although reporting Near Misses 
reduced the number of injuries, the number of Near Misses increased very rapidly in the oil and 
gas industry in Canada between 1980 and 1990 as shown in the Fig. 6. Naturally, since the 
number of Near Misses increased, the number of injuries decreased in contrast. Referring to the 
increased number of near misses, it seems there is a problem in risk assessment implementation. 
According to Phimistret et al., (2003), near miss reports and investigation reports reveal the 
control level of the risk assessment process in the construction stage. They can also help identify 
the root causes of the events and highlight the current and future challenges for risk assessment 
in the organization. By analyzing the type of near misses, one can gain a deeper understanding of 
the gaps in risk assessment implementation and remedy them. At the same time, even the 
absence of visible injuries does not necessarily indicate there being no issues in the risk 
assessment implementation. On the contrary, near misses may provide a better understanding of 
risk assessment implementation issues since they follow the same causation route of the injury. 
 
 
Figure 6: Number of accident vs. Number of Near Miss (Borg, 2002). 
Gaps in risk assessment implementation at oil and gas construction rigs may lead to 
accidents during construction period. Even if the internal risk assessment process is strong, 
external factors may increase the risk estimation for a particular activity. There are different 
sources that initiate gaps in risk assessment, such as service providing companies, outsourced 
contractors, stakeholders, owners and etc. Thus, the value of the risk itself is uncertain and can 
be magnified according to the quality of the HSE system in place and other externalities that 
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exist at the oil and gas construction rigs. According to HE Guixia (2011), one of the most 
important aspects in the oil production business that causes weakness in the HSE plan is 
difficulties in implementing the risk assessment safety measures of the HSE plan at the oil and 
gas construction rigs. 
For planning Ramsay (1999) believes that there are many difficulties that affect the risk 
planning implementation in the organization business plan. It is clear that more resources are 
needed to control the risks listed, especially in the risk business plan. Any deficiency in these 
elements may potentially lead to implementation issues with the risk planning. However, 
Ramsay believes that proper training is the key to ensure the success for the risk planning, 
especially in cases of emergency. The author holds that in case of emergency, the proper and fast 
response is a vital element, highlighting the importance of the efficient training. To ensure that 
the employees attain the necessary training to handle the emergency case, the emergency plan 
should have the flexibility to be updated at all times with respect to internal resource of the 
company. Moreover, Ramsay says that communication between all the required parties during 
the emergency is an essential element in which failing in the risk communication could have dire 
consequences. For example, in high-level emergency case where a third party is involved with 
the owner and contractor companies to control the accident, such as blowout or fire explosion, 
risk communication becomes crucial in the contingency plan. This shows the important role of 
risk communication in implementing the risk assessment regulations. According to the Health 
and Safety Executive report (HSE, 2010), risk communication has a major role in implementing 
risk regulation, considering it the core of risk assessment process. 
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Figure 7: Role of Risk communication (Risk & Resilience, n.d.). 
Fig. 7 displays how risk communication can ensure the stability and quality of Risk 
assessment process. It also has a critical role in the accurate implementation of risk assessment 
(HSE, 2010). Lofstedt (2008) states that in order to have a well-organized risk communication 
implementation in the company, integration between regulations and communication should 
exist. For example, it is important to provide vital and known communication channels for the 
employees to help them in knowing who to talk with and how to involve during accidents or 
crises. As such, it is important to regulate the roles of each party as this would help 
implementing risk communication in an effective way. In addition, Lofstedt believes that the 
main two challenges in risk communication are competence and capacity. For the competence 
element, the author says that risk communication is a very complex, dynamic process and to 
ensure its competence, it needs to be delivered in a limpid way that would increase the public 
awareness at the organizations. However, Dozier and Broom (1995) believe that the best way to 
enhance risk communication is to treat it as a process in the regulation. It is clear that the 
relationship between communication and regulations may take several forms. It is most effective 
when communication functions cooperatively as part of the regulations formation process. 
According to Aven and Vineem (2005), even though there is good monitoring, planning, 
analyzing, and communication in the risk regulations, that does not mean effective risk 
assessment will be achieved if the risk acceptance criteria is not properly implemented. It is clear 
that the initial risk regulations focus on the risk analysis stages which provide the basic elements 
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for decision-making with respect to choice of solutions and risk reducing measures. The latter 
two elements depend on the risk acceptance criteria. Therefore, any mistake in the risk 
acceptance such as accepting too much risk without enough resources to control it, would 
directly affect the outcomes of the risk analysis thereby affecting the whole implementation of 
the risk assessment  process. For example, in the UK system, the installation cannot be operated 
until the authorities have accepted the safety plan, where the principle of as low as reasonably 
practicable (ALARP) is one of the main elements in the safety plan (HSE, 1992). Moreover, both 
Aven and Vineem (2005) believe that the first step to have an efficient implementation is to do 
quantitative pre-determined risk acceptance criteria. The authors agree on an evaluated balance 
between environment, economy, and human when using the ALARP principle in risk acceptance 
criteria especially in the oil and gas industry. Aven and Vineem (2005) hold that the main 
challenge towards risk acceptance criteria implementation is the uneven balance favoring 
economic benefits and cost savings on the account of the environment and human. As such 
Health and Safety Executive (2001) suggests employing triangle framework of acceptance 
criteria in evaluating risk a shown in Fig. 8. 
 
 
Figure 8: Framework for tolerability of risk (HSE, 2001). 
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2.4. Evaluation of behavioral challenges and defects in the risk assessment  
 
Gordon (1996) believes that while technical and organizational factors can have a major 
impact on the safety and risk assessment in the oil and gas industry, personal factor have an even 
greater impact on influencing safety and risk assessment. This is due to the fact that the human 
factor is the main medium of interaction with other operating factors such as technical and 
organizational factors. 
 
Figure 9: Safety Culture, based on Cooper 2000 (HSE, 2005). 
The integrity of the human factors and their interaction will help ensure a better risk 
assessment implementation. French and Geller (2008) believe that in order to guarantee the 
stability of the human factors, it is necessary to create a safety culture in the organization itself. 
To carry this out management participation and encouragement is the key for implementing such 
culture as shown in Fig. 9. The authors claim that management should publish the safety culture 
between the employees through different activities such as regular inspection and auditing, 
awareness campaigns, training for competence assurance, positive promotion policy, and open 
communication. 
According to Beatrice (2011), negative attitude displayed by management influence the 
organization‘s safety implementation, creating a blaming culture in the work environment. 
Beatrice mentions that management should promote a positive work culture. That is, they must 
accept employees as human instead of creating a blaming culture that may affect the trust and the 
openness of the relationship between the management and construction employees. This would 
create a blame-free culture that encourages employees to sustain good practices, such as 
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reporting near misses, identifying hazards, and making recommendation. Gennard and Judge 
(2005), however, believe that even if the management wants to foster a free-blame culture, the 
change should start from the individual level. To do so, challenges and barriers should be 
examined as most barriers arise from Behavioral Based Safety (BBS) such as educational 
barriers. Deming (1993), who is considered one of the pioneers in safety engineering, believes 
that labourers with poor education usually do not prioritize safety which leads to productivity 
pressure from their seniors. Deming suggests that besides the proper training to maintain the 
competence level, labourers should be educated about the principle methods and implementation 
strategies of safety in the construction stage. This would grant labourers with a full spectrum of 
the importance of safety performance in their construction duties, which would in turn help them 
transition from knowledge based behavior to skill based behavior. 
Moreover, according to HSE (2005), sufficient employee welfare is one of the main 
barriers that may face the employee in practicing positive BBS. It is clear that the employees 
need to work in safe and healthy environment that would help them to perform in a free-stress 
atmosphere and this will lead them to be more focused and morale on their job with respect to 
the safety matters as shown in Fig. 10. 
 
 
Figure 10: Effect of employee welfare (Maheswari, 2007). 
 
HSE (2005), suggests that the first step to impose employee welfare in the organization is 
to establish welfare legislation which would enforce legally all activities and facilities towards 
employee welfare. For example in 1992, HSE established workplace (Health, Safety and 
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Welfare, 1992) regulations that concern the employee welfare in the working environment. The 
main goal of these regulations is to enforce the employers to provide safe and healthy services 
for the employee in their work place. Carrilo, (2010), says that providing a positive welfare 
services for the employee would lead to social, safety and economic benefits. For example, when 
positive and effective welfare is implemented in the organization, the employees would feel 
peace and equality in their job which would create healthy social relationship and satisfaction 
feeling between the employees. Due to this, safety attitude would be present in work 
environment that will enhance the organization productivity. 
However, According to HSE, (2011), that it is really hard to maintain the safety behavior 
in the oil and gas industry without effective safety leadership. It is clear that, senior management 
should always have informed involvement role towards all the potential hazards that associate 
with the construction stage where they should fully aware about the safety measure that are 
practiced in the field. According to Eid et al., (2012), promoting safety leadership can has an 
effective role in implementing risk assessment as shown in Fig. 11. 
 
 
Figure 11: Safety leadership effects (Eid et al., 2012). 
Eid et al., hold that in the oil and gas industry, to improve the risk assessment 
implementation, the management should provide the labourers with the necessary knowledge and 
training that would develop their hazard identification skills in the construction stage. This shows 
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how visible leadership can promote healthy and safety climate between the employees. Wu et al., 
(2007) echoes the idea that effective management leadership can enhance the implementation of 
risk assessment because it improves the safety performance in all of its aspects i.e. technical, 
organizational and behavioral. According to the authors, to ensure this positive mechanism of 
leadership, there should be an open communication between labourers and management that will 
build trust between them. However, Clark & Ward (2006) point out that leadership management 
may face challenges from the construction due to negative peer pressure of the labourers towards 
safety implementation. From example, employees who got used to practice their jobs without full 
safety performance may resist and ignore the new safety orders from management which may 
send the wrong message to the management that the current safety situation is already in a good 
shape. The authors believe that to avoid this issue, it is recommended to involve construction 
employees more in the senior management meeting to have better understanding of the safety 
importance. 
2.5. Evaluation of safety regulations, standards and agencies of oil and gas 
construction projects 
2.5.1. Benchmarking approach 
 
Many scholars in their research and studies believe that safety regulations and legislations 
can play major role in the risk assessment implementation. The importance of the safety 
regulations and legislations lies within their vital components such planning, monitoring, 
acceptance criteria, and communication. Ensuring high level of integration between these 
components is very essential for the implementation mechanism where it helps to have clear 
definition for the required roles and responsibilities in the risk assessment process. The 
importance of the safety regulations and legislations in oil construction industry increased 
gradually after several disasters and fatal accidents such as Piper Alpha in 1988. It is clear that 
more, safety case approach have been developed after Piper Alpha incident which contains 
moderate standards to ensure the (PTW) that was adopted later by the European Parliament (EP, 
2013). As such it is critical in understanding the necessary of setting the proper and efficient 
legislations which can outline and describe the safety enforcement measures in the oil industry. 
For example, The Norwegian safety authorities such as Petroleum Safety Authority Norway 
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(PSA), Norwegian Environment Agency (NEA), and Norwegian Directorate of Health (NDH) 
have established safety internal control system that allow monitoring the safety performance for 
different industrial sectors including oil and gas sector (Chourdakil, 2012). This system has 
certain standards that are based on target setting legislations and can provide fundamental 
requirements and procedures of oil operations. This chapter will evaluate the status of safety 
regulations and legislations of oil industry in UAE and how it affects the efficiency of risk 
assessment implementation. This would be approached by analyzing and examining the current 
regulations elements and safety agenesis in UAE. Then a comparison exercise will be conducted 
through a benchmarking process with other regulations that are used in oil and gas production 
countries such as the UK.  
According to Fabbri & Contini (2009), benchmarking is a vital method to evaluate risk 
assessment from regulatory perspective. The authors explain that benchmarking can be very 
effective for risk assessment regulations because it mainly assesses the difference between the 
organization and world class performances. Moreover, the authors believe that benchmarking 
can be considered as one of the continuous improvement techniques in risk assessment 
regulations where it tries to increase the organization knowledge that will help in improving their 
current processes and procedures. As result, the organization will start to follow the best 
practices that are used for risk assessment regulations in the world. In this study, the criteria of 
risk assessment benchmarking will focus on the following elements: 
A. Acts and Safety authorities‘ regulations 
B. Working Scope 
Fabbri & Contini believe these elements to have a direct impact upon the regulations 
function in regard to the implementation of risk assessment. The benchmarking in this study will 
reflect on the current best practices for risk assessment in the oil and gas industry which are used 
by international oil and gas construction companies, international safety agencies, and 
international codes of risk assessment. 
In addition the benchmarking will cover the relationship between oil and gas construction 
companies and safety governmental bodies. According to May (2007), the main goal of the 
government bodies is to provide regulations that ensure performing safely in industrial 
organizations. The author holds that when the government bodies provide a systematic approach 
through the regulations of industrial organizations, they expect that their performance would be 
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based on these regulations. As such, industrial companies have a legal accountability towards 
these safety legislations and they need to fulfill their requirement in their construction. The 
authors believe that to ensure the implementation of the regulations, the safety government 
agencies need to follow up on the compliance of the industrial companies through different 
activities, such as auditing, inspection, annual reports review and meetings. 
In this study, the relationship between the safety government agencies and oil and gas 
construction companies in UAE will be examined to determine how the risk assessment 
regulations for these oil and gas construction companies are related and can be affected by the 
safety government legislations. For example in Abu Dhabi Occupational Safety and Health 
Center (OSHAD) is the one who provides for different industrial organizations, including oil and 
gas industry, with the EHS management system and risk assessment  regulatory framework that 
are required in each industrial sector. This research will focus on how safety government 
agencies monitoring methods are implemented for risk assessment regulations in the oil and gas 
construction companies. This would help understand the regulations enforcement, interaction, 
and mechanism for risk assessment between the safety agencies and the oil and gas construction 
companies in UAE. 
2.5.2. Background to the oil and gas construction projects safety regulations 
 
It is unfortunate that many regulations in the oil and gas construction projects have only 
developed after major disasters. For example, Craweley (1999) mentions that the regulations for 
oil and gas in the UK can be divided into two eras: before and after the Piper Alpha accident in 
1988. According to the author, prior to the Piper Alpha incident, the regulations in UK were 
imposed more on the technical side which led to the increased use of the reactive approaches in 
the operation fields. Due to the huge economic losses of this disaster, the UK government pushed 
for improved safety legislations that were based on quantified risk assessment. This helped to 
have a broader perspective on the performance criteria of safety regulations where it contains the 
following advanced features: 
 Fire and explosive protection, (HSE, 1997): 
Prevention of Fire Explosions and Emergency Response (PFEER) Regulations were 
established in 1995 by HSE to provide passive fire protection for oil rig installations in 
the construction sites. PFEER contains 25 regulations that contain approved practices for 
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preventive and protective measures for fire and explosion hazards and efficient 
emergency plan.  
 Environmental protection (OSPRAG, 2011): 
According to Oil Spill Prevention and Response Advisory Group (OSPRAG, 2011), 
environmental impact received its appropriate weight and proper attention after serious 
oil and chemical spills during construction projects in oil industry. To ensure regulatory 
control in the oil construction project, environmental agencies were formed such as 
(OSPAG) and Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) in United Kingdom 
Continental Shelf (UKCS) where they monitor the oil and gas construction companies 
activities through environmental studies like Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
and Environmental statement (ES).  
 Emergency escape plans: 
According to Furland (1992), failure in the emergency response in many accidents at oil 
construction industry was the main reason these accidents turned into disasters as the 
absence of visible and implemented emergency regulations and management can be the 
major factor. The author believes that many oil production countries start being aware of 
the critical role of effective emergency response to mitigate the severity of the risk that is 
associated with potential hazards in the construction sites. As a result, safety emergency 
agencies were founded such as UK National Contingency Plan (NCP) to endorse the 
important elements of the emergency response: planning, communication, training, and 
exercising for any coming oil construction project. This has led to having new safety 
practices in the oil industry as emergency risk modeling that needs to be evaluated by 
approved safety authority.  
 Allocation of resource  
The concept of risk based resource allocation started rising in oil construction industry as 
part of control and mitigation strategies in risk assessment process. It had helped to have 
adequate estimation and preparation for different risks in the construction sites (Oyewole 
et al., 2010). The regulatory authority part in resource allocation is to guarantee its 
present in the oil and gas construction companies business and strategic plans. It is clear 
that the expansion of oil construction activities should go parallel with safety capacities 
and man power to mitigate injuries that may occur due to the increased workload. In 
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addition, the author believes that safety allocation of resource activities such as 
equipment regular checkup can help in ensuring integrity of asset which leads to 
conducting risk assessment in a more efficient approach. 
 Design and architecture  
Furland (1992) believes that safety regulations have moved from proactive to reactive 
approach and that is the reason behind increasing the importance of safety design phase. 
It is clear that, in the Piper Alpha accident, the design of the platform did not provide the 
crew members with sufficient escape routes that support the evacuation plan. Moreover, 
design can play a critical role in oil rig installation in the construction site. For example, 
safety design can provide a passive protection against fire through distributing the 
temperature profiles and heat flux on construction plant especially at the steel structure 
members. Moreover, safety designs can optimize sustainability trend in oil construction 
site by using construction materials that produce small amount of carbon monoxide in the 
manufacturing stage (ISO, 2008).  
 
2.5.3. Safety regulations, standards and agencies in the UK   
 
A. Safety authority regulations  
Health and Safety at Work Act (HSWA, 1974) is the first safety authority that regulates 
the safety legislation for oil and gas construction activities in UK. The main goal of establishing 
this safety authority was to distinguish safety regulations from economic regulations. The safety 
legislation for oil and gas construction includes offshore, onshore and pipelines activities and 
while there is a separate legislation for each of these activities, they were all directed by HSWA. 
HSWA requires the duty holders in oil construction to demonstrate safety implementation 
towards HSWA risk based regulatory processes through clear safety management perspective. 
This leads oil and gas construction companies to use the ALARP concept in their risk acceptance 
criteria to tolerate all different risks that they may face during operation. As such, according to 
HSWA regulations, safety case needs to be submitted before the construction project 
commissioning phase. 
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In 1974, in order to ensure the proper implementation of the safety compliance, HSWA 
created an enforcement body called The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) that played an 
advisory role to support different construction industries in UK. For example, HSE provides the 
required training, publications and seminars to ensure the safety competence of the asset and 
workers at the construction field. 
However, after the historical Piper Alpha incident in 1988, as a corrective response to 
enhance the organizational safety framework in UK, another primary safety act was established, 
known as The Offshore Safety Act 1992. The main purpose of establishing The Offshore Safety 
Act 1992 was to endorse and ensure the safety legislation of HSWA in the offshore oil and gas 
construction projects through reviewing the proposed safety cases. 
It is clear that these safety cases should contain details as to how hazards and risks can be 
controlled, mitigated and reduced to follow ALARP principle through the company safety 
management at the construction stage. Later on, in 2005, HSWA was replaced by another 
regulatory body called the Safety Case Regulation (SCR). SCR was established from Offshore 
Safety Act 1992 as the main safety authority reasonable for the safety cases of oil and gas 
construction projects. 
The following points summarize the generic roles description of HSWA and Safety Act 
1992: 
 Providing safe environment at the work place  
 Defining the role of Health and Safety Executive (HSE) 
 Approving safety cases for the duty holder 
 Approving code of practices ACOP from HSE 
 Investigating Accident and incidents through HSE 
 
B. Working Scope 
All oil and gas construction activities documents should be verified and reviewed by HSE 
with respect to Acts‘ legislations for projects in offshore rigs, onshore rigs, and pipelines where 
in each type of these projects, there is a specific regulatory authority which is reasonable of the 
documentation process with HSE, as shown in Fig. 12. 
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Figure 12: Safety legislative structure for oil and gas construction projects (Parliament, UK, 2006). 
Safety Case Regulation (SCR) aim to reduce all major risks that can occur in the 
proposed offshore hydrocarbon construction projects from the construction phase to the 
operation phase. The duty holder needs to use an effective and clear risk assessment in each 
stage to identify all possible hazards and presents mitigation plans with respect to ALARP 
concept. There are specific requirements that the duty holder should provide in his/her risk 
assessment such as description of the used construction materials, the safety system during 
materials fabrication and installation, and safety maintenance plan for the next 5 years. These 
requirements of risk assessment should be detailed and explained in the whole construction 
project documentation lifecycle that starts in Front-End Engineering Design (FEED) in design 
stage to the well operation procedures stage. 
For the pipeline construction, the main authority regulation is Pipeline Safety Regulations 
(PSR) where all oil and gas construction companies, whether onshore or offshore, should be 
complied with PSR standards to receive authorization permits before starting the job. This can be 
approached when the construction company submits a Major Accident Prevention Document 
(MAPD) that contains the mechanism of risk identification, risk evaluation, safety management 
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and regular maintenance schedule in all construction project phases to PSR. Then, PSR reviews 
the submitted MAPD and provides recommendation for improvement in technical or procedural 
requirements. For instance, the risk assessment methodology in MAPD must consider the 
following elements: pipeline routing, human factors, mechanical properties of the pipeline and 
safety design factor. In addition, if the pipeline construction project may cause environmental 
damages to the surrounding area, the duty holder needs to submit EIA with detailed risk 
assessment of all the environmental hazards and proposed mitigation plans. 
All onshore petroleum construction companies should directly define their scope of work 
to Control of Major Accident Hazard (COMAH) Regulation by submitting a safety case. This 
safety case represents an agreement between all important parties in the construction project i.e. 
duty holder, consulting and contractor, along with a key scheme of all the hydrocarbon 
substances that pose a major hazard in the construction site. The safety case explains in details 
the chemical properties of the hydrocarbon substances that are highly used in onshore 
construction projects and the best safety practices that are needed to handle and store them in a 
safe manner. After the Buncefield explosion in 2005, the focus on the danger of hydrocarbon 
substances increased, prompting COMAH Regulation to require that all the duty holders have 
specific risk assessment for all the construction activities that are associated with the 
hydrocarbon substances and present the control measures (HSE, 2011).  
2.5.4.   Safety regulations, standards and agencies in the UAE   
 
A. Safety authority regulations  
 
There is no official separate government body or authority which monitors safety 
engineering matters for oil and gas construction projects in the UAE, on the federal or local 
level. However, all HSE principles are addressed through several main federal and local 
legislations without explaining the technical requirements that should be implemented (Butt, 
2001). For example, the Federal Ministry of Labourers sets Law No.8 of 1980 that requires all 
employers in the oil and gas industry to ensure the safety of their employees at the workplace. 
For the environmental safety, the Federal Environment Agency, which was replaced by the 
Ministry of Environment and Water, established Law No. 24 of 1999 which requires assessing 
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the environmental effects and developing environmental protection standards in any industrial 
project in the UAE.  
Since UAE has federalism constitution, however, each Emirate has its own local regime 
for the oil and gas industry that regulates all the industry activities such as construction, 
production, and operation. There are three main Emirates that have petroleum activities as 
illustrated below in Fig. 13. 
 
 
Figure 13 :legislative structure for oil and gas industry in UAE. 
According to Johnson et al., (2005), Abu Dhabi produce around 94% of oil and gas in the 
UAE and as such construction industry is very active and plays a major role in enhancing the 
core business especially on the upstream chain. As shown in Fig. 13, Abu Dhabi National Oil 
Company (ADNOC) is responsible for ensuring the implementation of all Supreme Petroleum 
Council (SPC) regulations including the safety procedures for oil and gas construction projects. 
In Dubai, the legislations for oil and gas construction, operation and production projects, comes 
directly from Dubai Supreme Council of Energy (DSCE) where the department of petroleum 
affairs is in charge of all the administration works for these projects. The same regulatory system 
is practiced within Sharjah, particularly Sharjah Petroleum Council represents Sharjah 
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government and has the authority to set the legislative structure that involves defining safety 
regulations of oil and gas industry projects.  
B. Working Scope 
The working scope differs from one emirate to another due to the federalism constitution. 
This part will focus on the work mechanism in Abu Dhabi since it holds more than 90% of oil 
and gas construction projects (Johnson et al., 2005). Most of the contactors companies need to 
submit their HSE performance profile during the tendering stage to the owner company such as 
Abu Dhabi Company for Onshore Oil Operations ADCO for onshore concession or Abu Dhabi 
Marine Operating Company (ADMA-OPCO) for offshore concession. Then, it is up to the owner 
company to decide which safety study the construction company needs to consider for the 
proposed projects. Each operational company has its own safety de-minimis system that is 
flexible to choose any format or methodology of the risk assessment for the proposed safety 
study. As previously mentioned, there is no specific federal or local authorization body to 
monitor or ensure the safety construction legislations implementation in Abu Dhabi; instead, the 
owner companies conduct frequent audits and inspections to construction sites and check the 
contractors‘ implementation of the safety legislations. From the results of these audits and 
inspections, an annual safety report will be generated and submitted to ADNOC to review and 
then to OSHAD for their record only. OSHAD plays only an advisory role for all safety 
engineering matters in oil and gas construction projects since it does not have full authority to act 
as a complete monitoring agency in the oil and gas industry. However, for other sectors, OSHAD 
ensures the HSE compliance in construction projects through auditing and inspecting since it is 
the Sector Regulatory Authorities (SRA) that is assigned from Abu Dhabi government for the 
construction HSE matters. 
 
2.6. Evaluation of research and development on risk assessment 
frameworks  
 
Due to these technical, procedural, and behavioral challenges towards risk assessment, 
many scholars strive to develop a variety of frameworks that may enhance the performance of 
the risk assessment mechanism to overcome these challenges. They try to integrate other factors 
beside the likelihood and the consequences of the hazards. For example, many scholars attempt 
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to combine environmental impact (Slootweg et al., 2001), social impact (Goldman & Baum, 
2000), and health impact (Rattle & Kwiatkowski, 2003) in the risk assessment to have wider and 
better identification and estimating for the potential risks. Renn and Walker (2008), believe that 
these framework can be very beneficial for risk assessment and it can enhance its performance 
against technical, procedural, and behavioral challenges if they involve the basic components of 
risk assessment. As established already, these are identification, assessment of exposure and 
estimation of the risk. 
For example, Mahmoudi et al., (2013) have created a behavioral framework to develop 
the risk assessment by combining the social impact on the assessment methodology where they 
proposed five steps framework that include a hybrid model consisting of two main elements: risk 
and social. The authors believe that analyzing the social impact will provide a comprehensive 
diagnosis for socio-economic and socio-cultural concerns that employees can link to the hazards 
in the risk perception stage. In addition, the authors conclude that their framework can provide 
effective basic information to organize recovery programs that deals with natural disasters such 
as earthquakes and floods. 
Many scholars developed several frameworks to enhance the risk assessment 
implementation and performance in the oil and gas industry. The studies in the literature review 
usually cover the issues in the implementation from one aspect or angle without analyzing the 
connection and the correlation between different types of hazards and how they can work as one 
effective unit. For example, Cox and Tait (1998) believe that many organizations in heavy 
industries have limited and lack of knowledge in risk assessment methods due to the absence of a 
comprehensive understanding of hazards and their contribution and interaction in the workplace. 
Chan (2011) conducted a study to identify the ranked critical accidents, root causes, and 
mitigation site plans and how the different perceptions of the risk between the organization and 
stakeholders affect the safety performance. In Chan‘s research, he found that the top ten ranked 
risks for the organizations and stakeholders are different, whereas in the survey the organization 
representatives believe that the technical aspects such as fire, explosion, and failure in equipment 
are the most dangerous risk types for the oil and gas industry. 
The stakeholder‘s response, however, was different where they think that organizational 
and human factor obstacles such as inadequate standard procedures, poor communication and 
mental stress can lead to the critical accidents that result on serious injuries. According to the 
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author, that these different perceptions between organizations and stakeholders reflect how risk 
can be complex multidimensional phenomenon in the oil and gas industry. As such the author 
suggests providing new perspectives on accident mitigation plans which include a mechanism 
that can break down the complexity of the risk in the oil and gas industry. 
Other scholars developed certain frameworks to enhance the risk assessment and 
management process in the oil and gas industry from a technical aspect. For example, Aven et 
al., (2007) proposed a framework that focuses on the decision-making mechanism of the risk 
assessment and management process. The authors believe that many current risk assessment 
methods that are used in the oil and gas industry do not utilize the right procedural approach in 
classifying and characterizing the potential risks at the construction stage. The authors say that 
the process of pre-decision-making involves the usual risk analyses techniques, ALARP 
principle and cost-benefits analyses which do not provide enough illustration of risk and its 
uncertainties. As such, in their framework, the authors classify the decision-making into three 
categories with respect to the risk complexity: 
1. Standard decision-making process 
2. Advanced decision-making process 
3. Complex decision-making process 
In each of these categories, there is a specific methodology for risk assessment and 
management process where the controlling factors are uncertainty and manageability that usually 
shape the decision-making process for the wanted event. Fig. 14 displays the mechanism of the 
proposed framework. 
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Figure 14: The structure of the suggested decision framework (Aven et al., 2007). 
 
The authors recommend involving stakeholders in the risk based assessments in oil 
organization. According to the authors, this will provide an integrated awareness about the 
principles and strategies used for decision-making process in risk assessment. 
Xu & Fan et al., (2014) proposed procedural framework to develop the risk assessment 
implementation in the oil and gas industry in China. According to the authors, natural gas wells 
in China are facing a serious technical problem due the high percentage of hydrogen sulphide 
(H2S) in these wells. For example, in 2003 a fatal blowout occurred in Kaixian County of 
Chongqing city that resulted in the death of 243 people, prompting China safety engineers to 
review the probabilistic risk based assessment methods that are used in the oil and gas fields at 
the construction stage. 
In this framework, Xu & Fan et al focus more in the fault tree development technique 
where their framework will implement the individual risk concept. It is clear that the authors and 
other scholars (Li et al., 2007) believe that there is lack of framework that utilize the individual 
risk assessment in their risk assessment process, which leads to weakening the level of the 
individual hazards identification. To apply this concept, the authors employ the free tree analysis 
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to identify the uncertainties that are associated with the blowout accidents that resulted on the 
failure of safety system as shown in Fig. 15. 
 
Figure 15:  The proposed fault tree for well blow out control (Li et al., 2007). 
 
To enforce the organizational aspect in the individual risk assessment process, the authors 
established the acceptable risk level of individual which provide the reference procedures to 
involve the safety mitigation measures in emergency and awareness planning zones and 
exploration stages. For example, this framework suggests calculating the death probability with 
respect to the individual in certain location during the H2S diffusion that will have safer 
estimation for the toxic concentration. In the end of their paper, the authors mention that their 
framework can enhance the risk assessment for the development of high acid well through stage 
procedures that enforce the individual risk concept.  
Besides frameworks proposed to enhance the efficiency of risk assessment in the oil and 
gas industry, scholars insist that behavioral issues are the main challenges of risk assessment 
process. For example, many researchers believe that psychosocial-behavioral risk can have a 
direct effect on the oil and gas fields employee that may lead to catastrophic accidents such as 
fire, explosion, blowout, and toxic release (Johnsen et al., 2010; Mearns and Hope, 2005; 
Nahrgang et al., 2011). 
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Bergh et al., (2014) developed a framework that contains and analyzes psychosocial risks 
in the oil and gas industry where this framework works as indicator to help in managing 
psychosocial risks and measure the performance. It is clear that, according to the authors, 
psychosocial risk assessment is important because it deals with behavioral hazards that occur in 
the design, organization, and construction phases and it will help improve HSE risk assessment 
performance in the organization. The authors believe that the psychosocial risk assessment needs 
to be linked to the organization strategies so that HSE performance indicators are developed, 
enhanced, and can be used to monitor the potential psychosocial issues that may affect the 
wellbeing of the employees. 
The main goal of this study is to create Psychosocial Risk Indicator (PRI) that will 
provide a more integrated decision-making process in risk assessment mechanism. The 
methodology of this framework was conducted through a survey that contains several factors of 
psychosocial behavioral such as job control and relationship where in each factor there are 
number of questions as shown Fig. 16. 
 
 
Figure 16: Psychosocial-behavioral risk survey (Bergh et al., 2014). 
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For each question in the survey, there is a categorized numerical answer attached to the 
question. In the end of the survey, one can calculate the score by adding up the numerical values 
generated for each answer and obtain the total score to identify the level of psychosocial 
behavioral as shown in Fig. 17. 
 
Figure 17: PRI score system (Bergh et al., 2014). 
 
According to the authors, the framework questions and scoring system is based on 
previous theories that utilized the psychosocial risks in work environment, business processes, 
and organizational structures in different heavy industries.  
 
 
Figure 18: Source of Knowledge for PRI framework (Bergh et al., 2014). 
 
These psychosocial theories cover four main areas, as shown in Fig. 18: 
1. Scientific researches in psychosocial risks and stress in work 
2. HSE experience 
3. Internal data 
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4. Company regulations 
The authors mention in the end of their paper that their framework proposed an indicator 
for psychosocial risks in the oil and gas industry. The framework is efficient because it allowed 
the risk assessment process to have a wider scope in behavioral safety concept. The psychosocial 
framework for risk assessment enhances the HSE performance of other KPIs and that will 
directly reflect on the advancement of the HSE management system indicators. Simultaneously, 
the framework will reduce human errors in the future. Furthermore, Bergh et al., (2014) highlight 
that having free psychosocial risk environment in the workplace will promote the social-
sustainability relationship between the construction and the management employees. The 
limitation of the framework, as mentioned by the Bergh et al, is that the framework only 
indicates the psychosocial risks without tackling with the psychosocial risks themselves. The 
authors recommend establishing mitigation framework to control and better manage the 
psychosocial risk that may occur in the construction stage in the oil and gas industry. 
2.7. Summary of the chapter   
 
As examples were shown above, most of the frameworks are orientated into one aspect 
e.g. technical or procedural which leads to compromise in the other attributes. The absence of the 
integrated examination in the risk assessment frameworks impacts the required cohesiveness of 
safety system. In addition, vital details were not presented in several frameworks that ought to be 
mentioned as essential contributors of safety performance. A common example is, the equipment 
integrity and its maintenance recorders that exist in the construction site. As consequence, this 
study aims to develop a framework that has a comprehensive mechanism for the risk assessment 
that utilizes all the potential risks coming from variety sources in the construction site. This will 
help have a clear image for the possible hazards and what are the mitigation plans that should be 
conducted to manage and promote the best safety practices to control these hazards. This shows 
that the general methodology of developing this framework is clear, but, in this stage of the 
research, it is hard to specifically mention the parameters of the framework. This is because it 
relies on the results and outcomes of laws, regulations and human factors evaluations in the risk 
assessment that will be conducted as early objectives of this study. However, the decision-
making process for this framework should include three main examination steps: technical, 
procedural, and behavioral that presents the integrity evaluation concept to enhance the safety 
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and reliability implementation of the risk assessment in the oil construction in UAE, as shown in 
Fig. 19. 
 
 
Figure 19: Conceptual Scheme for Tertiary Risk Assessment Framework. 
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Chapter 3: Research Methodology 
 
3.1. Introduction  
 
The aim of this study is to evaluate the implementation of safety engineering system in 
oil and gas construction through risk assessment in UAE. To do so, four objectives should be 
examined, where these objectives contain three different aspects; technical, procedural, and 
behavioral. Each objective has different methodology in order to be achieved in this research 
Andersen & Mostue (2012) conducted an experiment to evaluate risk analysis and risk 
assessment approaches that are applied in the petroleum industry in Norway. They used a survey 
to determine the risk analysis methods of different oil and gas construction companies in Norway 
and to expose the challenges in the risk assessment. 
In this study, the similar approach will be employed and a survey will be utilized to 
determine the risk analysis and identification methods of the UAE oil and gas construction rigs, 
along with their weaknesses that affect the implementation of risk assessment. In addition this 
research will have combination of exploratory and descriptive methodology approaches. For 
example, in the exploratory feature, one of the questionnaire objectives is to explore the 
implementation problem to provide insights into and comprehension for more accurate 
examination. Furthermore, since this research covers the behavioral attributes of the individual 
worker in the construction site, a description of characteristics and functions is required which 
gives this study a descriptive trace in the methodology stage.        
However, the focus in this survey will be on the following points to help identify the 
technical, procedural and behavioral defects in the risk assessment process, distributed to both 
management and construction people: 
 
A) The risk based assessment  
In this part of the survey an evaluation will be conducted towards the efficiency level and 
application of risk assessment that are implemented in the construction stage such as 
HAZOP, FTA, ETA, and EIA in oil construction. 
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B) The compliance level towards Risk assessment process 
Reviewing the incidents and accidents history records that occurred in UAE onshore oil 
and gas construction rigs due to the inadequate risk assessment could be considered one 
of the effective ways to determine the level of compliance in risk assessment. According 
to Hopkins (2011), compliance to risk assessment is a vital indicator of the risk 
assessment   performance. The author mentions that in hazardous industries, reviewing 
the compliance of risk assessment process through accidents records would help expose 
technical and procedural defects that have a direct impact on the decision-making 
mechanism.  
C) The roles and responsibilities in the risk assessment  
According to Heijden (2006), evaluating roles and responsibilities would help in forming 
an adequate implementation for risk assessment process in the organization. The author 
believes that the competence level of management can be evaluated easier when the roles 
and responsibilities are clearly defined, which help in applying any improvement to 
enhance performance mechanism when required in the risk assessment process. 
Moreover, Hillson (2004) claims that defined roles and responsibilities can promote 
positive authority in the risk assessment process. It is clear that the author believes that 
identifying the hierarchy of authority would ease the understanding of the assigned roles 
and responsibilities, which grants the organization an informed path towards risk 
assessment. 
D) Risk controls  
According to Khan et al. (2002), there are four important areas that control measures 
cover in risk assessment process: equipment, materials, environment, and access. 
According to the authors, each company utilizes these external factors through different 
approaches thereby determining the effectiveness of control measure in risk assessment 
of the oil and gas industry. It is vital to evaluate the hierarchy of control measures that is 
used in the risk assessment process in the UAE onshore rigs. The hierarchy includes four 
important prevention measures: elimination, substitution, engineering control, personal 
control and personal protective equipment (PPE). To do so, it is critical to analyze the 
factors that may affect the company‘s choices of control measures such as cost, 
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applicability and effectiveness. This can be achieved by reviewing pervious case studies 
in which different corrective actions and control measures were employed to contain the 
risks. This would help understand the risk control mechanism in the risk assessment 
process and expose any defects that may occur in this revision of the case studies. 
E) The safety culture in the organization  
According to Odea & Flin, (2001), a questionnaire is an efficient method to collect data 
pertaining to human factors in the oil and gas industry because employees in this industry 
are highly familiar with questionnaires technique which allows them to respond in an 
efficient way and examine the safety culture in the organization. Both of the authors 
conducted a behavioral safety experiment through questionnaire to determine the safety 
leadership level between the managers in the offshore and onshore rigs in United 
Kingdom (UK) during the installation stage. The authors believe that the design of this 
questionnaire helps employees in exposing behavioral issues that simulate real cases 
between construction and management employees such as visibility, workforce 
involvement, and competency. In this research, this part of the questionnaire will focus 
more on the safety culture between the management and the end-users employees, and 
how it affects the safety performance implementation. For example, the survey will 
include questions about the level of safety leadership, along with its visibility and 
involvement from the top management to the labourers. The official safety practice and 
the supervision level for unsafe behavior acts in construction oil fields will be examined 
in this section of the survey. 
Beatrice (2011) claims that it is vital to collect qualitative data on examining the role of 
human factor towards safety implementation. Questionnaire is a very effective way to conduct 
this examination because it helps the examiner to be closer to the employees‘ world and observe 
the challenges they face and those which affect the behavioral safety. For example, educational 
background and work pressure will be analyzed through the questionnaire. This will help identify 
the hidden human factors that influence the risk assessment. 
Ismail and Hashim (2012) conducted an experiment to evaluate unsafe work processes, 
unsafe condition and the implementation of safety practice in the field for three oil and gas 
construction companies through BBS approach. In this approach the authors use personal 
questionnaire as methodology to collect qualitative data where the survey were held in the field 
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and that helps the authors to have more information because it allows the examiner to collect and 
observe the information simultaneously. According to Sutton (2014) that (BBS) plays a major 
role in changing the safety engineering development landscape especially in the beginning of 
nineteen-nineties as shown in Fig. (20). Sutton explains that scholars and professionals in all 
heavy industries including construction in oil and gas sector, tried to enhance the safety 
procedural and technical phases through codes, standards, and regulation, but still major accident 
such as  Chernobyl disaster  in 1986 and  Pipe Alpha in 1988 still occurring. Due to that safety 
experts start emphasizing on the safety behavior of the individual and later they focus on the 
safety group cultural behavioral. 
 
Figure 20:  The safety engineering system development in oil and gas construction (Sutton, 2014).   
 In this research, the questionnaire will focus on the employee welfare aspect in either 
housing or work place as well as how it affects the safety performance of the labourers in the 
construction stage. Moreover, employee development will be examined to determine the 
professional strengthening such as training courses and workshops that the organization provides 
to the employees to improve their safety awareness in the field. 
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3.2. Distributing the questionnaire 
 
The questionnaire targeted all employees working on the oil and gas construction projects 
in UAE. There are three main categories or classifications for the construction companies: 
owners (government sectors), contractors, and vendors, where most of construction projects are 
located in the onshore fields. As UAE is one of the leading countries in the onshore oil and gas 
industry, the onshore oil and gas construction projects are considered priority projects given their 
association with drilling, production, and development. This explains why construction 
contractors are more readily available in onshore rigs as opposed to offshore rigs. 
Consequently, the majority of the questionnaires in this research where distributed in 
onshore construction rigs. Most construction rigs are located in remote areas both for onshore 
and offshore fields, rendering electronic communication difficulties. Personal visits are required 
to ensure that the targeted employees from the management to the construction end-user level 
receive and understand the questionnaires. In this research, 10 personal trips to different 
construction rigs, including 7 onshore and 3 offshore construction rigs, were conducted to 
distribute the questionnaires. The onshore construction rigs where located in Asab, Bab, Bu 
Hasa, Sahil, Shah and North-East Bab (Dabbiya, Rumaitha and Shanayel). These construction 
sites are linked by more than 450km of pipeline, with storage and shipping services available at 
Jebel Dhanna station (ADCO, 2012). For the offshore construction rigs, the questionnaires were 
distributed to the three major construction sites: Umm Shaif, Zakum and Das Island, where these 
fields are connected through a pipeline network as shown in Fig. 21. 
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Figure 21: Onshore and offshore oil and gas construction rigs in UAE (ADCO, 2012). 
As shown in the Appendix A, the questionnaire contains three aspects: technical, 
procedural and behavioral, which will help identify all strength and weakness aspects of the risk 
assessment that is used in UAE‘s oil and gas construction rigs. This inclusive approach can be 
considered the first stage to achieve the research aim of developing a comprehensive framework 
to optimize the safety engineering system of the oil and gas industry construction projects in 
UAE. The technical questions in this survey focus on the level of understanding of the main 
safety studies used in oil and gas construction such as HAZOP, HAZID, EIA and etc., and how 
risk assessment mechanism is being applied in these studies. This will illustrate not only the 
technical capacity and background of all employees from management to construction end-user, 
but also what the current and potential technical challenges arise in risk assessment. 
Monitoring and communication are the most essential elements that the questions cover 
where many scholars believe that risk assessment in construction should be engaged throughout 
the life process and phases of construction projects. According to Zavadskas et al., (2010) to 
ensure the implementation of risk assessment in construction, there should be a continuous 
follow-up plan that monitors the quality of execution in all the basic five stages of construction: 
initiating, concept, planning, organization, and finishing as explained in Fig. 22. 
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Figure 22: Risk assessment life cycle in construction (Zavadskas et al., 2010).  
 
 
3.3. Interview  
 
The interview structure will be divided into five sections as shown in Appendix B which 
cover the following areas: general information, risk assessment mechanism, procedural 
challenges, safety culture and technical safety. The first section aims to examine the 
interviewee‘s background in oil and gas projects and how he/she is involved in the construction 
activities through various undertaken responsibilities. Following this, generic questions about 
safety engineering system performance and implementation will be asked to determine his/her 
opinion about the current safety measures against all the possible hazards in the construction 
industry. After that, the second section will cover the reasons pertaining to the weakness of risk 
assessment. Direct and comprehensive questions will be directed to the interviewee to give 
him/her more flexibility in elaborating on the risk factors and recommendations that can be 
employed to enhance the risk assessment implementation. In the third section, the focus will be 
about why many construction organizations do not pay the required attention towards the safety 
regulations and procedures e.g. not updating the procedures and lack of enforcing the safety 
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standards. The interview will also examine the interviewee‘s opinion about the government‘s 
role in ensuring the efficiency of the organization procedural schemes in the Middle East. 
Two main interviews will be conducted in this study. The purpose of conducting these 
interviews is to recognize the root causes for the risk factors affecting the implementation 
process of safety engineering system. Many safety engineering scholars use the interview 
method as a method at the experimental stage of the construction activities related research. For 
example, Törner and Pousette (2009) employed the interview approach to determine the 
influential factors that increase the gap between the construction workers and managers. 
3.4. Development of a new framework 
 
This research study will propose a framework that is based in the outcomes of both of the 
questionnaire and interviews phases. As this study is try to examine the gaps from all the 
different aspects, this framework will be divided into three main categories: technical, 
procedural, and behavioural.  This classification of the framework can significantly aid this study 
to achieve its aim. For example, if the management is willing to enhance the safety performance 
in the organization, a specific plan is required to be applied in an efficient and focused approach. 
In addition the presence of clear and integrated framework in the organization can provide 
visible communication channels, especially for the workers in the site to maintain high safety 
performance. For instance, as shown in literature review in Chapter 2, many major safety 
incidents happened in oil and gas industry due to the absence of safety communication scheme 
e.g. Piper Alpha.  
To avoid such kind of disasters, this framework will display how non-technical elements 
such as behavioural safety can disturb the whole communication process in which eventually 
affect the safety performance of the workers. For that, as it will be shown in this framework, the 
connection and mechanism between the elements of these three categories are displayed. This 
will help the senior managements to fully understand all the potential hazards that are associated 
with the construction activities and give them the chance to act proactively towards a safer 
culture. By applying this approach, the decision making step becomes more noticeable for the 
managers where they may require this visibility due to lack of safety information of the 
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construction site. As a result, better understanding and decision making will arise along with the 
risk assessment implementation. The systemic roles of framework inputs are explained in detail 
in Chapter 6.  
 
3.5. Qualitative and quantitative validation  
 
To ensure the effectiveness and feasibility of the proposed framework, it is needed to 
validate it in both qualitative and quantitative research approaches. Since the aim of this study is 
to enhance the safety implementation, the framework should be adoptable and practical for the 
all employee in the organization. That is, as in the interview stage, safety construction 
professionals will review the framework and discuss the potential challenges that may face the 
applications of the framework. The qualitative validation is conducted via construction manager 
and site supervisor to determine different views from all employment categories in the 
organization. The involvement of the end-users through the supervisor validation will add 
several advantages to reinforce the implementation process. For instance, according to Hale and 
Borys believe (2013), due to the poor involvement, variety of the safety frameworks has not been 
efficient and difficult to be understood by the workers.   
However, since this framework is designed for the construction industry, a quantitative 
validation is advised to support the usage of this framework. In construction, there are numbers 
of safety KPIs where most of them are reactive ones. The utilization of proactive KPIs is one of 
the major current gaps in the safety engineering system. For that, in this research study, a new 
concept, Total Positive Outcome Indicator (TPOI), is employed to determine the amount of effort 
that is put to enhance the safety performance. To be aligned with the main perception of 
framework, integrated examination, technical, procedural, and behavioural indicators will be 
essential part of TPOI calculation. Selecting the indicators will be the first step to apply TPOI. 
Here, calculating the spent man-hours is the next step (for each indicator) to quantify the 
consumed positive effort and energy. However, to correlate these performance indicators and 
their role in improving the safety performance, they should be displayed with known safety KPIs 
such as Total Recordable Incident (TRI). In this study two hydrocarbon construction projects 
have been selected to apply the performance indictors to their safety statistics. 
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3.6. Summary of the chapter  
 
The behavioral feature in this questionnaire will focus on the employee welfare aspect 
whether at home or work place and how it influences the safety performance of the labourers at 
the construction stage. Moreover, employee development will be examined in this method to 
determine the professional strengthening such as training courses and workshops that the 
organization provides to the employees to improve their safety awareness in the field. Zohar 
(2000) believes that examining behavioral employees, especially end-users, can help identify the 
senior management safety leadership and the quality of the internal communication between the 
organization employees. 
The sampling method chosen for the questionnaire of this research is stratified random 
sampling. Many safety engineering professionals consider stratified random sampling an 
effective to measure the safety performance in construction and various other industries. For 
example, Hofmann & Stetzer (1998) explain that using stratified random sampling in 
construction safety can help produce diverse experimental cells that contain managers and 
construction labourers from various owners and contractors companies in a way that gives a 
precise representation for the targeted population. In addition, Aksorn & Hadikusumo (2008) 
agree in utilizing stratified random sampling as a desirable statistical to analysis safety factors in 
construction due to the different companies with diverse responsibilities that are involved in the 
same construction project. As such, stratified random samples were selected in this 
questionnaire. Under the 95% confidence internal for a population of about 4000 employees and 
a margin of error of about 5%, a representative sample size was calculated to be around 350 
employees. In this research work, 355 responses (42 managers, 313 labourers) was collected it.  
The questions in this interview will be focused on the areas that highlight the main safety 
concerns that were exposed through the questionnaire, such as risk assessment weaknesses, 
absence of consideration of human factors in the safety system, and gaps in the equipment safety. 
To gain an integrated perspective on these issues, two interviews will be conducted in this 
research. One of the interviewees holds a senior managerial post and the other holds a 
supervision role at the end-users in the construction workplace. Comparing their answers will 
illustrate the difference in opinion of management and the labour force in the organization. 
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According to Fung et al. (2005), one of the best method to determine the safety culture defects at 
the construction site is questioning the decision makers (managers and above) evaluation of the 
labour‘s safety performance. Simultaneously, the authors stress the importance of capturing the 
end-users‘ assessment regarding the organization top management disciplines and strategies to 
implement safety in the oil and gas construction sites. 
Finally, to meet all the objectives, a validation processes will be applied to the developed 
framework. This framework provides a new concept on how the risk assessment can be utilized 
in a way that can be better integrated with all the work attributes at the construction site. The 
needs of an integrated examination in hydrocarbon construction projects have been mentioned by 
several academic professionals, as discussed in Chapter 1 and 2. However, it is vital to validate 
this framework from an industrial perspective by quantitative and qualitative approaches to 
determine its suitability as a method. As suggested in this study, the safety KPIs should be 
orientated towards the time and effort spent in implementing the safety system. As a result, 
leading indicators need to be used to examine the effort of both management and workers to 
provide safety environment at the workplace.  
In the end of this chapter, Table 4 summaries the methodology approaches for each 
objective in this study: 
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Table 4: Methodology approaches for the study objectives 
Objective Methodology 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
Objective 1 
Evaluating the current 
defects in the risk 
assessment as a 
method used in the 
safety engineering 
system 
        Objective 2 
Examining top risk 
factors in UAE oil and 
gas construction 
projects 
           
Objective 3 
Developing a framework 
to enhance the 
application of risk 
assessment for 
optimizing safety-
engineering system 
 
Objective 4 
Validating the developed 
framework through 
industry professionals 
 
Methodology for 
Objective 1 
 
Questionnaire 
Methodology for 
Objective 2 
 
Interviews 
Methodology for 
Objective 3 
Analyzing the results of 
the Questionnaire and 
Interviews 
Methodology for 
Objective 4 
Quantitative and 
qualitative Validations 
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Chapter 4: Data analysis and discussion 
  
4.1. Introduction 
 
The questionnaires start with demographic questions such as age, employer, gender and 
job position where these kinds of questions will provide a better approach and understanding in 
the result analyzing stage. This will result on providing an effective integrated framework for the 
targeted populations in this research. The first question in the general demographic question 
section starts with inquiring the type of the construction company that the employer works in it 
(e.g. owner, vendor, and contractor). The majority of the responses in this questionnaire came 
from owner companies represented by government companies such as Abu Dhabi Marine 
Operating Company (ADMA-OPCO)) and international contractor companies such as 
Consolidated Contractors Company (CCC). An estimated population number was determined to 
enable the calculation of an optimum sample size for the questionnaire. 
 
4.2. Statistical significance 
 
In this research work, Z score test was applied to verify the statistical significance for the 
following statements in the questionnaire where several scholars such as Goncalves et al., (2007) 
suggest using  Z  score test (two tailed) with stratified random sampling method as it provides 
the flexibility on assigning the weights for the variables. Supporting that, Lee et al., (2007) use Z 
score test as a statistical approach to determine the level of safety culture in different industries 
including construction.   
The following equation and parameters were used for the Z score test: 
𝑧 =
𝑃1 − 𝑃2
√𝑃(1 − 𝑃) (
1
𝑛1
−
1
𝑛2
)
 
 
Equation 1: Z score test Equation for two Populations. 
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n1= Total number of Population 1 (42 Managers). 
n2= Total number of Population 2 (313 Labours). 
P1 = Proportion (or total number) of individuals from sample Population 1 (n1) that agree or 
strongly agree with the statement of the question. 
P2 = Proportion (or total number) of individuals from sample Population 2 (n2) that agree or 
strongly agree with the statement of the question. 
 
Confident Level (CL) = 95%. 
 
Pooled sample proportion (P) = (p1 * n1 + p2 * n2) / (n1 + n2) 
M= Managers 
L= Labours 
 
4.3. Analysis of the results 
 
 Demographic questions 
 
 
 
Figure 23: Type of the construction company. 
51% 
M=12 
L=169 
4% 
M=1 
L= 14 
45% 
M=29 
L=130 
Owners Vendors Contractors
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Fig. 23 shows that 51% of the respondents are working with owner companies, 45% with 
the contractor companies and only 4% working with vendors companies. These numbers reflect 
the realistic employment landscape of UAE oil and gas construction industry in which most 
employees at the construction site at oil and gas rigs are either from owner or contractor 
companies. A vast majority of the responses came from males (92%) as shown in Fig. 24. This is 
due to the nature of the culture and physical requirements of the construction labourers role. 
 
 
Figure 24: Employee gender. 
 
Most employees participating in this survey were of the age between 20 and 50 as Fig. 25 
explicates. Of this, 30-40 years old employees are the majority (33%). The explanation for that is 
that many employees in the oil and gas construction field usually get to the seniority or 
managerial post when they are 40-50 years old. As explained above, work in the oil and gas 
construction projects demands physical and mental wellbeing and as such, many employees tend 
to retiree when they reach age 50. This explains why only 7% of the targeted population was 
above 50 years old. For the fresh construction workers, they start their career at a very young 
age, ranging from 17 to 19 years old. 
However, this questionnaire displays that both experienced and fresh construction 
labourers share the same education levels, which is a basic level. Fig. 26 illustrates that most 
92% 
M=39 
L=313 
8% 
M=3 
Male Female
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construction labourers find it very difficult to communicate in English, which poses a severe 
challenge to understand the safety producers and manuals made available at the construction rig. 
 
Figure 25: Employee age. 
By comparison, supervisors and administrative employees boast high school or university 
diplomas which assist them in conducting the documentation work in their job duties. 
 
 
Figure 26: Education level of employees. 
Bachelor and Master Degree holders occupy the leading roles in the organization, such as 
fresh engineers all the way up to senior engineers and senior manager posts that have a 
12% 
L=43 
24% 
M=4 
L=80 
33% 
M=5 
L=112 
24% 
M=30 
L=56 
7% 
M=3 
L=22 
Under 20 20-30 30-40 40-50 Above 50
70% 
L=249 
18% 
M=4 
L=60 
10% 
M=32 
L=4 
2% 
M=6 
Basic Diploma BSc or MSc PhD
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significant authority at the construction field. It can be seen from Fig. 26 that there are three 
main classifications with respect to the education level in construction: 
 Basic education (70%) 
 Diploma (18%) 
 Bachelor or Master Degrees (10%) 
Employees with PhD degrees usually work in the corporate offices and they come to the 
construction rig as temporary assignment to conducted courses for other employees as part of the 
employee development plans in the organization. This explains why only 2% employees hold 
PhD degrees.  
In terms of job position demographics, there are two classifications to select: end-user 
(labourer and technician), and senior staff (managers and senior managers) as evidenced by Fig. 
27.  
 
 
Figure 27: Job position for the employee.  
 
The results in Fig. 27 simulate the reality of job position distribution in the most 
construction companies, especially in UAE. To illustrate, Al-Kaabi and Hadipriono (2003) 
mention that the majority of the employee of the construction companies in UAE are the 
construction workers, which is the reason why the level of risk exposure and accident rate is high 
88% 
M=313 
12%  
M=42 
End-users Senior staff
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in UAE. However, the authors believe that even if the mainstream of the employees at the 
construction organizations are labourers, the focus of safety engineering implementation should 
not be only narrowed for this group but should involve all the organization employees from the 
top management to the end users level to ensure safety culture at the construction site. 
The aim of the next section in the questionnaires is to examine the employees‘ familiarity 
with safety practices and procedures inside the organization and at the construction site. Having 
the required safety knowledge is vital for them to enhance their risk assessment implementation 
skill. According to Liaudanskiene et al., (2009) being familiar with the company safety manuals 
and producers provides employees a clear perspective on how to apply the safety instructions for 
the construction activities.  
 
 Technical/Procedural/behavioral questions 
   
The first question in this section scrutinizes how employees feel about the strength of 
their HSE MS and its strength as procedural and applied system in the organization. 
 
 
Z value= 2.541 ,   P value= 0.011 
Figure 28: The company has a strong HSE management system. 
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Fig. 28 displays that 45% of the employees agree that their companies have a strong 
system whether from the procedural and technical perspectives while 32% do not agree that their 
construction companies provide a strong HSE MS. In this question most employees who strongly 
agree about the high strength of the HSE MS (12%) were from the senior staff especially from 
the top management. Conversely, the 11% who do not agree are from the end user classification 
(labourers and technicians). These results show that there lack of agreement about how strong 
the HSE MS is between the oil and gas construction companies in UAE.  
The next question was geared towards gauging the knowledge level of the employees 
with risk assessment such as methods that are used in their construction companies in the oil and 
gas industry. 
 
 
Z value= 0.677,   P value= 0.496 
Figure 29: You are familiar with risk assessment methods. 
Based on Fig. 29, one can argue that most employees lack sufficient knowledge of safety 
systems. The 43% who disagree are from the end users employee category. This can indicate a 
lack of training for the construction labourers which can cause serious safety issues due to the 
high exposure level with all identified potential hazards. To avoid any of these incidents because 
of lack of risk assessment skills, Schieg (2009) suggests that risk assessment courses should be 
available for all the employees in the organization, including labourer and technician, where 
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many of the construction companies try to improve the risk assessment skills only for senior 
decision-making staff. The author believes that a common error that construction companies 
make is their beliefs that risk assessments are only conducted in offices. Upon analyzing Fig. 29, 
it can be noticed that 21% strongly agree on the familiarity with risk assessment methods and all 
of these responses came from senior engineers or managers. This supports Schieg statement 
about how construction companies predominantly focus upon developing the risk assessment 
skills for the senior staff without involving other employees. 
The next question tackles a crucial point related to organization behavioral safety. The 
question attempts to explore the incidents reporting culture at the facility, where different 
construction companies have different attitudes towards the reporting system.  
 
 
Z value= 3.201 ,   P value= 0.001 
Figure 30: LTI accidents are always reported in your company. 
The question, as illustrated by Fig. 30, pertains to if your construction company reports 
all LTI incidents that occur in the field in which displays the organization commitment towards 
exposing the gaps and the defects that they have in their safety engineering system. According to 
Macrae, (2007) that the practices of reporting the incident in the facility have a direct and 
effective impact on the risk assessment implementation on the individual employee and this is 
because, these practices represent the visibility and leadership of the organization. Therefore, if 
the employee finds his/her organization practice healthy reporting system without hiding 
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incidents or using blaming culture against the violator, he/she will report all the defects in the 
used risk assessment  thus advancing the implementation process. From Fig. 30, it can be seen 
that 50% of all employee strongly believe that their construction companies report all LTI 
incidents, which shows a healthy reporting system in the oil and gas construction industry. 20% 
of the employees, who disagree about LTI reporting system, mostly came from vendor 
companies which are often unfamiliar with the reporting system.  
 
 
Z value= 3.201,   P value= 0.001,    
Figure 31: Your Company's provides enough training to ensure safety competencies level between its employees. 
Fig. 31 explicates one of the most important points regarding the employee development 
i.e. the professional safety development at the construction organization. Champan (2001) claims 
that most construction companies do not provide technical safety courses for their employees. 
This is especially true in the case of construction labourers. This explains why many of the end 
user staff lacks even the basic understanding of safety construction procedures in their 
organization. This is the reason why the question mentions the word ―enough‖ to examine the 
respondent‘s opinion about the training courses that he/she is receiving. As shown in Fig. 31, 
40% (mostly senior staff members) do not believe they have enough safety courses required for 
their jobs. Additionally, 14% who strongly disagree about the current safety courses hold 
managerial posts. This is shocking because construction companies should provide their safety 
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managers with high quality and integrated safety training courses to ensure senior staff 
competence because they represent the organization leadership and visibility. It is essential for 
end user employees to see their line supervisors and managers displaying high quality safety 
skills which in turn encourage them to follow and implement the safety engineering system at the 
construction site.  
 
 
Z value=5.552 ,   P value=.0.0 
Figure 32: There are efficient communication channels between the management and the labourers. 
 
To practice this healthy and safety relationship between manager and end users, clear and 
effective communication should be in a place inside the construction organization. 
Communication can be the most important element for the whole safety engineering system in 
construction field especially in the emergency situations where ambiguous communication in the 
facility, can lead to poor safety control and mitigation of hazards. This further leads to serious 
accidents at the construction sites. Pinto et al., (2001) mention that poor risk communication, 
which can occur because of variety of external and internal factors, creates a gap between 
managers and employee thus impacting the implementation process in the safety engineering 
system. 
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Fig. 32 explains how most employees (59%) in construction companies believe they lack 
efficient communication channels in their organizations and majority of the employee who 
disagree and strongly disagree are construction workers. Communication represents the key that 
they need to use in their safety daily job duties whether to receive the managerial instructions 
from the senior staff or translate, supervise, and implement them to the labourers. The 10% who 
strongly believe the efficiency of the communication are from the very top management such as 
constructions managers and vice presidents of the organization, as shown in Fig. 32. 
On the flipside, only a few construction labourers and technicians agree on the quality of 
the communication channels. This may be due to the communication mentality for the senior 
staff inside the construction facility in which they do not properly deal with all external and 
internal factors that influence the integrity of the safety communication. For example, Kine et al., 
(2010) mention that senior management at the construction companies should include factors 
such as work involvement and education levels of foremen in their communication plan from the 
design phase until construction phase. This helps the implementation process of the risk 
assessment. 
The next question focuses on a critical aspect for safety implementation at the 
construction organization which is management, leadership and commitment. According to Zhou 
et al., (2010) BBS of the foreman can be a real challenge for risk assessment implementations 
due to their weak safety understanding and background. To overcome this issue, there should be 
a real influential example from the senior management to highlight the importance of 
implementing safety instructions at the construction site. 
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Z value=0.778,   P value= 0.435 
Figure 33: Top Management conducts regular safety tours to construction fields. 
In this questionnaire, management leadership was examined through their commitment 
towards safety visits to the construction fields. As shown in Fig. 33, there are extremely high 
numbers of responses (70%) agree and (25%) strongly agree from all categories who believe the 
management leadership is present at the construction sites and this indicates a positive sign of the 
visibility of the senior management in the oil and gas construction industry in UAE. The 
presence of top management for safety tours and safety workshops has a great impact on the 
safety behavior of other employees. Most important it is the quality of these safety visits which 
can be ensured by effective listening and follow-ups with visit findings to enhance the risk 
assessment implementation progression (Zhou et al., 2010).  
The questionnaire explores the procedural features and effects on the risk assessment 
implementation in the safety engineering systems in the individual and group level. The very 
first procedural document that any employee should have is the job description that highlights 
the employee‘s role and responsibilities including the safety one at the construction site.  
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Z value= 2.787 ,   P value=0.005 
Figure 34: You understand your role and responsibilities towards safety in your job. 
As shown in Fig. 34 that there are two main responses for this question: first, 56% who 
agree that they understand their safety responsibilities comprise mostly of end user staff 
members. The second category of responses (34%) came mostly from construction labourers or 
top managers who lack a full understanding of their safety responsibilities on site. This is a 
highly troubling result because these two roles should have a solid understanding of their safety 
duties. Most construction managers in the oil and gas industry are held accountable for any 
safety incidents arising at the construction site. For the construction labourers, they should totally 
understand all technical and the procedural producers that are associated in their construction 
activities since they are highly exposed to all potential hazards at the construction field.  
A contrasting result occurred when the respondents were asked about the employee 
individual understanding towards safety responsibilities of his/her line supervisor at the 
construction organization. Toole (2002) explains that it is extremely important for the 
construction employee, especially the foremen, to fully understand their line supervisor safety 
roles in order to recognize their own safety responsibilities.  
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Z value=-1.306 ,   P value=0.190 
Figure 35: You understand your line supervisors’ role and responsibilities towards safety in his job. 
Fig. 35 shows that 52% of the employees do not know the safety roles of their line 
supervisors. As mentioned above, the lack of such information has a negative impact on 
employee‘s safety accountability. Conversely, most end user staff members agree 30% and 8% 
strongly agree, which is a strong indication that supervisors and coordinators are the most 
knowledgeable employee category when it comes to understanding supervisor safety 
responsibilities in oil and gas construction industry in UAE.  
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Z value=-0.111 ,   P value=0.912 
Figure 36: Safety policies and procedures are up to date in your company. 
The next question tackles the updating of safety policies and procedures inside the 
construction organization. According to Kartam et al., (2000) safety procedures plays a vital 
function in ensuring the safety at the construction sites where all incidents investigations mainly 
use the company safety procedures as primary reference for their investigation judgment. 
However, Fig. 36 displays extremely negative results where most respondents in all employee 
categories strongly believe that their construction company does not update their safety 
procedures. Kartam et al., (2000) illustrates that many of construction companies avoid the cost 
of updating the safety policies and procedures. In the long term, not updating the safety 
procedures may lead to serious violations against government regulations thus incurring severe 
ramifications. Furthermore, in case of a facility accident, it is hard for the insurance company to 
approve the construction organization claim if they do not have updated procedure that complies 
with the government regulations. 
Following this, the questionnaire focuses on the procedural safety group awareness. 
Toole (2002) believes that it is extremely important to determine the general perspective of 
safety among the employee themselves at the construction site because it can give the level and 
maturity of safety culture at the construction site. 
Fig. 37 displays that 50% of the construction company‘s employees (mostly managerial 
level employees) believe that their colleagues do not have a good understanding of the safety 
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policies and procedures inside their organizations. Aksorn & Hadikusumo (2008) explains that 
the high number of employees at the construction industry, especially in the Middle East, have a 
major challenge to understand the safety procedures due to the lack of education. This leads to 
several difficulties in safety implementation on the site. 
 
 
Z value=-2.874 ,   P value=0.004 
Figure 37: Safety policies and procedures are well understood by employees. 
The authors believe that construction managers can avoid these procedural challenges by 
simplifying the safety procedures and preparing proper safety induction booklet that illustrates 
all the required safety polices in a way that suits the capability of the construction labourers. 
The next question focuses on the organizational practices that occur in every construction 
facilities and their role in implementing risk assessment. The following question, as Fig. 38 
shows, asks respondents if they attend safety meetings in their own department. Usually there are 
various kinds of safety meetings at the construction companies where these safety meeting can 
be conducted in yearly, quarterly monthly, weekly and daily basis for different levels of the 
organization. Schultz (2004) claims that commitment of employees to attend theses kind of 
meetings reflects the employees‘ willingness to implement the safety measure in their duties. He 
adds that most employees from the top management to the foreman level have the intention to 
apply safety engineering system in the work cycle but they face obstacles in the way of its 
implementation, such as inadequate risk assessment. This explains why in Fig. 38 there is an 
6% 
M=3 
L=16 
50% 
M=29 
L=149 
31% 
M=6 
L=105 
13% 
M=4 
L=43 
Strongly Disagree Disagree  Agree Strongly Agree
91 
  
enormous agreement (54% agree and 33% strongly agree, respectively) for attending the safety 
meetings in oil and gas construction companies in UAE.  
 
Z value=1.241 ,   P value= 0.214 
Figure 38: You always attended the safety meeting in your department. 
As depicted in Fig. 39, respondents were asked if their construction organizations report 
all the fatal accidents at the construction fields. When compared to Fig. 30, one notices how 
almost all employees strongly agree that fatalities are recorded and reported. This may be due to 
the high severity of these accidents. For instance, Macrue (2007) states that it is difficult for any 
construction organization to hide lost human capital although unfortunately many try to avoid 
taking full responsibility by claiming they provide a safe environment in the work place. 
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Z value=1.858 ,   P value=0.062 
Figure 39: Fatality accidents are always reported in your company. 
 
 
Z value= 10.413,   P value=0 
Figure 40: The management provides safe work place for the end users employees. 
The next question aims to evaluate Macrue‘s (2007) point by directly asking the 
employees if their management provides a safe environment at the construction site or not. As 
Mercure predicts, 65% employees disagree, with most responses coming from the end user 
0% 
5% 
L=18 
2% 
L=6 
93% 
M=42 
L=289 
Strongly Disagree Disagree  Agree Strongly Agree
15% 
M=3 
L=49 
65% 
M=5 
L=226 
16% 
M=28 
L=29 
4% 
M=6 
L=9 
Strongly Disagree Disagree  Agree Strongly Agree
93 
  
employees. On the flip side, most managers responded with strong agreement (4%) that can be 
explicated as a defensive point view. 
Extra work loading can have a significant impact upon risk assessment implementation at 
the construction sites. Bates & Schneider (2008) conducted a field experiment that gauged 
physiological, psychological and sociological effects of construction workers due to the work 
loading in UAE. The authors use questionnaires and interviews as a methodology in experiment 
where the data analysis show how most construction workers suffer from fatigue due to 
workload pressure and the work environment. That is, most labourers said that they often face 
pressure from their management to increase production rate without considering the employee 
welfare aspects. For example, many construction labourers in the summer time suffer from 
thermal stress, adversely affecting their safety performance. This in turn results in labourers 
falling victim to several serious, even fatal, accidents.  
 
Z value=-7.746 ,  P value=0 
Figure 41: End users employees face heavy workload pressure in their job. 
The authors suggest that construction managers need to consider foremen welfare so as to 
ensure the safety in their construction activities and thus preventing human capital and economic 
loss. The questionnaire tries to examine the work-load level for oil and gas construction workers 
in UAE where Fig. 41 depicts how 67% employees believe that they are facing heavy workload. 
Many managers and senior employees strongly disagree with this statement, believing their 
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workers do not face any extra load and that the current work load is within the workers physical 
and mental capacity. 
While pervious questions in the questionnaire analyzed factors that can influence risk 
assessment implementation, the next question inquiries about the full implementation of this 
safety engineering at the construction field. There was strong agreement (64% strongly agree) 
from organizations employees in all the categories (i.e. Manager, engineers and labourers) as 
shown in Fig. 42. The results in Fig. 42 raise numerous vital questions on the contrasted 
responses about risk assessment implementation in the questionnaires so far. For instance, many 
senior staff members remain convinced that they provide all the necessary support from all 
different resources, materials, and equipment to ensure the safety environment in the work place.  
 
 
Z value= 0.4501,   P value= 0.652 
Figure 42: Risk assessment is fully implemented in construction fields. 
However, most admit to having major issues with the risk assessment implementation 
which is highly unlikely if the management employs visible leadership and adequate decision-
making mechanism in its risk assessment procedures. 
Koller (2005) expounds that most industries focus on the outcomes of the risk assessment 
from one perspective which leads to inadequate decision-making. This is applicable from the 
safety feature, where a variety of industrial companies tries to evaluate the risk assessment 
outcomes from the financial phase only. According to Koller this can be due to the limited 
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understanding of integrated safety system or due to the shortage of resources such as materials, 
equipment and man powers.  
 
 
Z value=2.059 ,   P value=0.039 
Figure 43: There is a poor decision making due to inadequate risk assessment. 
Fig. 43 demonstrates the strong agreement among all the respondents that the decision-
making mechanism is not that efficient and impact the risk assessment. The majority of the 52% 
of the respondents are holding a decision-maker role and this shows that the management at the 
construction organizations knows and admits about the weakness of the decision-making and its 
effect towards safety engineering systems. As expounded by Koller, this poor decision making 
process can be because of the lack of the knowledge or resources and to avoid these factors, the 
author suggests that the organization should establish a clear, updated and integrated decision-
making plan as part of the organization strategic vision. 
This brings the importance of the strategic plan of the organization and its safety 
performance in the oil and gas construction rigs. Jaselskis et al., (1996) explain that strategic 
development of construction facility usually displays the direction of the company construction 
operation plan, but to ensure the safety integrity, HSE plan should go in parallel with business 
plan. For instance, when the construction organizations aim to expand the construction activities, 
they need to increase the man power and resources to maintain the healthy and safe environment 
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in the workplace. Fig. 44 illustrates how employees have different opinions about the effects of 
organization strategic plan on safety implementation. 
 
 
Z value=2.169 ,   P value=0.030 
Figure 44: Safety implementation is a direct output of the company’s strategic plan. 
 
For example, 35% of the employees strongly agree with the safety role of the strategic 
plans, where most respondents were from the end user staff members that include fresh and 
young employees, engineers and coordinators. The reasons for that is that although these young 
employees have the technical skills to ensure the safety presence at the construction sites, to 
implement the integrated safety model in the site, a long-term vision is needed that should be 
initiated from the top management (Jaselskis et al., 1996). Moreover, the majority of foremen 
responded with disagree (16%) and strongly disagree (26%), indicating a lack of understanding 
of supervisor safety role as stated in Fig. 35. 
The next question in the questionnaire evaluates the monitoring system at the 
construction companies in the oil and gas rigs. Communication is a crucial element in monitoring 
system and as illustrated in Fig. 33, there is major concern amongst the employees regarding the 
quality of the communication in their organizations. However, Fig. 45 presents what the 
employees think about the safety role of the whole monitoring system in construction activities. 
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Not surprisingly, most employees strongly disagree with the efficiency of the safety monitoring 
system applied at the construction sites (Fig. 45). This matches the respondents‘ opinion about 
communication mapped earlier in Fig. 33. Naticchia et al., (2013) explains that many 
construction companies may have strong safety monitoring systems that cover different areas and 
protection layers such as PTW (procedural precaution), safety control (Technical), safety best 
practice (Managerial). However, the authors believe that the monitoring system could lose a lot 
of its strength if proper communication is absent because it contains a lot of planning initiates 
that require effective and clear communication channels.  
 
Z value=0.803 ,   P value=0.423 
Figure 45: your Company’s provides an efficient and effective safety monitoring system towards safety issues in the 
construction fields. 
The next question examines the safety compliance of the organization by inquiring if the 
respondents‘ construction companies consider safety as its priority, shown in Fig. 46. A vast 
majority of the survey participants (75%) agree that safety is one of the most essential elements 
in their agenda and this proves the willingness of the oil and gas construction companies to apply 
safety. Simultaneously, however, it explains the management‘s struggle in implementing these 
safety systems. 
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Z value=2.069 ,   P value=0.038 
Figure 46: Safety issues are priority for the management agendas. 
Legal enforcement is a critical element that can enormously help organizations 
implement safety systems at the construction sites and prevent potential accidents. For example, 
Tam et al., (2004) mention that one of the main safety challenge faced by the Chinese 
construction industry is laws and regulations enforcements. 
 
Z value=1.815 ,   P value=0.068 
Figure 47: There is strict enforcement of safe working procedures and policies. 
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The authors provide several reasons for this, one of which is the lack of the specific 
safety regulations bodies that ensure the implementation of the government safety legislations. 
According to the authors this enhances all different methods in the safety system such as risk 
assessment. As Fig. 47 illustrates, the questionnaire compiled the employees‘ response about the 
enforcement mechanism in their organization, where 62% do not agree about its safety 
effectiveness. It is not necessary that this number reflects the weak enforcement performance of 
the construction organizations because, as discussed in Chapter 2, there is major lack of federal 
government safety bodies that can supervise the construction activities in oil and gas industry. 
 
Z value=1.814 ,   P value=0.067 
Figure 48: Construction workers are well motivated to work safely. 
Ligard (2002) holds that safety motivation is the key element to enhance the safety 
behavior of the individual employee. This is especially true for construction labourers because it 
helps them avoid personal injuries and improve the occupational safety at the construction sites. 
Fig. 48 shows that there is a major issue regarding the safety motivation in the oil and gas 
construction companies in UAE. 62% strongly disagree and only 25% disagree in regard to the 
existence and efficiency of the safety motivation. According to Ligard this can be solved via 
organizational influences and practices such as establishing health and safety rewarding system 
for the foremen at the construction field. This highlights the importance of the organizational 
practices in implementing the safety system inside the construction activities.  
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Auditing can be considered best procedural control measures to ensure the organizational 
safety practices. Lund & Aarø (2004) debate that audits and inspection are tools for ensuring the 
integrity and the implementation process of the safety engineering system. However, the authors 
believe that most construction firms have implementation issues with the audit findings, where 
systematically, all the findings should be followed to ensure the required changes have been 
applied. Another critical point referred by the author is that many auditors do not focus on the 
integrity of the risk assessment mechanism employed in the safety system in the organization.  
 
 
Z value=2.731 ,   P value=0.006 
Figure 49: Audit and inspection are conducted effectively. 
Fig. 49 depicts how majority of the respondents (47%) believe they have an effective 
audit system at their facilities thus indicating a positive procedural safety of oil and gas 
construction in UAE. However, as Fig. 42 shows, there is a concern about the integrity of the 
risk assessment which can mar the audit and inspection methodology, as pointed out by Lund & 
Aarø (2004). 
Following this, the questionnaire focuses on the technical safety at the construction site in 
which equipment safety takes an essential part of the operation safety at the construction sites. 
Cann et al., (2003) expound that to ensure operation safety in construction activities, there are 
three important aspects that should be covered in construction: reliability, availability, 
maintainability. The author explains that these elements aid construction inspectors in evaluating 
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the equipment safety for current and future instances, which will improve the implementation of 
safety system on a long-term basis. For example, the authors add that during the risk assessment 
stage all the reliability insurance tests and maintenance records of construction equipment should 
be studied. This will prevent any fatigue failure that may occur due to over usage at the 
construction site. Moreover, the authors suggest all reliability records, especially of the heavy 
static and mobile equipment used at the field, should be made available along with the safety 
construction engineer to implement the risk assessment effectively. Fig. 50 shows that most 
employees disagree about the safety equipment safety at the construction site where 61% of the 
respondents hold managerial posts. This raises the question about the asset management role in 
implementing the safety system in their construction organizations. 
 
 
Z value=1.793,   P value=0.073 
Figure 50: Equipment that is used in construction fields are safety inspected. 
According to Sutton (2014) project management skills are as important as technical 
safety skills in implementing the safety system as it plays a critical role in distributing the 
resources in the whole construction phases. The author explains that inadequate resources 
allocation in all construction project designing phases, concept selection, process design and 
final design will lead to safety implementation disputes in the project execution phases. The 
author believes that in the designing phases, all major hazards should be examined as a lack of 
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resources preparation, i.e. allocation of safety machinery equipment, could cause accidents at the 
project sites at the construction, operation stage or both. 
 
 
Z value=0.281 ,   P value=0.779 
Figure 51: your Company’s uses sufficient resources to ensure safety during construction. 
Fig. 51 displays that 56% of employees agree that management use sufficient resources in 
the organization construction project. The agreed respondents are predominantly manager as well 
as senior and end user engineers. According to Burt et al. (2004) this may be a logical response 
from their side since resources allocation is one of the core elements in the managerial and 
leadership skills. Thus, senior staff may not wish to expose any faults in it. However, in the same 
question, there is an unusually high percentage, chiefly construction workers, who strongly 
disagree that resources are used to maintain safety. This raises a serious safety concern that is 
echoed by the authors earlier. 
The survey then asks the respondents about the procedural controls and the disciplinary 
systems against safety violations that exist in their construction firms. Molenaar & Washington 
(2009) hold that the presence of the disciplinary is vital in the workplace, but using it incorrectly 
can be counter-productive towards the safety system. That is, many industrial companies employ 
an aggressive disciplinary system via salary dedication, blaming culture, and revoking annual 
bonus. Instead, Molenaar & Washington argue, the industrial management should use a coaching 
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culture as their first choice because the purpose of the disciplinary system is to learn and teach 
above all else. 
 
 
Z value=4.697 ,   P value=0 
Figure 52: Your Company takes disciplinary actions against people violating policies and safety procedures. 
Fig. 52 presents the serious organizational gap in the implementation of the disciplinary 
system, where 52% of all employees strongly disagree with the disciplinary enforcement in their 
organization. Fang and Wong (2006) claim that weak implementation of disciplinary 
enforcement impacts other safety system implementation in construction such as risk assessment. 
The questionnaire then focuses on the safety practices that should take place at the 
construction site. According to the Fang and Wong that construction site safety practices play a 
critical role in sustaining the workers safety where mainly it can be performed through physical 
and organizational phases. Gillen et al. (2002) explain that the physical practices can involve a 
variety of actions such as daily site inspection and regular supervision. The authors provide 
several examples of safety schemes that can be applied at the construction site, such as the PTW 
system.  
Fig. 53 maps out the strong agreement (67%) between all the respondents that there is a 
daily supervision practice at the construction site, which indicates the high site safety awareness 
level amongst construction site workers. This is because construction site workers are directly 
52% 
M=23 
L=162 
31% 
M=2 
L=108 
14% 
M=12 
L=38 
3% 
M=6 
L=5 
Strongly Disagree Disagree  Agree Strongly Agree
104 
  
exposed to the hazards thus making them conscious of and more recipients to the importance of 
site safety, as opposed to the office employees in the same organization. 
 
 
Z value=1.270 ,   P value=0.204 
Figure 53: Field Safety supervision is conducted regularly. 
 
Unsurprisingly, a similarly strong agreement was shown in the next question. Fig. 54 
shows how 82% of the employees strongly agree about the usage of the PTW system at the 
construction site. This confirms the point raised by Gillen et al. (2002) regarding the high safety 
awareness of the construction site workers towards the site safety practices, physical and 
organizational. In addition, DeJoy (2005) believes that PTW system can ensure a safe 
environment for all site activities while also monitoring the labourers practices. It can also 
mitigate any gap that may arise in the initial process of implementing the safety engineering 
system. 
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Z value = 2.050,   P value=0.039 
Figure 54: PTW system is always applied before the start of any job in the field. 
 
Z value=10.413  ,   P value=0 
Figure 55: your Company’s safety management applies continuous improvement concept.  
Many scholars consider safety engineering as a dynamic field that needs to be updated 
from all its different features to maintain efficiency and quality. However, Granerud and Rocha 
(2011) expound that there are organizational challenges when it comes for applying continuous 
improvement of health and safety concept in construction. The authors illustrate how most 
construction firms tend to not use alternative safety methodologies in their construction 
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activities. Furthermore, the writers hold that the resistance of change can be dictated from two 
employee categories: managers and experienced labourers. In both cases, there is an aversion 
towards adopting new safety techniques if the firm has been following the same safety controls 
for a long time. In addition, the authors highlight that continuous improvement process may add 
extra costs to the organization in terms of providing new training courses for their employees to 
get used to the new safety approaches. 
Unfortunately, Fig. 55 displays that 62% of the respondents strongly disagree about the 
usage of construction improvement process in the company safety scheme. This may referrer to 
failure on part of the management as they are the main influence towards implementation of 
safety engineering system. According to Beatham et al. (2004), most construction companies 
avoid applying construction improvement process because they have performance safety 
mentality that focuses only on the current status without planning for future safety needs in 
construction. 
 
 
Z value=11.200 ,   P value=0 
Figure 56: There is a strong safety culture between the employees in the construction site. 
Ely & Meyerson (2010) mention that safety culture between the labourers at the 
construction oil platforms can be considered a product of the interaction between organizational 
behavioural and employees‘ technical skills as they combine psychological and situational 
variables. To illustrate, visible leadership of the management positively influence the safety 
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culture between the workers at the construction sites. Moreover, a lack of the welfare facilities 
and services, such as poor housing and catering, will mar the safety performance of the 
construction workers. Fig. 56 presents a strong disagreement about the presence of safety culture 
at the construction sites, with only 4% of the respondents claiming that they have a strong safety 
culture in their sites. 
These shocking results raise a variety of questions behind the factors that cause this 
absence of the safety culture. More importantly, they demand a solution mechanism that should 
be applied to resolve this major challenge towards the safety system implementation. One way to 
counteract such dismal results has been discussed earlier in Fig. 33. That is, management must 
show high visibility at the oil and gas construction rigs, which would systematically increase the 
safety awareness in the crew members. We should also note that Ely & Meyerson (2010) 
highlight potential external factors, i.e. welfare and human factors that disturb the adoption of 
safety culture at the construction site. Fig. 56 display general challenges in the implementing 
safety culture that require a focused investigation to identify and solve. 
 
 
Z value=5.994 ,   P value=0 
Figure 57: Coaching culture is used in the construction sites. 
Next, the questionnaire inquiries about the practices that shape the safety culture in the 
work place. According to Kines et al. (2010) the analogy of communication plays an important 
role in enforcing the safety behaviour at the construction sites. The authors illustrate that 
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although many construction organizations do not have coaching techniques or models in their 
procedures, senior and supervisor engineers directly working with labourers can follow these 
techniques as self-initiative. According to the authors, this helps create an open safety culture 
that will eventually help increase the level of maturity towards safety implementation between 
the end-users. Fig. 57 shows how 48% of the respondents, mostly end user staff members; do not 
recognize the presence of a coaching culture at the construction site. On the flip side, 33% of the 
respondents, predominantly holding management roles, believe that a coaching culture is 
practicing in their organization. As Kine et al. (2010) points out, the views of employees who 
spend more time at the construction site, e.g. supervisors and engineers, provide a more accurate 
reflection of the safety culture. As such, this gulf between the safety culture viewpoints of 
employees can be attributed to poor communication. 
 
Z value=1.164 ,   P value=0.246 
Figure 58: Behavioral safety activities are comprehensive and effective. 
Focusing on the individual level, the questionnaire starts highlighting the commitment of 
the construction organizations to raise behaviour safety awareness via campaigns or other 
activities. According to Mearns and Yule (2009) many of the oil and gas firms conduct different 
safety and environmental activities that focus only on the technical and procedural aspects 
(maintenance and emergency workshops) without embracing behavioural based safety (BBS). 
The results in Fig. 58 mirror the authors‘ statement where 75% of the respondents, from all 
employee categories, disagree about the occurrence of safety behavioural awareness. The authors 
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claim that the absence of such activities directly impacts the safety engineering system at the 
construction site. 
Choudhry (2014) presents a paper that strives to measure the safety behaviour at the 
construction site environment through behaviour management approaches designed by the 
author. Choudhry holds that most construction companies show compliance in the beginning of 
the experiment but later, gaps and failures arise due to several factors in the monitoring stage. 
These include meeting excessive production targets, tight construction schedule and a lack of 
professional skills. Interestingly, at the individual level, the safety behaviour of the construction 
workers also declines. The author provides an example of not using Personal Protective 
Equipment (PPE) continuously at the construction site during work time. This shows how the 
safety organizational leadership can influence the employee safety behaviour. Fig 59 sheds light 
on the strong agreement amongst the respondents (74% strongly disagree, & 14% disagree) in 
regard to the absence of the monitoring of the BBS at the construction firms. 
 
Z value=2.559 ,   P value=0.010 
Figure 59: The management measures and monitors the Behavioral Based Safety (BBS) in construction sites.  
This is a serious indication of the vulnerability of the current BBS programme for the 
most construction organizations (owners and contractors). Although many of the oil and gas 
construction companies have a BBS programme in their safety engineering system, several 
factors such as weak monitoring and measuring KPIs can hinder the capability of BBS scheme at 
the construction site. 
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Neal and Griffin (2006) believe that the safety culture can be enhanced comprehensively 
by involving all categories of the employees, especially the end-users in the safety meetings, 
strategic plans and committees. For example, the authors mention how most industry 
organizations do not have a safety committee whose main function is to link the site crew with 
the office team so as to help clarify all workplace safety challenges. As shown in Fig. 60, 65% of 
the respondents in this questionnaire, particularly the end user staff members, strongly disagree 
with the work involvement levels in their organization for general safety concerns. This 
elimination of the end-users impacts the implementation practise of the safety engineering 
system due to a lack of the integrated visualization (Vinodkumar, & Bhasi, 2010). 
 
 
Z value=-1.909 ,   P value=0.056 
Figure 60: Construction worker are involved in safety committees and planning.   
Safety responsibility in construction is so critical where many senior staff in oil and gas 
try to avoid taking or even sharing it. This is due to the legal consequences that may occur after 
any potential accident. Behm (2005) mentions that avoiding the safety responsibilities is the 
main reason why many construction employees do not implement the safety engineering system. 
The author believes that safety responsibility should be defined in the early stages of the 
construction project, especially the design stages where it can be applied via different. For 
example, during the hazard identification process, the author suggests to specifically mention the 
safety responsibility for each potential hazard that may cause accidents at the construction sites. 
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Moreover, Behm claims that declaring safety responsibility at the construction project helps the 
safety professionals in their root cause analysis i.e. following the chain of actions and 
interviewing people will be more accurate and precise. 
 
 
Z value=5.117 ,   P value=0 
Figure 61: Top management actively involved and take direct responsibility of safety incidents. 
Fig. 61 shows that 64% of the respondents believe that their management does not take 
any direct safety responsibility in the case of an incident at the construction site. This produces 
the feeling of lack of support from management towards the end-user workers. The 24% who 
hold a contradictory view are placed in managerial positions, thus exposing another major gap 
between the management and workers in the oil and gas construction. Korman (1999) says that 
the absence of management responsibility to safety accidents will mar the worker safety 
performance and may encourage them to practice unhealthy acts, such as not reporting accidents. 
Thevendran & Mawdesley, (2004) conduct an experiment that try to examine how 
construction organizations in critical industries such as oil and gas perceive human factors in 
their projects. The authors believe that evolution of human factors for construction project is 
crucial and there is a generic acknowledgement that human factors are the most important 
elements that can ensure the success and safety of construction activities. The exploratory study 
of their research show that there are many influences that can impact the interaction between the 
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human and machines and this can cause deterioration for safety performance and increase the 
frequency of risk at the construction site.  
 
 
Z value=0.797 ,   P value=0.423 
Figure 62: Human factors are always considered in the hazard identification stage. 
The authors explain that these influences arise from different sources inside the 
construction firm, including management leadership, mind-set and education/training. For 
instance, if the organizations share the ownership with the employees or hire a welfare officer, it 
will increase the sense of belonging and that will help to reduce the potential existence of human 
factors risk in the site. Fig. 62 sheds that most respondents (59%) do not agree that their 
construction firms are examining human factors in the hazard identification analysis which can 
impact the efficiency of risk assessment. Haslam et al., (2005) believe that many of construction 
projects in high risk industry such as oil and gas do not involve assessing human factors in the 
early stage of the risk assessment which affect the implementation of the safety engineering 
system. 
Finally, the questionnaire asks the respondents two questions about the factors that can 
improve the safety engineering system inside oil and gas organizations. Usually the safety 
engineer system comprises of areas such as leadership, audits, regulations, planning and risk 
assessment. Fig. 63 shows that most respondents point to this risk assessment methods (46%) 
and Behavioural Base Safety Programme (33%) as the top areas that needed to improve, a result 
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that is consistent with the survey results. To illustrate this point, the questionnaire outcomes 
reveal the willingness of safety commitment in the oil and gas construction platform from the 
management level to the end users level, but external and internal factors inhibit its 
implementation. The same concept is reflected in regard to the BBS based on the respondent‘s 
answers at the end of the survey where a glaring ignorance towards BBS factors such as Human 
Factors (HF) and their role at safety engineering system implementation is highlighted. 
 
Figure 63: Which area of safety engineering system in your company requires improvement. 
The last question in the survey asks the employees about the most effective factor that 
can impact the mechanism of the safety engineering system for oil and gas construction industry. 
Here, poor decision-making was selected by 45% from the respondents. Koller (2005) mentions 
that factors such as poor communication, lack of sufficient and integrated examination will result 
in a weak risk assessment output that decision-maker will depends on. According to the author, 
this is why many of construction professionals in oil and gas industry consider poor decision-
making is the real root cause for most incidents that occur in the site as shown in Fig. 64.  
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Figure 64: which one from the following factors could be the most effective one in the safety engineering system 
implementation. 
 
4.4. Summary of the chapter 
 
The majority of the questionnaire respondents range between 20-50 years old, and work 
with owners and contractors‘ companies at the oil and gas construction field. Most respondents 
possess a college education, but this depends mainly on the position they hold at the construction 
firm. The outputs of the survey explicate several positive and negative aspects regarding the 
implementation process of safety engineering system that are practiced at the construction sites. 
Many responses indicate the existence of positive and negative practices, such as visible 
leadership in construction site and strong theoretical HSE MS that is in the place among the 
company producers. For example, Fig. 28 depicts how most employees believe that they have 
strong HSE MS document. Yet, simultaneously, as can be seen by Fig. 35 and Fig. 36, many of 
the safety procedures need to be updated to compel workers into implementing the safety 
practices. 
In addition, the outcomes of the survey highlight, as Fig. 42 reflects, a major weakness in 
implementation of risk assessment which raises many questions: why do most employee believe 
so, especially the construction workers? How can construction companies improve the 
application of risk assessment to enhance the implementation of safety engineering system? 
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Avoiding these questions will impact the safety decision-making mechanism, as expressed by the 
respondents in Fig. 43. This sheds light on the importance of having a strong monitoring of the 
risk assessment mechanism to ensure the safety environment in the workplace. 
Aside from the procedural gaps shown in the questionnaire results, there are some 
technical safety concerns towards the equipment safety at the construction sites. For example, 
Fig. 50 shows that most respondents do not think that all the equipment is inspected at the 
construction rig site, something that should absolutely not be the case if technical safety scheme 
is implemented. Moreover, since there are enough resources that can be utilized for safety 
purposes, as shown in Fig. 48, such negative perspectives towards technical equipment safety 
should not be so prevalent. In fact, they shouldn‘t exist at all. 
The gap between management and end-users is obvious from this questionnaire. These 
gaps become even more pronounced when the questionnaire examines the behavioural safety 
aspect at the construction activities. This is critical because even if all potential procedural and 
technical hazards are assessed without considering the behavioural safety factors, it will not be 
effective to simply guarantee the integrated safety at the site. For instance, according to Dey 
(2004), human factors play a root cause in most major incidents during oil and gas construction. 
As such, it is vital to analyze human factors during risk assessment stage. This goes against the 
findings of Fig. 62, where there is a complete agreement over the absence of the human factors 
in the early stage of risk assessment. This can be seen as one of the main reasons why employees 
feel that they do not have a strong safety culture, as indicated by Fig. 56. 
This questionnaire exposes several areas that directly influence the safety engineering 
systems, especially the risk assessment, varying from technical, procedural, and behavioural 
features. However, further investigation is necessary to understand the reasons and risk factors 
behind why these challenges exist inside the construction organization, particularly between 
senior management and labourers. Such an investigation will help reach the aim of this study i.e. 
providing an integrated framework to optimize the safety engineering system in the oil and gas 
industry. This can be approached through interviewing construction professionals who possess a 
complete view pertaining to the current barriers and issues for safety implementation at the 
construction sites. This will be presented next in Chapter 5 of this research. 
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Chapter 5: The Interviews 
 
5.1. Introduction  
 
The main goal of the conducting the interviews is to identity the causes for the numbers 
and responses that appeared in the questionnaires which require further explanation and analysis. 
There were four safety challenges discussed from two perspectives, managers and workers, 
where both interviewees had the same questions. The questionnaire highlighted major gaps in the 
behavioural safety either at the individual/group level thus affecting the whole safety culture in 
rig construction site. This will enable the interviewee to search for the causes which will then be 
discussed with interviewees. More emphasis will be put on this section due to the inordinate 
response in the survey pointing out at an absence of behavioural safety, which, according to the 
literature review, led to many famous construction accidents. Lastly, safety of the construction 
equipment will be analysed as part of the technical safety and how it is addressed in the risk 
assessment in the site. This will include the maintenance system inventory and current best 
practices that ensure the safety calibration and performance of the equipment that would grantee 
their reliability, availability, maintainability and safety (RAMS). 
 
5.2. The interviews 
 
  First Interview  
The interview was conducted in the National Petroleum Construction Company (NPCC) 
head office, which is considered a major oil and gas construction organization in UAE. It has 
many construction projects with a variety of government oil and gas companies e.g. Abu Dhabi 
National Oil Companies (ADNOC) in different areas of the hydrocarbons upstream projects. The 
company profile indicates that there is a diverse culture among employees, with more than 60 
nationalities and more than 20 international subcontractors firms (NPCC, 2014).  
The interview starts with demographic questions to understand background, experience and 
the current status of the interviewee in his construction organization. The interviewee was a male 
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in his mid-forties and works as a construction manager for a number of offshore and onshore 
rigs. He has more than 25 years‘ experience in the oil and gas construction, with 10 of them 
spent at construction sites as a technician, project coordinator, supervisor and engineer. This 
variety of roles is one of the reasons he was selected for the interview as he would provide a 
layered view on developing the integrated framework. At the end of this section the interviewee 
was shown the results of the first questionnaire conducted in this research. 
In the second section of the interview, the interviewee was asked why most respondents 
believe that risk assessment is the weakest element in the safety engineering system either in the 
clients or contractors companies. The interviewee illustrated how this reflected one of the main 
challenges existing in the Middle East for a long time. From management point of view, the 
interviewee believed that the major obstacle to risk assessment it being treated as a 
documentation process rather than an effective method for ensuring safety of the employees. As 
such, most risk assessment meeting are held inside offices and only ―tool box talks‖ are 
conducted at the construction site thereby affecting the steadiness of risk assessment 
implementation. This often arises due to many senior management staff falsely believing that 
tool box talks can replace the role of the risk assessment. The interviewee explains that the core 
of the tool box talk is highly depended on the recommendation of the risk assessment. Thus, if 
any defects appear in it, such as lack of attention, this will lead to a chain of failures in the reset 
of the safety process. 
According to the interviewee, many construction firms also fail to consider how risk 
assessment is a vital method that should be updated at all times for a task. For instance, the 
interviewee suggests that risk assessment documents should be updated frequently and reviewed 
by all concerned parties, from management to end-users staff. According to him, this approach is 
not practiced by most organizations in the Middle East. Instead, they rely on the first 
examination of the risk assessment in the office based, where this issue can be overcome by 
dedicating a special risk assessment committee. This committee can enhance the risk assessment 
mechanism via several activities such as involving the end-users in the preliminary phases of the 
risk assessment and distributing the roles of the risk assessment implementation plan. Finally the 
interviewee agrees that the current practices of risk assessment fail to involve all areas 
susceptible to hazards i.e. organizational and behavioural. Most construction managers in the oil 
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and gas industry focus on reactive technical defects that may take place in the construction 
operation stages. 
 Procedural challenges, the third section of the interview, discusses the questionnaire 
response regarding the procedures safety performance and why so many respondents believe that 
their company safety procedural are not updated and not understood by employees, particularly 
construction workers. The interviewee mentions that many construction organizations invest 
heavily into the safety procedures and keep them updated until they earn the qualification from 
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) certifications to enhance the company‘s 
marketing reputation. However, following this, organizations begin procrastinating in regards to 
safety procedures and only review them until the next ISO audit cycle. The key point of using the 
safety procedures is to provide a robust documentation system that establishes a safety culture in 
the organization and safeguards the workers‘ wellbeing. The interviewee claimed that this is the 
correct mindset that should be followed with procedural safety that eventually will lead different 
ISO certifications. Additionally, most oil and gas construction provide new employees with only 
one introduction about all the safety procedures available in the organization. However, there 
will be no courses about the safety procedures and the suggested methodology of using them 
later in the employee career thereby marring the safety value of the procedures. Moreover the 
interviewee linked the weakness of risk assessment implementation with the low enforcement of 
safety procedural requirements at the construction sites. That is, many safety barriers are ignored 
due the lack of commitment to the organization‘s safety scheme. For example, it is rare to have a 
risk assessment evaluation sheet that involves safety procedural clauses where this practice can 
enhance the employee safety awareness towards the safety procedures and standards 
enforcement inside the firm. Lastly, the interviewee mentioned that there should be a specific 
committee responsible for examining the implementation and updating the safety procedures 
inside the organization via several techniques such as auditing and benchmarking. 
Since there was a major gap in the safety culture between the employees (as the responses in 
the questionnaire displayed), it is vital to focus during the interviews on the root causes of an 
unsafe attitude. According to the interviewee, behavioural safety and human factors did not arise 
in the construction safety landscape until the early of the 1990s. It was after this that construction 
professionals became aware of the critical role of the behavioural safety in preventing injuries 
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during construction. However, the interviewee elaborates that in any construction incident on the 
oil and gas rig, the presence of human factor acts as a root cause. This highlights the importance 
of having safety culture inside the workplace, especially the end-users who are exposed to 
hazards. 
The main issue with the behavioural safety is that management often fail to understand how 
to apply BBS programme and how can one strengthen the risk assessment with it. For example, 
HSE construction engineers tend to conduct numerous safety workshops and campaigns that 
foster individual safety. Unfortunately, these practices alone are not enough to establish healthy 
safety culture. The interviewee suggests that having healthy safety culture needs more practices 
and supporting system that can cultivate a safety climate amongst workers and encourage them 
to implement safety prior to any job. This can be achieved by having an open reporting system to 
help employees report and document all unsafe practices, near misses, and accidents without 
fearing any disciplinary action. The interviewee reports witnessing many cases where employees 
try to hide safety accidents to avoid being penalized, particularly those that may affect bonus or 
performance evaluation. As such, associating safety with job performance in this manner often 
leads to gaps in the BBS programme implementation. Thus, it is crucial to distinguish between 
the individual‘s performance and incident reporting to nurture a safety culture in the workplace. 
Not only does it foster a healthy reporting system inside the organization but also helps identify 
more hidden hazards in the identification stage. 
Moreover, the oil and gas construction field is not a very stable area given its close ties to the 
crude oil market. As oil barrel prices decrease many of contractor‘s construction companies 
begin downsizing, a process chiefly affecting the end-users. Thus, there is job security issues for 
construction workers and often reflects in their performance at the construction site. To avoid 
that, the interviewee suggests that suitable welfare plans should be associated with each 
employment contract to cushion the blow to their economic struggles. 
Finally in this section, the interviewee illustrates that weak monitoring of behavioural safety 
inside the workplace is another safety obstacles which affects the risk assessment 
implementation. Current monitoring practices simply fail to provide realistic solutions. For 
instance, many Middle Eastern construction companies use the stop card system that allow 
workers to stop any employee involved in any accident prone situation, regardless of hierarchy. 
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This is generally considered an effective behavioural monitoring scheme. According to the 
interviewee, however, this system is not without its shortcomings since it is reactive system that 
often leads to temporary outcomes. The interviewee explained that coaching sessions are usually 
used after accidents or near misses. The entire focus is to eliminate the immediate causes without 
delving into the root causes of these human errors. Such a myopic approach adversely impacts 
the risk assessment implementation because a successful risk evaluation requires an integrated 
review for all human factors. The interviewee also points out that a lack of safety motivation in 
the construction organizations is the reason behind this reactive mentality towards the 
behavioural safety. To avoid this, a safety motivation should be in the BBS programme as one of 
the main element designed to assist end-users through all potential barriers that contribute to 
human error, i.e. poor education, language difficulty, and work load. For example, the 
monitoring indicators should also be able to focus on the positive side of behavioural safety 
where construction firms should reward the employee displaying positive behaviour at the 
construction site. An example of such behaviour is translating the safety sign borders for the 
labourers who have difficulty understanding them. 
Equipment safety is the last part of the interview pertaining to the technical safety. The 
interviewee believes that the oil and gas construction industry hypothetically has a highly 
technical safety standard due to the risky work environment. For example, aside from falling and 
dropping objects, there are also hydrocarbon materials that pose as severe hazards. Moreover, 
most sites are located in remote areas and it is essential to check the whole technical safety 
features for all transportation vehicles. The interviewee mentions that the required recourses are 
provided to ensure the technical safety in the site, but the inadequate competence and knowledge 
is the major challenge that needs to be analysed during the risk assessment. According to the 
interview that, this is why in the questionnaire many respondents highlight the safety issue in the 
equipment where the real hazard and threat here is not only consists of equipment failure but, 
also handling and using the equipment in the right and safe manner. Many construction 
organizations do not emphasis in the handling equipment competence especially for the end-
users in which most of construction firms are conducting their equipment training in the 
workplace for short period of time. The interviewee adds that, it not very frequent to see labourer 
who has certification from a third party that ensure the technical competence of this worker with 
certain equipment, e.g. jacking up rigs. 
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On the other hand, the interviewee posited that reliability and maintainability of the 
construction equipment should be evaluated during the risk assessment process. He believes 
most organizations have major safety defects in these two areas. When a contractor or a client 
company orders the equipment from the vendor, a maintenance schedule will be available that 
explains how and when the equipment needs to be checked or calibrated. It also recommends 
several firms in-charge of these activities. Additionally, due to cost reduction and time saving, 
many construction companies try to overuse the life span of the equipment and conduct a 
minimal maintenance programme. For example, the interviewee explicates that it is very rare to 
see reliability testing scheme for equipment supervised and designed by the safety department. 
This reflects one of the technical gaps between them and maintenance department, leading to 
potential equipment failure mode. Unfortunately, most construction companies consider 
reliability of the equipment as a responsibility of the maintenance team. There is also a separate 
safety evaluation conducted without involving the HSE team in the same organization. Thus, for 
them, there is no need for integrating another team into the matter. This misunderstanding is the 
reason why this industry needs to have a more integrated mind-set about the safety 
implementation in the construction companies. The interviewee illustrates that upon realizing 
this, some construction companies recently launched the Reliability, Availability, 
Maintainability, and Safety (RAMS) system which is an initiative aimed towards enhancing the 
equipment safety performance. 
At the end of the interview, the interviewee was asked if he wished to make any further 
comments or give suggestions about the current safety challenges in the oil and gas construction 
field. He stressed the two following points: involvement and integration. Safety is not the 
responsibility for one department or the top management or the end-users only. It is state of 
working that everyone in the organization can contribute to regardless of position and 
qualification. The involvement of variety of skills and views helps integrating a view that 
optimizes the implementation process of the safety engineering system. 
 Second Interview 
The second interview was conducted in an offshore construction site at Upper Zakum 
offshore oil field development. It is considered the fourth offshore oil field in the world, under 
the authority of Zakum Development Company (ZADCO) government sector (ZADCO, 2010). 
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The first major construction project was executed by NPCC pertaining to the installation phase 
of the field which includes a variety of materials and activities such as jackets, riser platforms, 
flare towers and fibre-optic cables. Following this, the construction projects are a development 
focused that constrain with the field expansion and increase the production with many 
international construction firms involved. For example, Petrofac has many construction projects 
that deal with providing concrete layers and units to install beach protection for this artificial 
island. 
The interviewee was a male in his early fifties. He has been working in construction activities 
in the oil field for 25 years. He started off as a construction worker for 10 years and then worked 
as foreman for 6 years. From 2007 until now, the interviewee has been working as chief 
supervisor in Petrofac with his main responsibility being ensuring the safety and integrity of 
workers and the constructions sites. He was selected for this interview on account of him being a 
former labourer and possessing a vast experience with the workers‘ cultures, challenges, and 
mentality. 
After the demographic questions, the second section of the interview (risk assessment) began 
with exploring the reasons why most respondents believe that risk assessment is the weakest 
element in the safety engineering system. According to the interviewee the first reason is that 
most workers cannot understand the risk assessment procedures. For example, most risk 
assessment procedures are written an advanced language that is hard for workers with limited 
education to understand and utilize in their assigned activities. As such a simplification method 
is required to deliver the risk assessment concept. There should be a systematic approach to 
highlight all possible hazards and the proper mitigation plans. Additionally, the interviewee 
stresses that the major absence of end-users‘ involvement in the risk assessment meetings is also 
a major factor. In his view, most construction organizations consider risk assessment a 
managerial document that only senior staff should contribute to. Most managers further reinforce 
this misconception by allocating monitoring roles to construction supervisors or foremen who are 
not involved in the initial stages of the risk assessment. The interviewee posits that this is the key 
contradiction suffered by risk assessment mechanism implementation in the oil and gas 
construction projects. At the end of this section, the interviewee agreed on the need for an 
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integrated risk assessment as it provides integration between several vital areas, something he 
found missing in most of risk assessments in his experience. 
 The procedural challenges were discussed in the third section of the interview. Here, the 
interviewee explains several points on how procedures play a vital role in the labourer‘s safety at 
the workplace. For instance, he mentions that the procedural challenge for construction workers 
differs totally from the top management due to the scope of the work. The top management 
typically work on the safety procedures to enhance the firm‘s reputation through getting several 
ISO certifications in order to improve business strategies. Conversely, for workers understanding 
the safety procedures is a top priority. That is, most oil and gas construction companies provide 
basic safety courses for end-users such as H2S safety, fire safety, and first aid that can give the 
individual labour the essential safety skills to deal with hazards and risks at work. The 
interviewee believes that these courses are not enough approaches to ignore or restrain from 
giving the required safety procedures orientation which usually is specified for employees who 
have higher positions i.e. engineers and team leaders. Understanding the required procedures will 
allow the end-users to know the core concept behind the safety engineering system and the 
importance of implementing it in the workplace and this will improve the workers technical and 
behavioral safety skills regardless of their academic qualifications. To maintain a high level of 
procedural awareness among the construction workers, the interviewee suggests conducting a 
yearly refresh course that sheds the major safety procedures and their updates, case studies, and 
challenges. These proposed ideas can optimize all the methods in the safety engineering system 
where risk assessment will be handled with a more refined mentality from the construction 
workers.  
In the fourth section of the interview, the quality of safety culture between the end-users was 
discussed to find an explanation for the negative responses about it in the questionnaires. The 
interviewee was not surprised by these outcomes in the safety culture or behavioral safety 
because in his view these numbers reflect the current and previous issues in this industry. 
Unfortunately, most workers do not see the need of the behavioral safety due to the absence of 
other social/economic elements in the workplace. For example, the interviewee mentions that 
welfare is one of the hidden aspects that often lead to hazards that affect the employee safety 
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performance. According to the interviewee, there are two main types of welfare services that the 
organization should focus on for labourers: physical and mental. 
Pertaining to physical welfare aspect, the interviewee holds that many construction 
companies do not provide proper accommodation for their workers in a short-sighted attempt to 
save cost, along with poor welfare scheme inside the organization. Individually, the interviewee 
witnessed many accidents or near misses where the root causes is stress due to inadequate 
housing. Many construction organizations try to cram workers in accommodation units, 
especially in offshore projects. Additionally, many facilities such as washing machines, 
bathrooms, and shower rooms are of substandard quality due to overuse, lack of maintenance, 
and harsh environment factors. When combined, these factors contribute heavily towards 
maintaining a safety culture amongst end-users. 
Egregiously, mental welfare of laborers is an unfamiliar concept for many managers and 
senior staff members at construction firms. The designed welfare plan emphasizes the 
conditional characteristics of workers while eliminating vital features such work loading, social 
activities, and psychotherapy. According to the interviewee, these elements are critical for 
implementing safety as the oil and gas construction industry usually operate in remote areas with 
a divers- international l workforce. Since the majority of the employees at the construction site 
are end-users, the interactions between them will form the safety culture. This underlines the 
significance of mental welfare on the safety engineering application.  
Next, the interviewee mentions how there is a lack of development plans to further develop 
construction workers, something that applies for other employees in the organization such as 
engineers, team leaders and managers. Usually, construction workers receive safety courses in 
the beginning of their tenure only resulting in them working with the same job routine for years. 
According to the interviewee, it is thus unsurprising that many end-users lack any motivation 
when compared to other employees who have development plans that ensure their career growth. 
Several construction firms justify that the academic level for most labourers in this region do not 
qualify them to take courses or schemes to advance their career. However, this is not necessarily 
true according to the interviewee. He explains that there are a variety of courses especially in 
safety i.e. National Examination Board in Occupational Safety and Health (NEBOSH), which do 
not necessitate any academic qualification. Unfortunately, organization in the Middle East view 
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end-users of the company as constant production force at the construction site. The interviewee 
elaborates that this perception should be changed to a new one that deals with the labourers as 
capital in which one shoould invests in. 
In the fifth section of the interview, equipment failure was discussed to identify the root 
causes of this issue in the oil and gas construction projects. The interviewee explains that this is a 
challenge faced by many international construction companies, often leading to huge economic 
loses. However, from his experience, many construction organizations do not understand the 
reliability culture and its role in sustaining the stability of the asset management. The main 
purpose of applying reliability with safety engineering system methods i.e. risk assessment, is to 
assist the facility in reaching dependability levels that ensure the continuity of business and 
recover from potential equipment faults. For example, the interviewee mentions that many 
construction mangers request to reduce the Mean Time to Repair (MTTR) of the equipment 
scheduled for preventive (frequency) maintenance. This action may increase the level of 
availability of the equipment, but also results in minimizing reliability and maintainability. This 
adversely affects the safety performance of these methods in the site. The interviewee suggests 
that in order to enhance the implementation of the risk assessment, the reliability level of the 
equipment should be pre-emptively recognized in the hazard identification stage to anticipate 
potential failure that can arise due to equipment failure. 
Another critical point that the interviewee addresses is the major conflicts senior staff 
members have with safety standards of the equipment between the manufacturing and 
construction phases. For example, for pipeline installation, many accidents occur due to 
inadequate maintenance plan for the bending and rotary equipment. This arises due to many 
maintenance engineers relying on the prevention standards that come directly from the vendor 
without considering the harsh environment factors on-site. Bending and rotary equipment in the 
offshore construction sites can easily get corroded at an accelerated rate due to wet/dry 
conditions which usually irritates chain of chemistry reactions.  
At the interview‘s conclusion, the interviewee believes that the questionnaire responses do 
imitate some of the current safety challenges that the construction industry in the oil and gas 
field. According to the interviewee, there are safety gaps in all areas in the safety engineering 
system: technical, procedural, and behavioral, where each one affects the other. This shows the 
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needs for an integrated system to eliminate these defects. However, the interviewee stresses that 
behavioral element is the most vital factor in controlling and mitigating the hazards for the end-
users because it directly emphasizes the human factors of the employees. For example, by 
implementing the behavioral risk assessment at the construction site, the performance skills of 
the workers will be evaluated. And in case of occurrences of poor performance, this will help the 
organization identify whether the roots causes are procedural or technical, and to enhance the 
safety performance. The final point discussed by the interviewee was that failure in 
implementing the risk assessment leads to the failure for the whole safety engineering system 
because this interacts with all other methods continuously during the project timeline. Thus, it is 
vital for management to involve all different employees in it to provide a landscape perspective 
for all the potential risks. 
5.3. Analyzing interview results 
 
For the first interview, it is noticeable how the interviewee has more information 
regarding safety engineering system and its application from the theory standpoint. For example, 
the interviewee explains that the major weakness in risk assessment is that most organizations 
deal with it as a process which needs to be completed and documented without proper 
monitoring of its implementations. However, in comparison to the second interviewee, he 
justifies the difficulty of implementing the risk assessment due to the complex language of the 
procedures which most workers cannot understand because of their education level. Here, the 
second interviewee gives a more pragmatic view due to the scope of work. At the same time, 
both interviewees agree over the importance of the involvement of the construction workers in 
the risk assessment meetings as a pair of fresh eyes that can help determine all the possible 
hazards in the job activities. The importance of the hazard identification stage was mentioned as 
a common point and how it should be integrated to grantee the safety of the construction site 
without any comprise or replacement. For example, the first interviewee provided an example 
about how many workers use tool box talk instead of the original hazard identification conducted 
in the office and this matches the view of the second interviewee about the gap of 
communication in risk assessment between managers and construction workers.  
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Interviewees presented different analytic views regarding the procedural challenges in the 
construction organization. For instance, the first interviewee believes most senior managements 
work very hard in the safety procedures especially at the beginning of the company 
establishment to get the international certificates in order to enhance the marketing reputation 
only to abandon it later on. This assumption can be linked to the second interviewee‘s view 
regarding the lack of training for the construction workers towards the safety procedures. For 
example, continuous focus and attention towards procedural skills is required for the workers as 
the technical skills. Thus, when a lack of procedural knowledge amongst workers occurs it 
indicates a weak management. This can be noticed from several practices at the construction site 
such as the difficulty of labourers to gain access to safety procedures and not referencing the 
procedures clauses during the risk assessment. These unwanted practices can be replaced by 
better ones through visible communication. As suggested by the first interviewee, having a 
specific committee ensures the quality and implementation of the safety procedures. As per the 
second interviewee, this committee can also supervise the procedures and polices training 
courses that should be handed out on a yearly basis for the construction workers. Moreover, 
benchmarking with other construction organizations can be another approach that helps identify 
the areas that can be modified, as mentioned in Chapter 2.  
For the behavioral safety, there were many causes explained by both interviewees. For 
example, the first interviewee holds that management has a limited understanding about the 
applications and implementation of safety culture where practices such as blaming attitude and 
lack of safety can affect the behavioral safety of the employees, especially construction workers. 
According to Ruchlin et al. (2004) such a vulnerable mentality is related to the organization‘s 
safety policy being mistranslated by management. As such, the authors suggest conducting 
surveys frequently to glean the labourers‘ satisfaction with the safety culture programmes at the 
construction site and how it can be improved. This usual interaction between end-users and 
management would help create a culture with open channels for communication, as echoed by 
the first interviewee. As a result, proper monitoring for the behavioral safety can be applied to 
deliver an updated and transparent image of the safety culture and its efficiency at the 
construction site to the senior management. Both interviewees agree about the critical role of the 
individual behavioral safety in forming the safety culture where the second interviewee also 
stresses how poor welfare plan can disturb the safety performance of the worker. Geller (2001) 
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supports the second interviewee‘s idea claiming that many construction companies do not 
provide the sufficient welfare services for end-users in the oil and gas rigs. Additionally, the 
author believes that most human factor incidents are due to the poor mental human welfare plan 
that should prepare the right condition for the employee to work in safe manner. Geller admits 
that it is hard for the management to find end-users that apply and implement behavioral safety 
completely in the workplace, but the author proposes a model that encourages improvement of 
the safety culture. This can be approached if the management provides self-esteem and a sense of 
belonging for the workers as the second interviewee mentions. An example of this would be how 
the second interviewee mentions the necessity of providing development plan that guarantees 
career growth for construction workers. Implementing behavioral safety also helps optimize risk 
assessment to be more comprehensive as the interviewees said but the management should start 
taking the accountability of the safety culture at the construction site.  
Equipment safety was the last point to discuss with both interviewees. Equipment failure 
appears as the major technical issue facing the construction industry in oil and gas. As illustrated 
by the second interviewee, the gap between the maintenance and safety departments is one of the 
vital points influencing the integrity of the equipment. RAMS system should also be included 
into safety engineering system. Furthermore, the first interviewee stresses that safety 
professionals should distinguish between the safety standards in the operating and manufacturing 
phases. However, according to the second interviewee, he believes many equipment failures 
occur due to poor handling skills from the end-users. To expunge such occurrences, the second 
interviewee suggests refocusing the equipment control training courses for construction workers 
to make them adept at operating these equipment. Lastly, reviewing audit and inspection reports 
for the equipment during risk assessment would help determine all aspects of hazards such as 
equipment materials, safe distance, and machine calibration.  
The main goal for these interviews is determining the top risk factors in UAE‘s oil and 
gas construction projects that lead to the safety defects. The interviews expose several areas and 
risk factors that influence the implementation of safety engineering system. For example, lack of 
understanding and monitoring, poor communication, equipment integrity, workers skills etc. 
appears as a root causes for many safety challenges, disturbing the efficiency of the risk 
assessment. Most issues point to an absence of the integrated view mentioned in the literature 
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review (and the main point of discussion in this research study). Both the interviews and the 
questionnaires help shape the framework elements that enhance the application and 
implementation of risk assessment. The essential concept of the framework is illustrated in Fig. 
19 where three different examinations, technical, procedural, and behavioral should be conducted 
before reaching risk evaluation stage. The evaluation and the inputs of the framework will be 
based of the interviews and questionnaires outcomes in which the detailed mechanism of the 
framework function is explained in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 6: Development of a new framework for enhanced risk 
assessment implementation 
 
6.1.  Framework concept inputs and mechanism  
 
The aim of this study is to provide an integrated framework that can optimize the 
implementation of the safety engineering system through the usage of a risk assessment. 
 
Figure 65: Integrated Risk assessment framework for oil and gas construction projects. 
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Both the questionnaire and the interviews exposed the presently weak areas in the risk 
assessment application thereby aiding the selection of the framework inputs in this research. As 
shown in the Fig. 65, there are three main sections employed as filters during the hazard 
identification stage in which each one of them has specific criteria. Such a focus will facilitate 
avoiding the kind generalizations practiced in most risk assessment sessions to cover all the 
possible scenarios that can occur with the existing hazards.  
Each group has three standards that should clarify the identified hazard, its dimension and 
interaction mechanism with the wanted construction activity. Following this full examination, a 
regular risk assessment procedure is carried out where risk estimation and evaluation will be 
conducted in the General Risk Characterization stage. At the same time, risk monitoring will be 
involved in the all steps to facilitate a healthy communication between the parties, especially the 
management and end-users.  
1. Procedural section  
A.  Operation procedures section  
It is important to highlight the operational procedures that will be used in the construction 
task for all the employees who are participating in it. The first step is to indicate the manuals 
which the procedures are taken from them to help the job performers in identifying the main 
technical references. According to Hale and Borys (2013), providing these manuals during the 
risk assessment, entices a social motivation for the end-users to explore the procedural concepts 
and gain more technical information that can enhance their competence skills. Furthermore, 
having written procedures with manual reference offers a clear and precise summary for the 
execution of a complex construction task whilst also providing supervision for the workers on 
site (Embrey 1999; Skogdalen et al., 2001). 
There are three main steps that should be followed, as shown in Fig. 66: 
 Define the construction process based on activity analysis  
 Develop and write the procedures  
 Monitor the procedures enforcement 
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Figure 66: Operation procedures application steps. 
 
For the first step, shown in Fig. 66, it is critical to define the entire process that should be 
followed in order to achieve the main goals of the construction activity, including steps, 
materials, time, and equipment. However, many scholars suggest reviewing the manuals to select 
the required process so as to enhance the construction target that may rely on the experience and 
the history of previous jobs for a similar activity. Often, it is required to change or modify the 
described process in the manuals due to the job nature difference from one location to another 
thereby necessitating the use of individual ability to learn. The modified process should be 
within the international standards acceptable range limit, without major violations to 
specifications that can lead to safety defects at the execution phase. Additionally, the process 
analysis needs to check the feasibility of applying the defined process with the available 
resources and start contacting the procurement department in case of shortages of materials. 
Writing the procedures is the next step which should reflect the concept that was defined 
in the previous step and be suitable for the targeted job performers. To illustrate this, scholars 
like Antonsen et al., (2008), conducted an experiment to determine the gaps between the work as 
described in the procedures and the work that is actually performed in offshore site. They 
discovered that the best approach to deliver the message is through simplifying and clarifying the 
instructions to suit the end users‘ culture and education level. For example, the authors 
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mentioned that the performance rate of the workers improved significantly on the site when they 
started discussing the procedures in their daily activities and safety meetings. Furthermore, the 
authors suggested that written procedures can help to extract suitable KPIs to monitor the safety 
culture at the workplace. 
For the next step, monitoring the procedures contains two main process; evaluation and 
execution, in which these activities require a specific committee to continuously ensure the high 
level of performance and appropriate method of implementation. At the evaluation stage, it is 
suggested for safety engineers on site to conduct a weekly quiz for the workers to determine the 
quality and level of understanding. This will help to collect important information for the 
committee members and apply any necessary adjustment in the written procedures. However, for 
the execution stage, the committee members should monitor the compliance level of the 
employees through analyzing the safety performance and root causes of the accidents. Mapping 
the roots causes of the accidents with their procedural faults leads directly in improving the 
classification mechanism during risk assessment session. 
 
B. Safety and health procedures 
From the questionnaires and interviews, it was noticed that the three elements that requires 
improvement to enhance the safety and health procedures implementation are as shown in Fig. 
67. 
 
Figure 67: Safety and health procedures application steps. 
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Selecting safety measures from the HSE procedures is the key goal to provide the 
proactive and reactive measures against the different hazards for the required construction job. 
All the selected measures should be directly driven from the main organization manuals in a way 
that suits the surrounding environment. For example, man power size, the worker competence, 
and frequency and severity of hazards in which these factors should be examined for office and 
field employees who frequently engage with this selected activity.  
Many of the HSE engineers capture the written procedures and embed them as safety 
measures in their integrity plan without any consideration for job performer academic 
background which may require more clarity and simplicity. To illustrate this, the safety and 
health procedures can be simplified by adding some drawing and figures that can be more 
understandable for labourers who have the language barrier issue. This can be displayed through 
separate posters that can be hanged on different spots of the construction location. Moreover, it is 
suggested for the safety engineers to explain these procedures by giving examples from pervious 
lesson learned which shows the importance of studying and analyzing the earlier incidents for the 
same wanted activity. However, one should always remember that the main goal of clarity and 
simplicity step is to enhance the compliance and not compromise or provide short cuts against 
safety performance. Having multiple and different contractors in the same site can be another 
challenge in this stage where each construction company have their own safety system. As such, 
it is extremely vital to explain and utilize the same safety measures for the all the workers 
whether they are form the client or contractor companies thereby helping the labourers to focus 
at one system to follow. Using checklist is another method that can provide clarity and simplicity 
concept in a suitable technique in the construction field. For instance, before conducting any 
construction activity, the end user should fill the safety measure checklist that illustrates the job 
procedures and then he/she submits it to the main supervisor.  
Many scholars (Mikkelsen et al., 2004) define the safety feedback as the lost link that can 
ensure the workers‘ engagement with organization procedures. That is, the author mention that 
mangers deal with safety procedures as communication tool and this is a common mistake. They 
state that procedures are implementation guidelines that need to be communicated between the 
employees where feedback can play this role and this helps to apply continuous improvement 
goal in the future. This can be approached by forming a specific committee that its members are 
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responsible to update and improve the safety procedures through the cycle steps as displayed in 
Fig. 67. 
C. Communication procedures 
The absence of oriented communication in many of the construction organizations is because 
they lack a clear communication procedure that involves all organization activities e.g. 
maintenance, materials supply, and construction. The usual practice, which is followed, explains 
and embeds communication briefly without mentioning the people and channels. For that, most 
of the risk assessment sheets do not provide any kind of communication information even for 
emergency cases. As such, this framework will enhance and fill the communication gaps that 
were shown in the questionnaires by providing a scheme that answers the three major questions; 
what, who, and how. The visibility of these three pillars of communication can eliminate the 
different barriers that may occur during exchanging information as shown in Fig. 68. This helps 
to ensure the success of communication in the entire construction project. 
 
 
Figure 68: Communication Process. 
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 Answering “the What” 
Knowing ―the What‖, is the first and most critical element in the communication because it 
defines the targeted audiences and methodology that need to be followed. Following this, 
distributing the roles and responsibilities in communication will be visible during the risk 
assessment session. ―the What‖ is frequently associated with the level of the risk that may occur 
at the construction sites, usually divided into three Tiers. 
Tier 1, refers to the risk and hazards which can damage employees and assets in the 
surrounding area of the construction activities. When the risk extends to the safety buffer zones, 
Tier 2 classification and status should be declared in which management must intervene to 
mitigate the situation. Tier 3 is the riskiest state that can reach to the crisis and/or disaster level 
e.g. massive fire which requires the help of local authorities such as civil defense. The new 
initiative in this framework is that the hazards in ―the What‖ are classified with their severity and 
communication level (Tier 1 to 3) to help to win time especially in the emergency cases. 
 Answering “the Who” 
All the staff, engineers or end-uesrs on the construction sites whether from the client or 
contractors companies should recognize who to communicate in regards to any safety matter. It 
is critical in this step to assign focal point on the site for safety communication purpose before 
starting any construction activity. However, as explained in ―the What‖, if the risk escalates to 
Tier 2, the management should be directly contacted hence why an Incident Management Team 
(IMT) should be developed for every project. The IMT team will be instructed by the Incident 
Commander (IC) whose responsibilities are as follows: 
 Committed support to the workers on the construction sites.  
 Provide technical level support - manage the higher level impact of the emergency in the 
construction site. 
 Deliver additional resources and equipment (logistics) 
In the case of a Tier 3 situations, (IC) will be in charge of contacting the required local 
authority to attain the required support. 
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 Answering “the How” 
There are various written and verbal methods of communication which can be utilized for the 
risk assessment purposes, but to ensure efficiency it should proceed from the management. For 
example, management leadership demonstrates total commitment to safety communications in 
order for the workers on the site, which in turn maintains the organization‘s credibility with staff 
and contractors. Pertaining to the written communication, Abduyyeh et al. (2006) believe that a 
technical safety handbook is one of the best approaches that management can apply to 
communicate with the workers on the site. The authors suggest that a suitable handbook should 
contain direct and simple graphs that clarify safety communication rules and regulations to 
employees. This will keep the workers abreast with the new legal and technical changes in terms 
of dealing with machineries, equipment and reporting incidents. 
2. Technical section 
A. Functional analysis 
This framework presents integration between construction safety and systems engineering 
through functional analysis that explains the equipment parts and their utilities. This would help 
fill the gap in the questionnaire, especially in the machineries and equipment failures. There are 
several scholars who strongly believe that there is a lack of technical examination for the current 
automotive safety technology at the construction site (Saurin et al., 2008). This is due to the 
nature of the heavy equipment with their numerous parts which act as potential hazards for users 
and the surrounding environment.  
As observed from the questionnaire, the workers lacking a higher education background are 
often unable to deal with construction equipment in a safe manner. Furthermore, the interviews 
explicit show that many of the construction organization do not have sufficient technical courses 
for their staff. For that, having functional analysis in the risk assessment will guarantee the 
awareness and control of work equipment to prevent any accident or injury. Furthermore, rapid 
advances in technology often make constant updating of their procedures difficult for 
organizations. 
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In this framework the functional analysis for the construction equipment will be divided into 
four main categories as shown in Fig. 69. These four aspects will enhance the proactive safety 
performance for the users. 
 
 
Figure 69: Functional analysis aspects. 
 Materials analysis 
In this step, the materials of the equipment are classified into chemical and physical 
characteristics, providing an integrated understanding regarding the equipment operation phase. 
As illustrated in the interview, the materials characteristics in the manufacturing and operation 
modes should be clarified and distinguished. This is similar to the idea of having Material Safety 
Data Sheet (MSDS) for the chemical used at the construction site. For example, many current 
pipelines used in the oil and gas industry are made from Fiber Reinforced Polymer materials 
(FRP) such as Carbon Fiber and Glass Fiber. There are several advantage of using these 
materials in pipeline construction due to the light weight and anti-corrosion features saving a lot 
of time and effort in the maintenance process. Unfortunately explosion impacts (a type of 
dynamic loading) are frequently present in the all streams in this industry thereby requiring 
impact/resistance structural materials. These materials have a very low resistance to the elevated 
temperature where their critical temperature is relevantly low comparing with other pipeline 
materials e.g. steel. For that, it is vital to deliver this kind of information in the risk assessment to 
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let the engineers and planners put suitable prevention and mitigation plans for any emergency 
case.  
The materials classification in this framework contains four categories; flammability, 
radioactivity, chemical and biological hazards. For the flammability, it is critical to assess the 
level and rate of ignition for the material because it helps to choose the right equipment for the 
wanted construction activity. For instance, the materials will be allocated as combustible and 
non-combustible resources through the labeling system helping the end-users to identify the 
suitable equipment for the assigned job. This can be very effective to prevent accidents 
especially for the hot jobs activities where many scholars refer to explosion issues in during 
these jobs e.g. welding (Chi et al., 2009).  
There are several radioactive sources arising in the oil and gas construction sites, usually in 
the soil formation. Radon, for instance, is an active Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials 
(NORM) that, even with small concentration, can have long term effects on human cells. 
Additionally, Radon is responsible for equipment radiation contamination at the site, a fact 
which most construction organizations are unaware of. Thus, heavy construction drilling 
equipment i.e. piling driving tools are usually exposed to such radiation contamination thereby 
necessitating regular checking using nuclear gauges. This would allow the maintenance 
department to have an inventory for the equipment with their radioactivity level as one feature of 
equipment suitability. Following this, the risk assessment process will be more efficient.  
Verma et al., (2003) believes that the chemical and biological hazards in the construction 
equipment usually come from the raw materials and substance that are occupied or associated 
with them. For example, in the oil and gas construction sites, most of the cementing units that 
ares producing large amount of Particles Matters (PM 2.5 and PM 10) have serious effects on the 
respiratory system. Many construction companies only emphasis to wear the dust masks during 
the mixing stage and this is not enough to eliminate the PM hazards. There should be an 
exposure limit vale for worker daily usage. Furthermore for the chemical side, there are 
numerous of alkaline materials (e.g. adhesives) which has a caustic characteristic that can cause 
severe chemical burns to human skin in case of wearing the improper protection gloves. For that, 
it is very important in this framework to add occupational health aspect of construction 
equipment as part of jobsite protection. 
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 Maintenance analysis  
Both of the interviews stress the fact that absence of effective maintenance towards the 
construction equipment is because of the lack of the communication between safety and 
maintenance departments. As a result, RAMS system was recommended to fill this gap in both 
of the interviews. In this framework the joint between safety and maintenance will be through 
defining the equipment life cycle in the risk assessment. For example, most of the oil and gas 
construction organizations use the color coding system which states the equipment condition for 
functioning at the site by labeling them with certain color (which refers to availability). Should 
the equipment not be safety approved, it will not be labeled by the agreed color. In such a case 
the equipment shall instead be sent to the maintenance department. However, Chavada et al. 
(2012) believe there are many gaps in this system hence requiring a complete approach to ensure 
the equipment‘s integrity is not compromised. After all, several equipment failures happen at the 
construction site due to the manipulation of the color coding by contractors due to the work load. 
This usually occurs when the client companies pressurize the contractors to raise their 
productivity rate. 
To prevent any manipulation on the site, the equipment‘s maintainability should be defined 
in the risk assessment by the maintenance department. The documentation of the equipment 
preventative maintenance needs to be available during the risk assessment on the office and in 
the execution stage on the site. However, it will be difficult to mention all the equipment for each 
construction activity on the assessment sheet and therefore only main/critical equipment are 
involved. This maintenance strategy will help the senior management to monitor the equipment 
utilization and know which equipment are used more or less at the construction sites. Knowing 
these information can assist the management to have better equipment allocation plan saving 
time and reduce cost in the operation phase at the sites. 
Moreover, safety engineers must ensure that all equipment have at least 90 to 100% of the 
repairs completed, since a high number of equipment failures take place due to inadequate 
repairs (Kittusamy et al., 2004). That is, many of the construction organizations try to save 
equipment maintenance period time by accepting repairs that are only 50 to 70% complete. In 
this framework, maintainability of the equipment involves complete repairs that assist both the 
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safety and the maintenance teams to track equipment and their availability at the construction 
sites. 
 People analysis  
The people analysis mechanism here is more focused on the human factors contribution in 
the safety performance with technical equipment in the construction site. As an example, it was 
mentioned in both of the interviews; many labourers lack the required competence to deal with 
construction equipment that contains advanced technology. The relationship between changes in 
equipment technology and worker skills has been highlighted by many construction 
professionals. For instance, Goodrum and Gangwar (2003) consider the shortage of skilled 
workers to be one of the greatest challenges faced by the construction industry. Goodrum and 
Gangwar mention that the point of having technology in the construction equipment is to ease 
the physical work by shifting the energy from the labourers to the machines, but this can go 
wrong if there is a weak level of control. This stresses the importance of the training quality 
which is provided to workers by the construction organizations. According to Klein and 
Kleinman (2002), there is a major gap in the risk assessment towards examining the workers 
skills with the used technology at the construction sites. For example, the Klein and Kleinman 
suggest mentioning the names of the job performers for each construction activity during the risk 
assessment session because it aids in displaying the worker technical training background. 
Exposing the worker skills and the training they received will let the management observe the 
weaknesses in their employee‘s skills, thereby highlighting the kind of courses would help in 
filling these gaps.  
The error that most of the construction companies fall in is that if they employ expert 
workers with more than a decade experience on the sites, they do not feel obligated to enroll 
them in any training. This is unacceptable due to the continuous development in the construction 
equipment technology. For instance, there is a trend for lifting equipment to be more automated 
in order to reduce the human factors for any potential accidents which can be applied as new 
added features in the control panels in the cranes. Here, work experience will not be sufficient to 
reach the required competence to operate the mobile crane at the site. After all, many crane 
incidents arise due to a lack of the knowledge of the operator towards the advanced features and 
control panel configuration. As such, many professionals emphasize the auditing role of the 
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training centers to ensure not only their quality but also that their course materials are updated 
with respect to the latest technology. By this, the certified labourers will have the advanced skills 
to effectively and efficiently operate the automated equipment and machineries at the 
construction site in a safe manner.   
 
 Method analysis 
The method analysis in this framework focuses mainly on the environment and condition of 
using the construction equipment. For example, according to Lingard et al., (2013) several 
moving objects accidents (e.g. excavator tracks) occur at the construction site due to poor 
visibility inside in the cabin. The authors believe the root causes for most of these accidents are 
related to the unsafe methods/conditions while using the equipment. This highlights the critical 
role of examining the method and environment of the job location aside from the technical 
features of the equipment prior to beginning an activity. As such, including method analysis in 
the risk assessment can expose the safety defects in the design phase where a good allocation 
between vital structural areas i.e. power lines and mechanical equipment, is required to avoid any 
potential accidents. Thus, it is necessary to involve the designers with safety and maintenance 
engineers together at the beginning of the risk assessment process to identify any design fault at 
the early stages and save design-change costs in the future.  
Analyzing the interaction between equipment and external factors is another major step that 
should be conducted in the equipment method analysis. For instance, most of the electric 
construction equipment such as electric motors can functionally be damaged and become a 
serious hazard due to the heavy rain. Then, electric currents can be developed that can affect the 
workers at close proximity to the equipment. Furthermore, according to Janicak (2008), most of 
the electric equipment fatalities arise due to a lack of compatibility between the environment and 
control measures. For example, during high level humidity, construction workers conducting any 
electrical jobs should wear specific impact gloves which operate as an insulation layer against 
electrical currents. Furthermore, the author refers to a static electricity as a serious hidden hazard 
that frequently occur in the dry air in cold temperatures, with construction equipment acting as 
potential conductor for such electricity. To avoid this, grounding tools should be attached with 
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the equipment and mobile machineries at the construction site to help dispel the electricity. As a 
result, this framework is designed to define the equipment and its suitable Personal Protective 
Equipment (PPE) with respect to the site condition during the risk assessment. 
B. Failure modes  
Lin D et al., (2001) believe that examining the functional analysis of the equipment is one of 
the vital approaches to prevent equipment failure on the workplace. However, the authors refer to 
the Murphy‘s Law concept i.e. anything that can go wrong, will go wrong, and for that control 
and mitigation plans should be involved in the risk assessment stge. In this framework a forward 
logic method will be used where all the possible failure modes scenarios are defined as shown in 
Fig. 70. Then, the processes after and before failure stage are evaluated to have complete and 
integrated view. 
  
 
Figure 70:  Failure modes analysis. 
 Defining Failure Modes 
As discussed in the literature review, knowing your hazards is the first step in eliminating it 
at the workplace and this is applicable also for failures modes. Construction sites in oil and gas 
industry witness frequent failure modes. However, it differs from one construction organization 
to another; depending on the construction activity provided e.g. exploration, extraction, refining, 
transporting, etc. For instance, in pipeline construction, pipeline rupture during installation is a 
common incident due to failure or improper usage of heavy excavation machineries. Here, the 
organization shall review these failures with emphasis on the immediate and root causes to 
provide solutions for the future projects. To illustrate this, the immediate causes for most of the 
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pipeline rupture in the offshore site are related to the erosion, runoff and sedimentation where the 
root cause of all of them is mainly faulty laying and trenching.  
These definitions of the causes will help shape the failure effects that may occur during the 
construction works, but it is far more practical for employees, especially end users, to apply 
monitoring practices. Monitoring the failure effects are divided into two main categories: people, 
and environment. Pinto et al., (2011), believe that supervision of these two factors is the last 
barrier layer in failure modes prevention. Applying this concept to the pipeline rupture, 
supervision practices to site environment can help the safety engineers to have more knowledge 
regarding the soil mechanics at the site. For example soil reinforcement can be applied in the 
offshore site as immediate action to strength the ground to have better resistance against runoff 
and sedimentation. 
 After Failure  
The ―After Failure‖ section explicates the required emergency response that the crew at the 
site needs to follow to control and mitigate the situation before it escalates to the next level. The 
crew members at the site should have enough knowledge and training in communication as 
referred in the procedural section. However, a preliminary response plan has to be implemented 
until getting the full plan structure from emergency team in the head office. The main goal of this 
plan is to keep the work continuity with respect to the safety of the people and assets to reach to 
the business recovery phase. To reach to this stage as soon as possible, Lambrecht, and Lievens, 
(2008) suggest answering the following questions: what are the resources that are needed to be 
there in order to control failure impacts? What are the alternative plans available to precede the 
operation activities? 
For instance, the authors mention the failure of diesel motors generation that are usually used 
in remote construction areas needs an immediate action from the workers on the site to mitigate 
it. This requires availability of resources of fire fighter team such as portable fire extinguisher, 
breathing apparatus, and fire-retardant coverall. Furthermore, after controlling the event, another 
motor generation will be required to continue the construction work on the site as business 
continuity plan. As a result, the authors refer to the necessity of mentioning the emergency 
resources and the way of utilizing them for each failure mode scenario in the risk assessment 
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stage. As such, this framework focuses on the emergency recourse management and the 
importance of implementing them in the risk assessment. 
 Before Failure 
Detecting the failure mode is the chief goal of the failure mode analysis where forward logic 
is employed to analyse the technical system and improve the safety performance during design 
and construction stages. According to Liu et al., (2013), using this sequence of evaluation can aid 
the designers and safety engineers in understanding the dynamic between equipment/machinery 
and construction job. This integrated view helps identify all potential hazards that may lead to 
failure. As such, estimating the hazard and its severity and putting prevention safety barriers is 
the major key in this stage. That is to say, in the first stage (Defining the failure mode), it shapes 
the frequent failure modes and their immediate root causes. 
In the ―After Failure‖ phase, it shows how recourse management is needed to mitigate the 
risk. As a result of this exposure which demonstrate that explicit mitigation acts, putting 
prevention safety barriers will be more systematic with respect to the environment of the 
construction project. According to Guldenmund et al., (2006) that, failure of a single component 
in design stage can cause the failure for the whole system thus highlighting why identifying 
potential single-point failures is essential for determining problem. For example, cladding at the 
site can be divided to the following sub activities; installation, fabrication, reviewing the 
specification, and supervision/communication. The following single barriers can be added for 
each subsystem as shown in Table 5: 
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Table 5: Safety Component analysis. 
Component Hazards Safety barrier 
Installation Lack of knowledge of the 
installers 
Registered and Certified 
installers in the site 
Fabrication Lack of sealing and drainage Pre erection safety  check 
Reviewing the specification None compliance at the 
construction process to reduce 
cost 
 
Continuous and effective 
supervision 
Supervision/communication Work load/ commercial 
pressure 
Applying permit work system 
and motivation 
 
Moreover, many designers prefer this way of analysis when it comes for materials selection 
to choose the right feature for suitable performance against the process construction and 
operation phases and factors that may lead to the failure mood. 
C. Maintenance strategy  
The questionnaires and interviews helped unveil all technical defects in the functional 
analysis and failure modes. Many construction professionals believe in the need of involving the 
maintenance strategy in the risk assessment of the project. For instance, Hung et al., (2009) 
believe that three maintenance strategies; predicative, prevention, and reactive should be applied 
for each construction. 
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Figure 71: Maintenance Strategy and Tactics. 
The authors describe how the current usage of these strategies in the organization 
requires a more specified focus. That is, traditional maintenance strategies may not achieve the 
production and safety goals because they are designed to preform before or after equipment 
breakdown. Such a superficial understanding of the role of maintenance strategy prompts 
management to make questionable decisions that translate into accidents at the construction site. 
As such, a new methodology will be introduced in this framework which involves border 
dimensions of the maintenance strategy, such as audit and leadership (Fig. 71). 
 Leadership and Audit  
According to the Sunindijo et al., (2007) leadership can serve as a vital contributor to 
performance indicator geared towards achieving a well-rounded implementation process at the 
construction site. This is particularly applicable to the maintenance phase where a variety of the 
organizations do not demonstrate enough visibility due to the fact that maintenance is not 
practiced in offices or the construction sites. Senior managers often display leadership with other 
senior employees in the office or when facing a large number of employees e.g. workers in the 
construction side. As result, a lack of implementation arises in the maintenance strategy 
activities. 
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Many scholars such as Skipper and Bell (2006) believe that leadership visibility is the 
solution which can fill such gaps. However, the authors indicate that the real challenge in 
maintenances strategy leadership is finding a managing strategy where important competency 
elements are being monitored, such as accountability. The relationship between leadership and 
accountability depend on one another where the absence of one affects the other. For example, 
most risk assessment sheets of the maintenance activities only refer to the senior maintenance 
engineers and technicians. This practice is usually defined as non-accountability job assignment 
that leads to non-commitment attitudes amongst the employees. This, if left unchecked, can 
further escalate into a behavior barrier against the planned strategy. To enforce the leadership 
accountability in the maintenance strategy, the following actions are advised for the top 
management in the organization. 
Firstly, assuring senior management level support and involvement in the maintenance 
training program. This promotes accountability of the management in developing the employee 
skills in areas other than production. Additionally, management participation in the near misses 
and incident investigations reflects the management commitment in fostering a culture geared 
towards implementing the desired organization strategy.  
On the other hand, Tang et al., (2009) illustrates that the goal of a construction partnership, 
from safety perspective, is to share risks and gain a better emergency response. However, the 
authors state that the lack of private-public partnership in construction projects disrupts the 
flexibility of the maintenance strategy. According to the authors there are three straight benefits 
from having external maintenance partnership: involving the external parties in implementing the 
organization strategy, reducing direct maintenance services cost of the organization, and 
providing a faster response in case of failures at the site.  
Jones et al., (2006), shed light on how failure in implementing the maintenance strategy is the 
main cause of extra costs in the construction project. For example, the authors suggest that safety 
and health management system audits should include compliance towards the maintenance 
strategy. Moreover, the authors suggest involving external maintenance partnership in these 
audits during various project phases. 
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In this framework, the main point of examination in the auditing process is the maintenance 
measurements that describe the organization performance towards the maintenance strategies. 
The benefits of auditing these indicators, as Kumar et al., (2013) elaborate, is that they help 
determine maintenance strategies such as condition based maintenance, reliability of the 
equipment and maintenance productivity. The authors emphasize the importance of examining 
the role of Maintenance Performance Measurement (MPM) as a qualitative and quantitative 
approach that can measure complex functions such as maintenance activities. The audit 
mechanism focuses on two key aspects to assess the maintenance system: effort and result 
indicators of MPM. These indicators provide a balance perspective for the senior management. 
For example, effective indicators display whether the construction job is completed, has led to 
the expected output indicators, and ensured that the desired quality of output has been achieved. 
 
Figure 72: Maintenance performance indicators. 
Tracking reports can be utilized to measure the effectiveness of these indicators via 
auditing and continuous monitoring is also required. The main purpose of the tracking reports is 
to provide real-time information of the maintenance status at the construction site. Combining 
auditing and tracking reports provides senior management an opportunity to evaluate the 
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implementation process of the maintenance strategy and an efficiency indicator in reflecting the 
safety performance. 
Furthermore, tracking reports help the organization reduce maintenance cost by providing 
an inventory that illustrates all the information of resources as project data. Therefore, in future 
projects, this data will display a better link between the maintenance s, materials, equipment, and 
machineries so as to attain an integrated reporting system and lower the chance of any 
redundancy in the project. 
3. Behavioral section 
According to Garrett and Teizer (2009) that the difference between human factors and 
behavioral analysis in construction safety depends mainly on the worker beliefs. Garrett and 
Teizer illustrate that human factors are more associated with factors affecting the individual 
performance e.g. training and equipment usage. In on other hand, behavioral section strives to 
examine all the attributes that influence the worker beliefs which can be developed into attitude 
and then to constant behavior. Both interviewees as well as most of questionnaire respondents 
echo each other in asserting that behavioral safety is the most important prevention barrier at a 
construction site. However, most safety professionals settle on the challenges that associate with 
the implementation process. These challenges can contribute due internal or external reasons as 
the questionnaire and interviews display. For example, from the questionnaire, the external 
factors that affect the behavioral safety performance for the employees can be classified into 
three categories: employee capacity, organization, and work environment. According to Clark 
(2013), all these factors are related to each other and to have an efficient BBS program at the 
workplace, it is vital to implement an approach that continues to link these areas together. This 
explains the three themes, i.e. safety competence, welfare plan, and behavior analysis, in this 
research framework which imitates the responders and interviewees opinion about the current 
status of the behavioral safety performance. Understanding the interactions mechanism between 
these three points is a key challenge that top management should address in order to foster a 
healthy safety culture at their sites. Fig. 73 clarifies the main stream of the interactions between 
these behavioral safety aspects where the ultimate goal is to promote a healthy safety culture at 
the workplace. 
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Figure 73: Behavioral safety elements interaction.  
 
A. Organization factor   
Organization factors play a critical role in the Applied Behavioral Analysis (ABA), 
comprising of significant features such as supervision, leadership and etc. However, scholars 
such Zohar and Luria (2004) believe that behavioral organization factors have a direct effect 
upon worker competence. For example, as the second interviewee mentioned, most oil and gas 
organizations provide only the basic safety courses for their staff, usually at the beginning of 
their tenure. Evaluating the training matrix of the employee, especially for the workers at the site, 
is extremely important to determine the level of their safety competence and how it could 
improve in the future. Due to the complexity of the oil and gas industry, most workers complain 
about other organization factors that may affect their safety competence as the questionnaire 
display in this study. For instance, work load, poor visibility of managements, and blaming 
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culture can disturb the worker safety competence even if he/she has received adequate technical 
training course.  
As a result, senior management should deliver healthy organization factors that motivate end-
users to augment their safety competence through initiatives such as safety bonus and 
supervision care. Langford and Sawacha (2000) suggest several practices for the organization to 
enforce safety attitude at the workplace. For instance, having joint safety training between safety 
supervisors and workers at the site strengthens the safety culture in the long-run. Additionally, 
the authors believe that organizations should establish a clear policy illustrating how any worker 
has the right to refuse a task that he/she has not been trained in. The commitment of the 
organization towards these healthy practices will build a perspective that the company cares 
about the workers‘ personal safety and is more willing to cooperate. 
B. Work Environment factor  
Construction workers need acceptable rest, washing facilities and food. To ensure the 
behavioral safety of the worker, the welfare plan should reach beyond these basic requirements. 
According to Harris and McCaffer (2013), welfare is one of the most serious hidden work-
environment behavioral factors that cause vulnerability in the workers‘ technical skills. For 
example, several health and physical issues often appear due to a poor welfare plan for workers 
at the site. 
The questionnaires and the interviews point to more examples regarding the negative 
outcomes of organization compromising on the welfare plans. When welfare services quality 
declines at the site, the end-users lose the incentive to be creative and give innovative feedbacks 
to improve the safety system implementation. This framework highlights that an ineffective 
utilization of working environment factors has an equal effect on the managerial and field 
activities. This should encourage the organization to gain a wider perspective about the impact of 
an informed welfare plan that establishes a safety culture in their current and future projects. 
Emerging welfare plan in the risk assessment as essential element within all other technical 
ones, increase the chance to have more suitable work environment factors for the labors at the 
site. That is, analyzing technical activities highlights the kind of services the employee needs to 
safely perform the required job. For instance, most pipeline construction projects require able-
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bodied laborers who are able to perform the different activities, such as bending and lifting. 
Here, risk assessment will help the top management and project supervisor select younger labors 
for these activities and assign older ones for other jobs at the site. Moreover, involving a welfare 
plan in the risk assessment provides the asset engineers with a better idea in the layout of welfare 
facilities that need to be installed, such as heating facilities during cold weather. 
Wong et al., (2007), support the importance of having integrated welfare plan that runs 
parallel to the technical work at the construction site. However, the authors encourage most 
industrial organization to conduct a separate risk assessment after the welfare resources 
installation to avoid any incident that may occur during the operation phase. For example, 
several incidents occurred in the construction projects due to incorrect storing of cylinders in 
non-ventilated places outside the workers‘ accommodation. 
C. Employee Behavior  
Mohamed (2002) supports the concept of how employee behavior is highly related with other 
behavioral external factors in which shape it as the last barrier of behavior safety. As such, the 
organization should avoid focusing solely upon analyzing the worker safety behavior without 
considering the organization and work environment factors. To attain a meaningful evaluation of 
the worker, indicators from both management commitment and work environment ought to be 
monitored in a continuous manner. Selecting the indicators is the key obstacle that an 
organization needs to cross in order to ensure they have fair monitoring system.  
Management commitment is a vital indicator of the organization behavioral safety since it 
can exceed beyond establishing policy and procedures. For example, management commitment 
is the essential element of creating a supervisory and supportive environment at the construction 
site. When an end-user feels that his/her management prioritizes his or her personal safety over 
productivity, the communication transparency will increase in the organization. At this point, 
tracking the behavioral analysis of the employee in the daily activities will be easier. That is, the 
more emphases from senior staff, the more oriented supervision toward worker behavioral safety 
is applied as result of management activities e.g. manager‘s visits to site, managers-workers and 
open discussion. 
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Nahrgang et al., (2011) encourage worker involvement as one of the main behavioral 
indicators in the behavioral analysis system. Management should be more willing to provide 
active and passive control to end-users. For example, workers can participate and contribute in 
decision making of safety policy and procedures. As such, more individuals will gain 
appreciation for the safety behavioral and its importance, eventually shaping a healthy safety 
culture at the construction site. 
Understanding and applying these new indicators will help the organization utilize an update 
in the industry. For instance, as was explored during the questionnaire and interviews, 
organizations use a performance mentality to analyze the worker behavior at the site. Such a 
mentality is propagated by the idea that unsafe behavior is fundamentally linked to workplace 
accidents records and scenarios. As such, accident data is considered the key indicator for 
judgment.  
This framework analyzes the effort put forth by management as part of employee behavior. 
The reason behind this focus is that employee behavior influences the technical skills of the 
workers. That is, most behavioral safety incidents at the construction site come from experienced 
workers who required revived several trainings by their management. However, concurrently, 
management often fails to stress the role of behavioral safety at the workplace. To attain a safety 
culture at the workplace, an integrated examination of the employee behavior should be 
conducted. This will aid safety engineers understand the root causes of unsafe practices, instead 
of focusing only on the act-doer and the required disciplinary actions. 
6.2. Validation of the Framework  
 
A. Quantitative approach  
As can be seen in Fig. 65, there are three key areas that need to be covered to gain an 
integrated understanding of the potential hazards in a construction project. After selecting the 
indicators, Total Positive Outcome Indicator (TPOI), will be employed to know the efficiency of 
these indicators to reflect the safety implementation and its effects on the performance. TPOI 
method concept has been mentioned briefly in a several occasions from construction 
professionals (Wallbaum et al., 2012) that it relies on the positive leading indicators. In this 
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framework, the proposed TPOI is further integrated by taking into account employee efforts, 
management commitment, and the organizational structures in place to promote a safe 
workplace. 
 Indicators and research objectives  
The objectives of this study are examining the current safety challenges that affect the 
implementation process in the oil and gas construction projects. The chosen indictors should 
reflect the gaps explicated in framework, questionnaire and interviews, as shown in Table 6. For 
the procedural indicator, auditing and follow-up check is the main indictor to evaluate the 
compliance level of construction execution, with respect to organization safety procedures. 
Table 6: Performance Indictors of safety implementation compliance. 
Indicator Area Objective Measure Example 
Audit and follow-up checks Procedural Compliance towards 
procedural requirements 
 Number of audits and 
follow-up checks 
 8 hours for each 
audit and follow 
up 
 
Equipment verification Technical Avoiding the equipment 
failure in the site 
 Number of Equipment 
verification 
 4 hours for each 
equipment 
verification 
Maintenance assessment Technical Fill the gap between the 
safety and maintenance 
departments 
 Number of equipment 
that have full 
completing repair 
 72 hours for 
each full 
completing 
repair 
Welfare examination Behavioral Providing comfortable level 
of welfare services for the 
workers 
 Number of Welfare 
examination 
 Number of training 
provided to the end-
users  
 8 hours of the 
welfare 
examination 
 7 hours for each 
day of training 
for each worker 
 
The proposed framework, in the procedural section, provides conceptual steps that 
involve all major areas such as communication, technical, and safety performances. As such, a 
number of specific and dedicated audits and follow-up checks will be utilized as performance 
indictor of management commitment. These procedural audits, occurring once in each quarter, 
ought to cover all faults highlighted in the procedural section. For the follow-up checkup, it has 
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to ensure that all the procedural audit findings are fulfilled and there is an action plan that 
explains the methodology employed to achieve it. By applying this procedural performance 
indicator, the optimization of sustained safety regulations can be monitored and tracked. 
Equipment and their failure modes were the most technical highlights referred in the 
framework. These two areas serve as the objective of study i.e. exposing the technical safety 
challenges at the construction site. As a result, equipment verification is a vital technical 
indicator since it aids both the safety engineers in the field and top management in guaranteeing 
equipment integrity. Additionally, using equipment verification as an indicator aids the technical 
managers to continuously observe the machineries performance and optimize the operation goals 
with respect to safety measures. Furthermore, maintenance assessment will be employed as the 
second technical indictor in this framework. Maintenance assessment enables industrial 
professionals to achieve one of the objectives of this research in filling the communication gap 
between the maintenance and operation departments. For example, the assessment process 
involves reviewing the maintenance records status and availability of the equipment parts before 
operating them at the construction site.  
Moving to the behavioral indicators, the framework illuminates the critical influences that 
become the root causes of low behavioral safety performance by the end-users. Here, low 
qualities of welfare, such as poor housing, greatly affect workers‘ technical safety. For instance, 
as shown in Fig. 73, employee behavior can be directly influenced by organizational and 
environmental features. As such, the selected performance indicators must reflect these 
influences. 
The first indicator is welfare examination that determines how satisfied workers are with the 
facilities provided by their organizations. This examination should focus on the physical and 
mental aspects. Accelerated production rate and reduced cost are the immediate causes of a 
compromised welfare quality. According to Hoonakker et al., (2005), these safety initiatives 
appear when the emphasis shifts towards a well-rounded safety culture at the workplace. 
However, the authors stress how the organizations must ensure their end-users‘ technical 
capability to sustain healthy behavioral safety. This can be achieved by measuring the planned 
training hours against the actual training hours delivered to the workers.  
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 Applying the performance indicators in the construction projects 
The first construction project is for National Oil and Gas Construction Company, considered 
one of the most active construction contractors in the onshore concession. The construction 
project period is estimated for two years (2016-2018). The main goal is providing pipeline 
network to transport hydrocarbon from several well heads to the refinery in the operation plant. 
In this section, a benchmarking exercise between TPOI and TRI will be conducted to show if the 
indicators can provide an integrated risk assessment to optimize the safety performance. For 
example, all the man-hours of the four indictors are calculated in term of TPOI from Q1 to the 
Q4, represented by the green line in Fig. 74. According to Siu et al., (2004), most organizations 
conduct numerous safety meetings and reviews at the beginning of the project. Later on, 
however, the effort towards safety declines because the focus shifts to all the operation 
challenges at the construction site. This is obvious in Fig. 74 where the TPOI man-hours declines 
dramatically form 68,000 hr in Q1 to 34,000 hr in Q4. This reveals the compromise and non-
commitment of the senior management towards the initial HSE project plan. As such, this 
finding accurately reflects the implementation problem this research attempts to explore. 
 
Figure 74: TPOI VS. TRI for pipelines construction project. 
Furthermore, the columns in Fig. 74, represent the actual man-hours spent at the 
construction site. When compared with the TPOI line, an inverse relationship can be highlighted. 
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For instance, in Q2 and Q3, when the project reaches execution stage, the physical work at the 
site increases to achieve the production targets. As a result, management tend to emphasize in the 
operation aims and get relaxed with safety measures as shown in the intensely decline of the 
TPOI in Q2 and Q3. As such, it is expected that, the total number of the incidents increase as 
TRI graph displays in which the lowest numbers occur in Q1 and highest in Q4. The behavior of 
TRI in Fig. 74, reinforces the research‘s claim that root causes of incidents manifest when the top 
management compromise on the safety plan implementation. As such, when the man-hours spent 
on TPOI decrease, more incidents are expected to be occurred at the construction site. As such, 
management in the organizations should utilize performance indicators and TPOI as alert method 
for inadequate safety performance lest a real accident occur. 
The second construction project is for CONMIX Company that provides cementing 
services for several hydrocarbon structures in the UAE, both at the onshore and offshore 
construction sites. The project is examined through the performance indicators similar to the 
pipeline construction project, but here the statistics are presented in monthly basis due to the 
smaller size of the project. The goal of this project is to provide ready columns in 10 months‘ 
period to an offshore rig in Das Island, as shown in Fig. 75.  
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Figure 75: TPOI VS. TRI for offshore concrete structures. 
The workers are exposed to variety of hazards at the workplace. They are especially 
vulnerable during mixing the concrete, pouring the concrete mix and opening concrete forms. As 
evidenced by Fig. 75, the company spent high rate of man-hours in several areas of safety system 
as TPOI pattern displays. Most organizations tend to do so in the beginning of the project. 
However, between February and April, TPOI plummets, simulating the company negligence 
toward implementing the safety plan. As such, accidents start occurring in the second week of 
February and reach a maximum with 11 TRI in the beginning of March. An increase in the 
number of TRI due to the decline of TPOI was observed in both projects, as shown in Fig. 74 
and Fig. 75. However, the response of the CONMIX managers was to regain their high safety 
performance and spend more man-hours in implementing safety system than at the site. From 
April to June, there was a significant improvement in the TPOI pattern that reflects the 
management effort on improving the safety applications, technical, procedural, behavioral. It 
reaches its maximum rate in the middle of June with 23,000 man-hours, without recording any 
incident at the construction site. 
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According to Zou et al., (2007), organizations achieve maturity level when dealing with 
risks, if they start changing and updating their tradition practices in both operation and safety 
perspectives. This mentality shift can be dedicated in this project in Fig. 75 when a slight drop of 
TPOI occurred between June and August. Here, the company did not count on the zero-excellent 
record of TRI, and bonus back to recover the high rate of TPOI. The explanation behind that is 
that, the CONMIX Company experienced how relying in incident records lead the management 
to get eased and relaxed with other vital indictors as what occurred between February and April. 
As such, the TPOI rate increases again and reach to 21,000 man-hours in October as shown in 
Fig. 75.  
In the both construction projects, the performance indicators (represented via a TPOI 
pattern) show how most organizations have a good implementation at the starting stage of the 
project. With time though, a negligence and carelessness attitude develops that reduces the rate 
of TPOI and increases TRI. 
From analyzing both Fig. 74 and Fig. 75, it is evident that every time there is a decline in 
the leading indicators, an accident will take place in the field. For example, in both projects, the 
number of TRI appears immediately once TPOI pattern has declined past a certain point. As a 
result, TPOI has the potential to be utilized as a performance indicator and an alert to the 
management before accident occurrence. Additionally, as shown in Table 6, TPOI reflects an 
integrated approach towards optimizing the safety system implementation. This will aid 
management in identifying not only the root cause but also areas that require improvement in the 
risk assessment (Fig. 65). 
B. Qualitative approach  
   This study provides a new conceptual framework of how the risk assessment can be 
utilized to optimize safety implementation at a construction site. This framework simulates the 
need for more integrated method, as the literature review explicates, to fill the current safety gaps 
in the hydrocarbon projects. Furthermore, the structure of the framework is derived from the 
questionnaire respondents‘ and interviewees‘ analysis. 
Although this framework has been examined by several industrial professionals, there is a 
necessity to evaluate the framework from an academic and industrial perspective. For example, 
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Wimbush and Watson (2000), use a qualitative approach in their study which delivers a 
framework that optimizes the quality of health at the workplace and public areas. According to 
the authors, using qualitative approach granted them a wider scope when predicating future 
challenges upon the proposed framework. Industrial experts often find themselves focusing on 
current obstacles without considering the resilience of the framework against dynamic factor e.g. 
adoption and change management. As such, this method allows safety professionals to gauge the 
long-term suitability of a proposed framework.  
In this study, the first interviewee serves as key evaluator for the framework. Before starting, 
the evaluation process should be categorized to avoid an imbalanced examination. For example, 
the following categories are used in different stages of the evaluation: feasibility, performance 
and measurements of the framework. According to Kahan (2008), these categories can provide 
an integrated understanding for the framework mechanism for current and future challenges. The 
author believes that sustaining the high functionality of the framework is the key target that the 
evaluator must determine during his/her examination process.  
 The First Evaluation  
The evaluator has a strong background in construction safety. He has been involved in 
several projects as safety advisor and consultant in hydrocarbon projects. Additionally, he 
frequently publishes papers on the role of safety and risk factors during construction activities. 
Before starting the evaluation process, the framework had been explained and reviewed with the 
evaluator to provide a comprehensive view. The evaluator agrees how hazards and risks are 
highly associated with the hydrocarbon construction projects due to the nature of the work. He 
believes in the need of continual improvement in implementing safety in the construction field. 
According to him, safety systems in the oil and gas industry suffer from accidents due to the lack 
of implementation where professionals keep trying to fill this gap through different approaches. 
Utilizing risk assessment as a proactive approach can strengthen the system implementation if 
executed strategically. The evaluator simulates risk assessment as the safety eye in the project 
that needs to be placed on the right spot to detect all the possible hazards. This justifies why 
many scholars indicate the need of having an integrated method to cover all safety challenges 
that affect the implementation process. The evaluator elaborates that this framework presents the 
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possibility of using risk assessment as an integrated method to solve the implementation safety 
defects in the construction field.  
 The Feasibility of the Framework  
According to the evaluator, that the proposed Framework in Fig.65 has a new concept which 
includes technical, procedural and behavioral aspects. However, the examination should examine 
the practicability of applying this framework within the project plan during execution. The 
evaluator believes that the technical structure is oriented more towards the equipment safety. 
Additionally, merging elements such as function analysis and failure modes helps involve 
maintenance and reliability perspectives in the risk assessment process. The evaluator believes 
that a common mistake most organization make is not involving all the resources integrated with 
the usage of the equipment. For example, integrity of the equipment itself cannot prevent 
accidents since other factors contribute in the process e.g. people and methodologies. Therefore, 
the evaluator supports using the function analysis method to cover all hazards from various 
factors. However, to have an accurate application of function analysis, a reliability engineer 
should be involved in the designing and execution stages. According to the evaluator, this would 
allow the Framework to be more efficient in all subsequent steps. As Fig. 70 illustrates, the 
evaluator suggests that the mode of failure requires a forward logic understanding that 
employees with a reliability background are more familiar with. Concurrently, collaboration with 
safety engineers is vital to select the best emergency response in case of equipment failure in the 
construction field. 
As such, the evaluator stresses employing safety and reliability engineers in all technical 
elements in this framework. This would result in the implementation of a visible strategy to 
improve the safety in the technical aspect. However, the evaluator believes that having a separate 
maintenance strategy (as suggested by the framework) could be a challenging initiative. This is 
because most organizations are used to a general strategy for all the projects and shy away from 
time-consuming initiatives. According to the evaluator, this can be eliminated gradually after 
employees in office and field grow more familiar with it. For example, Fig. 71 suggests that 
maintenance tracking reports of equipment should be delivered on a frequent basis during the 
operation phase of the project. Such an activity is rare in the hydrocarbon construction industry, 
thus requiring time and effort before it can be practiced effectively. 
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For the procedural section in the framework, the evaluator advises that the feasibility of the 
elements is simple, but it requires accurate work to reach to the planned targets. For instance, the 
evaluator explains that Fig. 66 and Fig. 77 illustrate in a clear approach the mechanism in how to 
extract operational and safety procedures that suits the project resources and environment. 
Despite that, the evaluator suspects in the quality of the extracted procedures if the employee in 
charge is not competent enough in the both of technical and safety aspects. Therefore, the 
operation and safety procedures should be written simultaneously for the wanted construction 
activity to have a comprehensive view for different employees. Generally, the evaluator finds the 
idea of having a specific technical, safety and communication procedures is a unique one and has 
several benefits for the main organization procedures. This should be observed through applying 
continuous update from the lessons learned in the construction field. In this point, the evaluator 
suggests increasing the feasibility of the procedural section in the framework to conduct 
benchmarking exercise with local and international construction safety agencies. The evaluator 
justifies this remark that focusing only lesson learned to improve procedures is a narrow 
perspective in technical and safety perspective. Yet, this is not applicable for the communication 
procedures as the evaluator highlights. For instance, organizations have their own 
communication chart and methodology that suits the nature of work at the site benchmarking 
exercise will not add a lot of vales to the communication procedures. Apart of that, the evaluator 
supports the idea in Fig. 68 in which it clears the main three aspects of communication, what, 
who and how, for all employees in the office and construction site. However, the evaluator 
believes this mechanism can be modified in a way to be more feasible by adding communication 
officers as a medium between workers and management.  
For the behavioral section, the evaluator states that the safety behavior concept is the major 
gap most organizations fail to apply in their safety system. According to him this framework is 
oriented more towards the behavioral safety of the end-users. Though a vital part of safety 
implementation, this alone is not enough since poor behavioral safety starts from the 
management level. For example, Fig. 73 demonstrates how the interaction mechanism between 
the employee and various behavioral factors. Yet, this should be narrowed and classified into 
three levels: managerial, supervisorial, and laborer. This can be more visible and feasible if the 
figure could illustrate how the lack of safety behavior in management has a direct effect upon the 
end-users‘ performance. As a result, the evaluator suggests adding a general behavioral analysis. 
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The evaluator justifies this suggestion by pointing out how, in his experience; the root cause of 
unsafe behavior for the workers is poor safety behavior of management. 
The evaluator believes that human factors are more related to the non-technical skills such as 
leadership, communication and stress management. Thus, this section of the framework should 
involve such soft skills. The evaluator supports his view by citing several studies that have been 
conducted by behavioral safety professionals, for e.g. Dainty et al., 2005, Smith et al., 2002, and 
Gilley et al., 2009.  
 Monitoring Plan for the Framework  
As the evaluator stated, that the proposed Framework in Fig. 65 is more conceptual where it 
may cause some complications for construction organizations during the implementation 
process. For that, an implementation plan is developed that contains practical guidelines that can 
ease the execution process for the industrial sectors. As it was illustrated by the evaluator, that 
there should be a defined role for each job category in the organization with a visible and clear 
job description. In other words, the construction organizations tend to agree in the highlighted 
elements in the Framework, but still they need the answer of the following question, how we can 
do it?  This can be answered through having monitoring plan of the Framework which was not 
clear in Fig. 65.  
As shown in Fig. 76, that monitoring plan involves all the gardens of the employees in the 
organization in two main phases. The design and operation phases include variety of 
communication dimensions that aid each employee in office or site to implement the integrated 
risk assessment progressively.  For example, as the evaluator mentions, the management should 
have a clear description of the potential project with visible goal in which each employee 
including worker has enough knowledge in his/her role.   
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Figure 76: Monitoring plan of the Framework. 
 
However, the details of the project goals should be delivered with respect to the 
employee role and responsibilities to preserve an adequate level of understanding without any 
complexity. For example, Cheung et al., (2011) mention that many of the construction 
companies share their project aim and objectives with all their employees without simplifying 
these information for the end-users. For instance, the involvement of the workers in the design 
stage is a very vital, but it ought to be applied in suitable way. As consequence, safety engineers 
and supervisors will play a key role in the simplification process to raise the level of the 
awareness of the organizational culture between the workers. In addition, the senior management 
needs to agree on the technical methodologies which should be used during the execution phase 
that encloses equipment and machineries. For more illustration, both of the interviews and 
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evaluation stages display a major safety challenges in the equipment that are used during the 
construction activities.  As result of that, defining the approaches that are going to be utilized in 
the project, aids safety engineers and supervisors to narrow the potential hazards in the site and 
become more focused on preventing or mitigating them.    
 Furthermore, this mechanism can be enforced through having explicit roles and 
responsibilities especially for the end-users. The importance of this step is that it prepares the 
labors to determine their work scope and safety instructions which give them the right to reject 
any risky job activity. In this point, as the evaluator stresses, during the risk assessment, when 
the role and responsibility are defined with considering the safety perspective, it displays the 
message of delivering the job in a safe manner. As result of that, the job performer will not 
compromise the safety value over production rate even if he/she is facing high work load. After 
that, as shown in Fig.76, the involvement is going to be more sufficient in the design stage 
because each employee can contribute with a better level of knowledge. For example, when the 
worker participates in the pipeline laying process, the worker can propose a more realistic 
suggestion due to his expediency with construction site environment. Due to that, all the pervious 
elements; roles and responsibilities, project goals and methodologies could be updated and 
enhanced before moving to the operation phase.   
 Moving to the operation phase, to enhance the monitoring of the Framework in Fig. 65, 
practical steps are advised to be followed that can go parallel with various applications of the 
integrated risk assessment. For example, senior management should demonstrate efficiency to 
their leadership in order to support the new approach of applying risk assessment during the 
entire implementation process. This action provides a vital support for the Framework especially 
in the behavioral section. Ofori, and Toor (2012) believe, that the implementation of technical 
elements in the safety systems relies mainly on non-critical activities such as management 
leadership. For ease of understanding, the authors give example in the end-users behavioral in 
the construction site and how it is highly associated with management visibility. As the 
Framework explicates, elements such as welfare of the employee when it gets direct supports 
form management, it displays the care of organization on the workers comfort. This eventually 
motivates labors to work in a safe manner in the site. However, safety leadership can be 
distracted if there is a poor communication in the process. For illustration, the communication 
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procedural section in Fig.65 focuses in answering the main three questions: what, who and how. 
Yet, as the evaluator highlights there is a need to conduct a frequent meeting between the 
management and supervisors in the site to check on the risk assessment implementation. For 
example, in the oil and gas construction projects, it is a usual practice to that project engineer to 
submit a daily report about the operation status to the management. To simulate this, as shown in 
Fig. 76, that daily updates between safety engineers and management aids the organization to be 
informed on the safety condition and how it could be improved. According to Kine et al., (2010) 
in their paper that verbal communication can play a critical role on improving safety in 
construction. This can be approached either by using official channels i.e. reports or unofficial 
approaches such as virtual meeting.   
 The next important task that the both of the safety engineers and supervisor need to 
deliver is effective supervision on the workers in the site. As it was illustrated in this research, 
inadequate supervision is one of the direct causes for the safety incident in the construction field. 
As it was mentioned in the second interview, most of the construction organizations utilize the 
role of supervisor in the technical aspects which gives negligence attitude to occur against other 
safety features. For that, as shown in Fig. 76, supervision assurance element aims to have more 
integrated safety role for the supervisor e.g. procedural and behavioral characteristics.  This 
mechanism widens the role of supervisor in a way that he/she should be aware of all aspects of 
the needed supervision activities in the construction site.  
 Yet, there is another vital contribution to ensure the integrity of the monitoring of the 
Framework. Workers feedbacks are extremely significant to determine how the Framework is 
exposing the workplace hazards and how they could be mitigated. Therefore, listening and 
transferring their feedbacks about Framework gives the chance to the management to apply some 
changes in the implementation mechanism. For example, as the questionnaire displays that most 
of the workers are not satisfied with the welfare services that their construction organization 
provide which eventually reflects in their safety performance. As consequence, both of the safety 
engineer and supervisor need to allocate a specific time to pay attention towards workers opinion 
and suggestions to the application of the integrated risk assessment. Therefore, the Framework in 
Fig.65 will be combined with Fig.76 to strengthen the risk monitoring element as shown in 
Fig.77.  
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Figure 77: Modified Integrated Risk Assessment Framework. 
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 The Second Evaluation  
The first evaluator highlighted two critical aspects of the first proposed framework in Fig. 
65; the adaptability of the framework and the monitoring plan. For further explanation, the first 
evaluator stresses on the role of change plan management in enhancing the efficiency of the 
framework implementation. Hence, this plan aids each category in the organization with 
necessary steps to adapt the changes in the risk assessment changes. Moreover, as Fig. 77 
displays that risk assessment cannot be fully integrated if there is no visible communication. A 
clear communication should involve the entire organization employees from the management to 
the workers level. 
Although Fig.77 explicates a modified version of the integrated risk assessment by the 
first evaluator, there is a need for another validation especially from the operation and workers 
perspective. The second interviewee was selected as the second evaluator since he has a solid 
background in the construction operation. As in the second interview, employees with 
construction field experience can spot hazards that are hidden to managers in the organization. 
For that, the modified framework in Fig. 77 was presented to the second evaluator to know how 
it can optimize the implementation process of the safety system in oil and gas construction 
projects.      
Starting from the procedural section, the evaluator supports the concept of involving the 
workers in the procedures whether the technical or the safety one. According to the evaluator that 
having workers representative i.e. supervisor on reviewing the required procedures can add 
several benefits. For example, the supervisor will know all the safety references that he should 
go back to in case of any technical/safety emergency. In addition, this involvement of the 
supervisor helps him to deliver the required message to the workers in simplified approach. 
Moreover, the evaluator emphasizes on the role of the communication procedures in which it 
provides visible channels for the workers if they have any inquiry. This should go alongside with 
a clear role and responsibilities as the risk monitoring plan suggests.  
In the technical aspect, the evaluator believes that all the integrity and safety aspects of 
the equipment should be checked before the worker perform the required job in the site. For that, 
the evaluator stresses in the necessity of collaboration between the safety and maintenance 
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departments as the framework displays. For example, technical examination such as function 
analysis and failure modes should supply the elementary technical safety judgment skill to the 
supervisor. The evaluator elaborates that these basic technical skills would be enough to 
implement the supervision assurance as the risk monitoring plan shows. In addition, from the end 
user point view, having maintenance strategy will ensure that all workers should receive the 
prerequisite training in case of using new technologies. This practice has several safety benefits 
especially for the experienced workers who are used to work with certain technical equipment 
for long period. In the end of the technical section, it is critical for the safety engineer to report 
the equipment performance on daily basis for maintenance department and senior management. 
The active communication provides the maintenance engineers and managers to take proactive 
actions in the event of risky and non-safety performance of the equipment in the site.             
 Thirdly, the evaluator states that the framework in Fig. 77 contributes in an efficient 
approach to preserve the safety behavioral of the workers in the construction site. For instance, 
the evaluator highlights how vital elements such as worker welfare impact the safety 
performance and the importance to link it with risk assessment. According to him, many of 
incidents in the site are associated with poor welfare services and they contribute as root causes. 
Unfortunately, most of the construction organizations do not follow this logic in which it results 
in compromising welfare aspect for operation purposes. Moreover, the evaluator says that having 
open channels in in the risk monitoring plan between workers and supervisors, gives the chance 
to address all the welfare defects that face the workers. As consequence, the senior management 
should be able to detect any gaps or decline in the provided welfare services to fix and enhance 
them. Moving to the safety competence, the evaluator supporters the concept of Fig. 73, that 
safety competence it is not only an individual attribute, but it interacts with other influences. Due 
to that, construction organization should widen their view to include other factors apart from 
technical training only. For example, assigning the appropriate work load for each worker that 
suits his/her technical skills and physical features. However, the evaluator said even with having 
all the required measures, the safety leadership by management is a key to attain the safety 
behavior of the workers. This safety leadership ought to be more than site visit as the risk 
monitoring plan illustrates, in which it should be visible on a daily basis. Then, more accurate 
behavioral analyses could be applied.   
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The evaluator trusts in the concept and mechanism of the framework in Fig.77 in raising 
the safety awareness and providing better protection for workers in the site. The comprehensive 
interpretation of this risk assessment framework offers a good opportunity to the worker to be 
involved with different aspects of the projects e.g. technical or procedural. According to the 
evaluator, this involvement has another dimension than enhancing the safety performance in the 
site. For instance, effective involvement substitutes the gap of general knowledge that most of 
the workers suffer due to the limited education that they had. With time, the raise of the 
knowledge between the end users will reflect positively in many attributes in terms of improving 
the quality of work of the construction organization. The evaluator concludes that this framework 
can be updated and modified after implementing it for a sufficient time without compromising its 
core concept which is the integrated viewed.  
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Chapter 7:  Conclusion, Recommendations, limitations and further 
research possibilities 
7.1. Conclusion  
 
This study strives to optimize the safety performance at construction projects in the oil 
and gas fields through implementation of risk assessment. As can be gleaned from the literature 
review, many scholars elucidate their struggles with current applications of risk assessment and 
the needs for an integrated approach. The aim of this research is to involve all vital and 
contributable areas that can cause an accident as immediate or root source. Technical, 
procedural, and behavioral aspects were investigated with respect to the external and internal 
attributes that play a critical role in the oil and gas industry. Pervious risk assessment 
frameworks could not provide an integrated perspective to identify the full scope of the hazards 
at the construction site. To have an integrated view for better safety implementation, an 
integrated examination should be conducted. To determine the possible threats at the site, all the 
employees in the organization have been questioned through a survey that was distributed as a 
part of the field work in this research.  
Exposing the current gaps in the organizations‘ safety engineering system was a vital step 
towards detecting the key elements that had to be strengthened in order to enhance the 
implementation process. There were unexpected points raised by both management and end-
users, providing a glimpse at the various barriers towards the implementation plan. For instance, 
both management and end-users indicate some gaps in the technical skills, either due to the lack 
of training or communication between departments. Furthermore, this stage of the research 
explicates the difference mindset between management and end-users in how the safety and 
operation procedures should be utilized. A major challenge arose in the behavioral aspect 
especially from the management side. For example, most managers who participated in the 
questionnaire, lacked vision when it came to how welfare is associated with workers‘ behavioral 
safety at the site. 
These primary assessments need more investigation so as to construct coherent 
framework that can optimize the safety performance. As consequence, both interviews and 
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benchmarking practice were conducted to help this research perceive the hidden attributes behind 
these unhealthy acts. 
The same methodology was followed in the subsequent stage of the research where two 
main interviews involved a senior manager and a supervisor to discuss the early outcomes of the 
questionnaire. These interviews helped to understand the internal and external influences that 
create unhealthy attitudes between managers, engineers, and workers. For example, most 
equipment failures occurred at the construction site due to poor communication between safety 
and reliability engineers in the field. Yet, it could be related to a procedural defect e.g. failure in 
updating the operation procedures with respect used technologies at the site. This highlights how 
having multiple viewpoints can affect the implementation process in several ways either by 
management or end-users. As such, in the both interviews, the importance of involving 
employees was highly stressed.  
The field work questionnaire, benchmarking, and interviews in this research allowed 
spotting vital elements, as illustrated in the Framework at Fig.65. The Framework provides 
conceptual strategies that deliberate both academics and industrial concerns. For instance, in Fig. 
69, functional analysis methodology was suggested to be not used in the equipment itself only, 
but with all the influences that interacts with it as well. This approach of usage of functional 
analysis shields the scholar‘s suggestions in the necessity of utilizing functional analysis with 
risk assessment. Concurrently, construction professionals indicate the importance of involving 
other factors such as people and materials as part of equipment integrity. Furthermore, the 
Framework introduces new features of behavioral safety during the risk assessment, ensuring the 
behavioral communication between management and workers. Sub elements, which involve 
behavioral analysis, open the permanent channels for both managers and workers. As the two 
interviews emphasized, when the behavioral analysis is applied, the management awareness and 
responsiveness towards their workers‘ essentials is augmented. This, in turn, improves welfare 
made available to the workers. As shown in the Framework, these comprehensive features of the 
element and sub-elements gives this Framework the strength in implementation of the safety 
engineering system. 
Since construction is a very practical field, especially in critical industry such as oil and 
gas, there is a need to examine how this Framework will be adopted and applied with the current 
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situations. The evaluators expounded that the impact of the Framework is different from one 
employee to another depending on his/her role in the organization. For example, the evaluator 
claimed that the organization should prepare a plan that involves all employee categories: senior 
staff, Middle management, and workers. According to the evaluators, this provides each category 
to implement the Framework process in the rate and methodology that suits its function at the 
site. Additionally, the evaluators highly recommended continuous response to the workers‘ 
feedbacks which improves the framework and its implementation. Moreover, to optimize the 
safety performance, the evaluator suggested several healthy practices which must be applied 
along with the Framework. For example, since equipment failures are very common at the 
construction site, having reliability engineer at the site can play a major factor to eliminate these 
unwanted events. 
7.2. Recommendations 
 
This study examines the safety performance and implementation at the construction oil 
and gas rigs. The reviewers of this research emphasize the new integrated approach that contains 
vital attributes to optimize the safety system execution. As was shown in this study, safety 
engineering is a very dynamic field that requires a consecutive improvement. For example, 
according to Green (2011), in his book Making Sense of Construction Improvement, the safety 
presence in construction should be updated frequently with respect to other influences, such as 
technology and shortage of resources. Green elaborates that stagnated; obsolete systems in 
construction pertaining to safety engineering systems will act as implementation barriers.  
In effect, this study presents the following recommendations that can provide the chance for 
other researchers and professionals to utilize the conceptual product this framework displays in 
altered approaches and purposes.  
 Creating numerical model that reflects the risk assessment performance as  of safety 
implementation  
Having numerical model has many research potentials where it can aid the organizations to 
develop software to measure the safety implementation in the operation phase.  
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 Studying in depth the role of human factor in affecting critical technical elements 
As shown in this study, there was a large gap in applying and monitoring the behavioral 
safety performance by management. This study exposes vital contributed element i.e. welfare, 
that can dramatically influence the workers‘ safety output. As result, a detailed study is highly 
recommended to determine how human factors affect the safety implementation and 
management role in oil and gas industry.  
 Providing other proactive KPIs for construction safety  
This research presents a new concept of measuring the safety performance in the construction 
sites. For instance, this study focuses on the amount of energy management expends towards 
safety engineering system, including meeting, training hours and etc. As such, for construction 
safety improvement, other proactive KPIs could be examined to gauge their impact on the safety 
performance e.g. quality control, supply chain management, and Life cycle costing. 
 
 The adaptability of framework 
Generally, the evaluators agree with the feasibility of the proposed framework, proposing 
some modifications that have been illustrated above. However, it is critical to examine all 
categories pertaining to how the framework will be adopted by the organization, i.e. senior 
management, engineers/supervisors, and end-users. As such, it is important to discuss the 
adoption strategy in three different layers and what obstacles may arise against the 
implementation mechanism of the framework. 
A. Senior Management  
The key challenge for adopting any new framework lies in how the organization manages the 
change. Supporting this view, many scholars such as Rozenfeld et al., (2010) identify 
management implementation as the crucial factor that influences the successful adoption of a 
new framework. For instance, according to the authors, there are several proposed frameworks 
that succeeded in some construction firms and failed in other. Construction firms should always 
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implement any new changes gradually. The fault occurs when the organization wants to fill their 
safety gap instantly which results in poor implementation.  
As a result, besides applying management of change towards the proposed framework, risk 
management audit should be conducted frequently e.g. quarterly basis. Utilizing risk assessment 
framework will differ from one Construction Company to another, depending on internal factors 
such as organization capital and man power. Management must examine how these factors 
interact (via audits, for e.g.) with new risk assessment techniques to gain a better management of 
change strategy. According to Spira and Page (2003), such findings may assist senior 
management in determining the level of efficiency of risk assessment as well as purveying a 
realistic evaluation of the new adopted mechanism.  
In the end of this section, the resistance from the mangers is a common obstacle during any 
initiative that may affect the production rate. This is mainly due to a lack of understanding. 
However, management of change and risk management audits can gradually assist senior staff to 
adopt the framework. This facilitates updating any internal or external factor that may affect the 
implementation mechanism. As consequence of that, all direct report employees under senior 
management can effectively transfer the framework concept to the end-users.  
B. Engineers and Supervisors 
The role of mid-career employees in adoption of new framework is essential due to the 
complexity of oil and gas construction projects. There are two main challenges for engineers and 
supervisors. First, they should participate with senior management during designing the 
implementation mechanism of the framework elements. Toole (2005) explores how increasing 
engineers‘ role in the design stage can provide extra safety opportunities and barriers. Many of 
the organizations rely totally on management to execute the implementation. However, Toole 
indicates that construction safety is a very dynamic field which requires a continuous exposure 
and reflection from the site to gain a realistic image of the laborers and work environment. This 
point of view echoes the idea of involving engineers and supervisors with managements in the 
early stage of the implementation plan.  
Transparency when overlooking the workers‘ feedback and progress with the new 
Framework is the second task for engineers and supervisors. In the first stage, understanding the 
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management view is the key challenge. There is, however, an additional step that is required. For 
example, both engineers and supervisors should have the necessary communication skills to 
explain the proposed framework to the end-users. According to many construction professionals 
(Knight and Graydon, 2007; Sageev and Romanowski, 2001; Williams, 2006) there are several 
obstacles which usually engineers face during communicating with the end-users at the site. That 
is, things that could be common knowledge for the engineers may be foreign concepts for the 
end-users e.g. wearing PPE at all times at the site even if there is no operation. Additionally, 
complex technical need to be delivered to the workers in a sample manner. Due to that, using 
simple language with abundant visuals, e.g. graphs and charts is required to reach to the end-
users.  
In the end of this section, it is critical to emphasize in the role of engineers and supervisors in 
reflecting the workers‘ adoption of the new Framework. This involves both the physical 
performance and individual behavioral performance of the worker at the site. The organizations 
often content with only the management understanding the new initiative. This narrow 
perspective can be replaced if both engineers and supervisors transfer workers‘ implementation 
to the management on a frequent basis. The key benefit of this practice is that the senior 
management will receive live feedback from the construction site. This results in providing the 
senior management a window to adapt to any elements of the implementation plan as required.  
C. End-users 
This study points to the workers‘ safety behavioral performance as the main indicator of 
success of the proposed framework. As illustrated earlier, monitoring and providing any 
resources for end-users is the responsibility of senior and mid-level employees. These external 
and internal factors play a critical role in the approach of how workers adopt the proposed 
framework. According to Manley (2008), a direct safety communication encourages the end-
users to show more initiative pertaining to the implementation progress, especially in their core 
tasks. For example, the end-user should be able to ask for safety explanation at any time, either 
officially (e.g. PTW) or unofficially, before conducting the construction activity. Furthermore, 
workers have the right to request technical training in case of using new technologies in the field. 
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The more the worker is visibly active with the safety challenges that he/she faces at the site, 
the more engaged the senior management will be. The evaluator explains that, rather than 
fostering a blame culture at the site, the visibility of both management and workers can shape a 
healthy coaching culture at the site. That is, when a worker reports a safety obstacle, the safety 
engineers save a lot of time during the investigation to determine the root cause. Once the 
management eliminates the blaming, the visibility of the end-users‘ increases. The evaluator 
believes eventually this practice improves the implementation process of the new framework.  
Finally, as part of the vitality of the end-user feed backs and visibility, this research stresses 
the importance of the Framework‘s welfare section. This is a new concept related to the risk 
assessment in construction with workers‘ welfare, boasting several advantages in adopting the 
framework. For example, when workers express their satisfaction with the welfare facilities, this 
provides an indication of their capability to learn and implement the Framework procedures. To 
maintain this healthy culture, it is important to encourage the end-users to be involved as key 
participants in the welfare section during risk assessment and report any defect that could occur 
in the construction operation. As a result, the senior management in the organization will 
emphasize the workers‘ welfare as a factor in which it can enhance safety and production rate 
simultaneously.  
7.3. Limitations of the study  
 
This study provides a new perspective towards optimizing the implementation of safety 
engineering system. Academics, scholars, and construction professionals suggest using an 
integrated mechanism to enhance the safety implementation at the site. The essential mechanism 
was delivered in this research by providing an integrated Framework as shown in Fig.65, which 
illustrates how to fill current safety implementation gaps. However, as with any research, there 
were constraints affecting research methodology. 
According to Atieno (2009), time constraint is a very common factor that influences the 
selection of a suitable approach to achieve his/her research objectives. For example, in this study, 
the majority of the construction rigs examined were onshore rigs, since over 90% of UAE oil and 
gas construction are located there (ADCO, 2012). Despite the similarity of the construction 
procedures between onshore and offshore sites, a focus study in the offshore may expose specific 
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safety threats. That is, there are different external factors such as see water level, harsh weather 
and water salinity that impact the equipment and structure of the offshore rig. As such, utilization 
of the risk assessment should take into account these attributes, their impact on the organization 
communication and end-users‘ behavioral performance. 
Furthermore, several interviews have been conducted during the questionnaire phase, 
where two of them were represented as key interviews. Since construction is a very complex 
field that has variety of views point, it would have been more comprehensive to have extra key 
interviews. The two key interviews represent the main perspectives (Senior Management and 
End-users). However, to determine all immediate and root causes of the lack of safety 
implementation, additional input is required on each perspective. For instance, construction 
managers in the same organization have different technical backgrounds e.g. installation, 
maintenance, etc. Such diverse experiences may potentially expose a more detailed sub-element 
in this framework. 
There is also a lack of previous risk evaluation studies that cover the safety performance 
implementation in the construction phase of oil and gas industry. As such, to get the fundamental 
information about the current gaps, a questionnaire with statistical analysis was the suitable 
approach. In case of availability of earlier studies that provide critical analysis or numerical 
models, this would help the research to cover this topic from a different perspective. As a result, 
under the 95% confidence internal for a population of about 4000 employees and a margin of 
error of about 5%, a representative sample size was chosen. The sample size could be stretched if 
there is more flexibility with research timeline. Apart of the constraints that are explained above, 
the validity of the research undertaken and its main outcomes have core values. It is well known 
that the scientific research is a continuous mission aimed at the understanding of real life 
challenges and requires continuous assessment as this study represents. 
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Appendix: A 
 
Designed Survey for the efficiency of safety level and reliability engineering in oil construction 
 
The main purpose is to identify the current defects in the risk assessment system of the oil industry, 
Please tick (✓) near the appropriate answer:  
 Demographic questions 
Q1- What is your construction company type? 
⃝ Owners 
⃝ Vendors 
⃝ Contractors 
Q2- What is your gender?  
⃝ Male 
⃝ Female 
 
Q3- What is your age? 
⃝ Under 20 
⃝ 20-30 
⃝ 30-40 
⃝ 40-50 
⃝ Above 50 
 
Q4- Please describes your education level: 
⃝Basic education level 
⃝Hold a Diploma degree 
⃝Hold a bachelor degree 
⃝Hold a Master degree 
⃝Hold a PhD degree 
 
 
 
 
 
197 
  
Q5- What is your job position in the company? 
⃝ End users  
 
⃝ Senior staff 
 
 Technical/Procedural/behavioral questions 
Q6- Dose your company has strong HSE management system?  
⃝ Strongly Disagree 
⃝ Disagree 
⃝ Agree 
⃝ Strongly agree 
 
Q 7– You are familiar with risk assessment bases methods. 
⃝ Strongly Disagree 
⃝ Disagree 
⃝ Agree 
⃝ Strongly agree 
Q8- LTI accidents are always reported in your company.  
⃝ Strongly Disagree 
⃝ Disagree 
⃝ Agree 
⃝ Strongly agree 
Q9- Your company provides enough training to ensure safety competencies level between its 
employees. 
⃝ Strongly Disagree 
⃝ Disagree 
⃝ Agree 
⃝ Strongly agree 
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 Q10- You are familiar with the HSE MS elements of your company.  
 
⃝ Strongly Disagree 
⃝ Disagree 
⃝ Agree 
⃝ Strongly agree 
 
Q11- There are efficient communication channels between the management and the labourers. 
⃝ Strongly Disagree 
⃝ Disagree 
⃝ Agree 
⃝ Strongly agree 
 
Q12- Top Management conducts regular safety tours to construction fields. 
⃝ Strongly Disagree 
⃝ Disagree 
⃝ Agree 
⃝ Strongly agree 
Q13- You understand your role and responsibilities towards safety in your job. 
 
⃝ Strongly Disagree 
⃝ Disagree 
⃝ Agree 
⃝ Strongly agree 
 
Q14- You understand your line supervisors’ role and responsibilities towards safety in his job. 
⃝ Strongly Disagree 
⃝ Disagree 
⃝ Agree 
⃝ Strongly agree 
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Q15- Safety policies and procedures are up to date in your company. 
 
⃝ Strongly Disagree 
⃝ Disagree 
⃝ Agree 
⃝ Strongly agree 
 
Q16- Safety policies and procedures are well understood by employees. 
 
⃝ Strongly Disagree 
⃝ Disagree 
⃝ Agree 
⃝ Strongly agree 
 
Q17- You always attended the safety meeting in your department. 
⃝ Strongly Disagree 
⃝ Disagree 
⃝ Agree 
⃝ Strongly agree 
 
Q18- Fatality accidents are always reported in your company. 
⃝ Strongly Disagree 
⃝ Disagree 
⃝ Agree 
⃝ Strongly agree 
 
Q19- The management provides safe work place for the end users employees. 
⃝ Strongly Disagree 
⃝ Disagree 
⃝ Agree 
⃝ Strongly agree 
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Q20- End users employees face heavy workload pressure in their job. 
⃝ Strongly Disagree 
⃝ Disagree 
⃝ Agree 
⃝ Strongly agree 
 
Q21 Risk assessment is fully implemented in construction fields. 
⃝ Strongly Disagree 
⃝ Disagree 
⃝ Agree 
⃝ Strongly agree 
 
 
Q22- There is a poor decision-making due to inadequate risk assessment. 
⃝ Strongly Disagree 
⃝ Disagree 
⃝ Agree 
⃝ Strongly agree 
 
 
Q23- Safety implementation is a direct output of the company’s strategic plan. 
 
⃝ Strongly Disagree 
⃝ Disagree 
⃝ Agree 
⃝ Strongly agree 
Q24- Your company provides an efficient and effective safety monitoring system towards safety issues 
at the construction fields. 
⃝ Strongly Disagree 
⃝ Disagree 
⃝ Agree 
⃝ Strongly agree 
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Q25- Safety issues are priority for the management agendas. 
⃝ Strongly Disagree 
⃝ Disagree 
⃝ Agree 
⃝ Strongly agree 
  
 
 
 
Q26- There is strict enforcement of safe working procedures and policies. 
⃝ Strongly Disagree 
⃝ Disagree 
⃝ Agree 
⃝ Strongly agree 
 
Q 27- Construction workers are well motivated to work safely. 
⃝ Strongly Disagree 
⃝ Disagree 
⃝ Agree 
⃝ Strongly agree 
 
Q 28- Audit and inspection are conducted effectively. 
⃝ Strongly Disagree 
⃝ Disagree 
⃝ Agree 
⃝ Strongly agree 
 
Q29- Equipment that is used in construction fields are safety inspected. 
 
⃝ Strongly Disagree 
⃝ Disagree 
⃝ Agree 
⃝ Strongly agree 
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Q30- Your company uses sufficient resources to ensure safety during construction. 
 
⃝ Strongly Disagree 
⃝ Disagree 
⃝ Agree 
⃝ Strongly agree 
 
 
Q 31- Your company takes disciplinary actions against people violating policies and safety procedures. 
 
⃝ Strongly Disagree 
⃝ Disagree 
⃝ Agree 
⃝ Strongly agree 
Q 32- Field Safety supervision is conducted regularly. 
⃝ Strongly Disagree 
⃝ Disagree 
⃝ Agree 
⃝ Strongly agree 
 
Q 33- PTW system is always applied before the start of any job in the field. 
 
⃝ Strongly Disagree 
⃝ Disagree 
⃝ Agree 
⃝ Strongly agree 
 
 
Q 34- Your company’s safety management applies continuous improvement concept. 
 
⃝ Strongly Disagree 
⃝ Disagree 
⃝ Agree 
⃝ Strongly agree 
 
Q 35- There is a strong safety culture between the employees at the construction site. 
⃝ Strongly Disagree 
⃝ Disagree 
⃝ Agree 
⃝ Strongly agree 
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Q 36- Coaching culture is used at the construction sites. 
 
⃝ Strongly Disagree 
⃝ Disagree 
⃝ Agree 
⃝ Strongly agree 
 
Q 37- Behavioral safety activities are comprehensive and effective. 
⃝ Strongly Disagree 
⃝ Disagree 
⃝ Agree 
⃝ Strongly agree 
 
Q 38- The management measures and monitors the Behavioral Based Safety (BBS) in construction 
sites. 
⃝ Strongly Disagree 
⃝ Disagree 
⃝ Agree 
⃝ Strongly agree 
Q 39- Construction worker are involved in safety committees and planning.  
⃝ Strongly Disagree 
⃝ Disagree 
⃝ Agree 
⃝ Strongly agree 
 
Q 40- Top management actively involved and take direct responsibility of safety incidents. 
⃝ Strongly Disagree 
⃝ Disagree 
⃝ Agree 
⃝ Strongly agree 
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Q 41- : Human factors are always considered in the hazard identification stage. 
 
⃝ Strongly Disagree 
⃝ Disagree 
⃝ Agree 
⃝ Strongly agree 
 
 
Q 42- Which area of safety engineering system in your company requires improvement. 
 
⃝ Risk assessment tools 
⃝ Leadership visibility   
⃝ Regulations and policies  
⃝ Behavioral based safety 
⃝ Others 
 
 
Q 43- Which one from the following factors could be the most effective one in the safety engineering 
system implementation. 
 
⃝ Poor decision making 
⃝ Inappropriate allocation of Responsibility  
⃝ Lack of resources 
⃝ Lack of experience 
⃝ Others 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for your time in completing this survey 
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Appendix: B 
 
Interview for Safety System for Oil and Gas Construction Projects   
The main purpose is to identify the top risk factors in the oil and gas construction projects 
 
 
Q 1:  Could you explain and tell your experiences and career leader in oil and construction field? 
 
  
 
Q2: Why most of the respondents believe that risk assessment is the weakest element in the safety engineering 
system? 
 
 
 
 
Q3: As shown in the questionnaires results, many responses believe that there are many safety defects in the 
safety procedures i.e. understanding and updating them. What do you think about this issue and how we 
can eliminate and fix it in the construction projects?  
 
 
 
Q4:  In the questionnaires, most of the responses, managers and workers, admit that there is major challenge 
towards the implementation of safety culture and Behavioral Based Safety (BBS) Programme in many 
construction organizations. Why do you think this is happening? How safety culture can be improved in the 
construction site? 
 
 
Q5: Equipment failure appears as a main technical safety obstacle that faces the workers in the sites. What do 
you think about the level of integrity and safety of the used equipment in construction site?    
 
 
 
 
Q6: Do you think there is a need for an integrated model to enhance the application of risk assessment? If yes 
how it should be applied?  
 
 
Q7: Do you want to add or comment about the safety engineering system? 
 
 
Thank you for your time 
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Appendix: C 
 
Invitation Letter for Framework Evaluation  
 
 
I am Ghanim Kashwani , Civil Engineering PhD student in school of Energy, Geoscience, Infrastructure 
and Society (EGIS), Heriot Watt University. As part of my PhD study, I am conducting a research on 
‘Implementation of Safety Engineering Systems in Oil and Gas Construction Projects in the UAE ’ which 
aims to evaluate the implementation of safety engineering systems in the oil and gas industry 
construction projects through risk assessment  application in the UAE. 
 
The aim of this study is to provide an integrated framework that can optimize the implementation of the 
safety engineering system through the usage of a risk assessment. Both the questionnaire and the 
interviews exposed the presently weak areas in the risk assessment application thereby aiding the 
selection of the framework inputs in this research. There are three main sections employed as filters 
during the hazard identification stage in which each one of them has specific criteria. Such a focus will 
facilitate avoiding the kind generalizations practiced in most risk assessment sessions to cover all the 
possible scenarios that can occur with the existing hazards. 
 
Your participation in the evaluation is very vital for this study due to your industry experience in 
construction. Interview venue could be any place you feel comfortable. You can also choose a good time 
to meet. The interview data (and/or any other materials related to the interview) will be kept strictly 
confidential. Your identity will be protected at all times. Further, you will be requested to verify your 
interview transcript if you wish to do so.  
 
You can contact me on the details given below. I hope to hear from you soon. 
 
Thanking you. 
  
Best Regards 
 
Ghanim Kashwani  
PhD Candidate  
School of Energy, Geoscience, Infrastructure and Society 
T: +971509904227  
Emil:gak1@hw.ac.uk 
 
